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INTRODUCTION
Indian tribes have refused to disappear despite the genocide of
the 18th and 19th centuries, the neglect of the first half of the 20th
century, and the genocide-at-law that continued well into this cen-
tury.' Indian tribal claims against the Government also continue to
be initiated and litigated in spite of the creation of elaborate judicial
devices to settle these claims for all time. When Congress enacted
the Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA), it did so with a great
deal of thought about the need for uniformity and predictability in
the American patent system, but with no thought about the impact
of the newly created system on Indian claims against the
Government. 2
1. See Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native
American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REv. 713, 718 (1986) (noting that as United States citizens
killed Native Americans and destroyed their culture, state legislatures passed formal resolu-
tions legalizing such actions by declaring Indians to be outlaws and beyond protection of law).
2. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Slat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (establishing United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and United States Claims Court); S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong.,
754
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In fact, Indian claims against the Government occupy a marginal
position in American law. Judith Resnik has demonstrated that In-
dian law is simply not within the received tradition of the domain of
federal court jurisprudence.3 The same observation can be made
about the narrower domain of claims against the Government for
money damages. Indian claims are rarely mentioned in the schol-
arly literature on the subject matter areas and procedural issues
within the ambit of United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and the United States Claims Court.4 Similarly, the annual
2d Sess. 17 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14-15 (noting that creation of United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce "desirable uniformity" and, thus,
reduce forum shopping that is common to patent litigation); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) (focusing on patent
jurisdiction of Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit and benefits produced by court's patent
jurisdiction); Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More Than a National
Patent Court, 49 Mo. L. REv. 43, 60 (1984) (indicating that Department of Justice had hoped
for greater Federal Circuit control over tax and environmental cases in addition to patent
issues, but jurisdiction over civil tax and environmental cases fell by wayside); Ellen E. Sward
& Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A Practitioner's Perspective, 33 AM. U. L.
REV. 385, 397 (1984) (noting patent law was "the real impetus").
3. SeeJudith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
Cm. L. REV. 671, 686 (1989) ("Most of the books [treatises and materials for federal courts
courses] refer hardly at all or only in notes to Indian tribe cases.").
4. The major treatise on claims against the United States has separate sections dealing
with more frequently litigated claims, but no section dealing with Indian claims under the
Tucker Act. See JOHN M. STEADMAN ET AL., LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
§§ 8.113-8.120, at 156-65 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing employee compensation); id. §§ 9.101-
9.125, at 169-202 (covering government contracts); id. §§ 11.101-11.111, at 219-32, 13.101-
13.120, at 245-78 (handling tort claims). Indian cases are cited when relevant to the point,
usually procedural, such as jurisdiction or the statute of limitations. See URBAN A. LESTER El
AL., LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 3.107, at 52 (2d ed. Supp. 1989) (discuss-
ing attorney's fee case); id. § 6.101, at 95-98 (construing Court of Claims law to be law of old
Claims Court); id. § 6.115, at 103-05 (limiting congressional reference jurisdiction); id.
§ 7.103, at 121-23 (applying statute of limitations); id. § 7.110(c), at 141 (assessing in rem
jurisdiction); id. § 8.104, at 149-50 (discussing waiver of sovereign immunity). Only one ref-
erence is substantive. See id. § 7.106.2(c), at 127 (referring to breach of fiduciary duty cases);
infra notes 183-287 and accompanying text (discussing breach of trust in federal district
courts, Court of Claims, and Claims Court).
The Federal Bar Association has published a practitioner's handbook for practice before
the Claims Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See ARTHUR L. BURNETr,
FEDERAL BAR ASS'N HANDBOOK ON PRACTICE BEFORE THE U.S. CLAIMS COURT AND THE U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (1986). This useful handbook contains rules of
the two courts, articles on jurisdiction of the courts, and practice pointers. In addition, the
handbook features articles on practice within specified areas, including analysis of developing
case law relating to jurisdiction and other procedural issues. The handbook deals with only
one issue with regard to Indian claims, however, and that is in an article written by the Deputy
Chief of the General Litigation Section, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice. See James E. Brookshire, Emerging Indian Damages Litigation Against the United
States: Mitchell, The "Government Trust, " and Other Considerations, reprinted in BURNETr, supra, at
135-59. While thoughtful, the article takes the narrowest possible view of the court's jurisdic-
tion in this area. Indian property claims are not covered at all.
It is not surprising that most articles stress the areas most often litigated, such as intellec-
tual property, international trade, government contracts, and tax decisions. See generally Janet
Spragens, The Tax Cases of the Federal Circuit: 1986 and 1987, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 1141 (1988)
(providing overview and general discussion of Federal Circuit tax cases); Robert G. Vaughn,
Federal Employment Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 825 (1987) (giving area
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reports of the Judicial Conference for the Federal Circuit contain
few references to Indian claims.5 A two-part symposium on the old
Court of Claims included a short descriptive article by a prominent
attorney who was active in tribal claims work.6 Indian law was
marginalized even within that symposium, being confined, as always,
to its own category. For example, an article on eminent domain in
the same symposium contained no reference to Indian property
claims, which involve the largest sum of money of any takings
claims. 7
In a recent symposium on the new Claims Court, an article on the
takings clause referred to a claim of major importance in Indian law
as "an obscure Indian property law case."8 Ironically, while one of
summary of Federal Circuit employment cases). Articles by authors assessing more broadly
the role or performance of the Federal Circuit and the Claims Court have not analyzed the
impact of the new court system on Indian claims, except for isolated references to the fact that
Indian claims are included within the court's jurisdiction. See Joan Baker, Is the United States
Claims Court Constitutional?, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 55, 95 (1983) (finding Indian claims among
variety of claims adjudicated by Claims Court); Philip R. Miller, The New United States Claims
Court, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 7, 9, 12 (1983) (noting Claims Court jurisdiction over Indian
claims); Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 Am. U. L. REv. 1003,
1009 (1988) (noting that enabling legislation gave Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction over
Indian claims).
5. The Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit has been published for the past nine years' in the Federal Rules Decisions. Indian
claims have been listed in the statistics on other claims. See Claims Court Breakout Session,
Fifth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, in 119 F.R.D. 45, 226 (1987) (listing five major categories of Federal Circuit cases as tax,
contract, service pay, civilian pay, and other claims). Other than their inclusion in statistics or
in passing mention that Indian claims are included within the jurisdiction of the Federal Cir-
cuit, I have found only one reference to Indian claims in the annual conference proceedings.
See Loren A. Smith, Claims Court Breakout Session, State of the Court Address, Fourth An-
nualJudicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in 112
F.R.D. 439, 500 (1986) (praising partial summary judgment as method of narrowing issues,
"particularly in Indian cases"). Even presentations focusing specifically on the Federal Circuit
review of Claims Court decisions omitted references to Indian claims. See Claims Court
Breakout Session, The First Three Years of the Federal Circuit: A Critique, Fourth Annual
Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in 112
F.R.D. 439, 450 (1986) (focusing on international trade, employment, government contracts,
and patent cases). One exception is a short presentation byJames Brookshire, taking up ap-
proximately four pages in print, regarding breach of trust cases in the Claims Court. See
James Brookshire, Claims Court Breakout Session, Fifth Annual Judicial Conference of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in 119 F.R.D. 45, 255-59 (1987).
6. See Glen A. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Claims Before the Court of Claims, 55 GEO. LJ. 511,
528 (1966) (scanning history of Indian tribal litigation in Court of Claims by surveying cases
litigated in court before and after establishment of Indian Claims Commission).
7. See generally Herbert Pittle, Suits Against the United Statesfor Taking Property Without Just
Compensation, 55 GEO. L.J. 631, 631-46 (1966) (concentrating on problems which are brought
to Court of Claims when United States takes property without formal condemnation
proceedings).
8. See Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the United States
Claims Court: Adjusting the Burdens That in Fairness and Equity Ought To Be Borne by Society As a
Whole, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 549, 553 (1991) (referring to holding in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704 (1987)). The court in Hodel declared "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property-[is] the right to exclude others." Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
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the authors is the president of an organization named "Defenders of
Property Rights," the major reference to Indian tribes in the work is
a sympathetic treatment of a multimillion dollar takings claim
against the U.S. Government by the United Nuclear Corporation, a
corporation that lost valuable mining leases when the Navajo Tribe
refused to approve its uranium mining plan.9 The authors' discus-
sion of this case reveals a lack of knowledge of basic principles of
tribal sovereignty and the federal trusteeship. 10 The discussion also
ignores the painful history of the failure of the law to provide any
remedy to the Navajo people who continue to suffer the disastrous
effects of uranium mining and the resulting contamination of many
areas of the Navajo Reservation." Miners as well as Navajo people
living near the uranium tailings have died of cancer, dust poisoning,
and pulmonary fibrosis. In addition to causing ground water and
river contamination, uranium mining was responsible for a disas-
trous flood caused by a broken dam at a United Nuclear Corpora-
tion tailings pond that released ninety-five million gallons of
radioactive water. It has been called the "worst contamination in
the history of the nuclear industry. . .. ",12 Although these events
undoubtedly influenced the Navajo tribal government when it can-
celed the leases, none of these facts were reported in the opinion or
in the article lauding it. Nor has federal law permitted the injured
Navajos to recover from either the uranium mining companies or
9. See United Nuclear Corp. v. Watt, 912 F.2d 1432, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that
failure of Secretary of Interior to approve mining plan was taking of mining company's prop-
erty without just compensation and remanding case to Claims Court in order to determine
just compensation to which United Nuclear was entitled).
10. United Nuclear Corp. was premised on the Government's failure to require the tribe to
approve the mining plan. United Nuclear Corp., 912 F.2d at 1434-35. Although the Secretary of
the Interior has the power to approve tribal leases, that authority does not include the power
to force the tribe to enter leases. Id. at 1438; see AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMIS-
SION, FINAL REPORT 338-47 (1977) (noting difficulty of renegotiating long-term mineral leases
approved by Secretary); Reid P. Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial
Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Land, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (1974) (discussing leasing
of Indian lands as well as duties of Secretary of Interior as trustee of Indian lands).
11. See PETER MATrHIESSEN, INDIAN COUN-TRY 293, 296-97, 301-02 (1979) (discussing
uranium contamination in Four Corners area of Navajo Reservation); ANITA PARLOW, CRY
BELOVED GROUND: BIG MOUNTAIN, USA 23, 29 (1988) (discussing excavation of Indian natu-
ral resources including uranium, oil, and gas).
12. MATrHIESSEN, supra note 11, at 302 (reporting that Nuclear Regulatory Commission
made statement quoted in text). Matthiessen contrasts this actual disaster with the much
more widely reported Three-Mile Island near-disaster, intimating that identity of victims as
Indians contributed to the lack of publicity about the flood. Cf. GERALD M. STERN, THE BUF-
FALO CREEK DISASTER (1976) (recounting successful litigation strategy of pro bono attorney
on behalf of West Virginia communities destroyed by flood caused when dam containing coal
waste and water burst, spilling 130 million gallons of water).
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the United States for any of these injuries.13 Kerr-McGee, the ura-
nium mining company, continues to deny liability except for work-
ers compensation claims, and the Navajo peoples' attempts to hold
the U.S. Government accountable in court have been unsuccessful.
The Federal Circuit reviews Indian claims because Congress com-
bined the former Court of Claims, which had jurisdiction over In-
dian claims, 14 with the Court of Patent and Customs Appeals to
create the new Claims Court. The jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims also included some patent cases as well as tax, contract, pay
suits, takings cases, and congressional reference cases. 15 Congress
added the Court of Claims to this mix in part to counter the argu-
ment that the two new courts, the Claims Court and the Federal
Circuit, would become overly specialized. 16 Congress also gave the
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction over other subjects, the most
frequently litigated of which are international trade, Merit Systems
Protection Board, and government contracts cases.' 7
The debate over the utility and wisdom of the creation of special-
ized courts to deal with developing areas, such as science and tech-
nology, is a rich one.' 8 While specialized courts undoubtedly
promote efficiency, commentators have expressed concern that such
courts may attract less than first-rate judges who then can develop
tunnel vision, write pedestrian, conclusory opinions, and be subject
to capture by the bar. 19 Some have argued that the United States
13. For a series of lawsuits designed to gain compensation for the miners and others
injured by uranium exposure that were spectacularly unsuccessful, see infra notes 549-56 and
accompanying text.
14. 25 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988) (providing that Indian tribal claims arising after 1946 may
be brought in Court of Claims).
15. Loren A. Smith, Claims Court Breakout Session, Seventh Annual Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in 128 F.R.D. 409, 457
(1989).
16. See Adams, supra note 2, at 82 (explaining that specialization might result in increased
influence of special interest groups, lower quality of judges, and judges not maintaining
generalist perspective); see also Sward & Page, supra note 2, at 396 (emphasizing that over-
specialization was chief concern of Congress).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988) (detailing jurisdiction of United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit).
18. See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 6-7 (summarizing debate and evaluating treatment of
patent cases under new court system). For an argument based on the importance of uniform-
ity of the law throughout the nation, see Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture:
Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 603, 607 (1989)
(suggesting that uniformity may be accomplished by modifying regional organization of fed-
eral intermediate appellate tier by increasing categories of appeals routed to nonregional ap-
pellate fora).
19. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 147-60 (1985). Judges in specialized courts
are exposed to a few narrow subjects in great depth. Such a narrow focus can prevent judges
from being open to new ideas or seeing the greater implications of their decisions. Id.; see
Rader, supra note 4, at 1003-06 (noting criticisms of specialization of Federal Circuit's juris-
diction arising in legislative history of Federal Courts Improvement Act); Sward & Page, supra
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should not be termed a
specialized court, although it does deal to a great extent with spe-
cialized subject matters. 20 Even accepting this distinction, however,
one would be hard-pressed to call the Federal Circuit a generalist
court.
2 1
Indian claims comprise only a tiny portion of the jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit in terms of numbers of cases. 22 Nevertheless,
money judgments in Indian claims often involve millions of dollars.
That a small number of cases involving tricky points of law expose
the Government to enormous liability should be enough to make
anyone pause to consider how well Indian claims are treated by this
system. Yet, the fact that Indian claims formed no part of the con-
siderations that impelled the creation of the new courts does not
necessarily mean that the new courts serve them ill. In fact, very
little has changed about the way Indian cases are litigated in these
courts. 23 The thesis of this Article is not that the new system is
worse than the old system, but that the system as a whole suffers
from structural problems creating a perception among some Indian
people and advocates for Indian tribal rights that the Indian claims
court system is rigged. That is, it is rigged to favor the Government
and to reward financially the small group of attorneys who specialize
in these matters without enriching, in any real way, the day-to-day
existence of tribal people. 24 Conversely, others paint a somewhat
note 2, at 395-96 (discussing Congress' hesitancy and concerns about granting additional spe-
cialized jurisdiction to Federal Circuit).
20. See Meador, supra note 18, at 613 (positing that Federal Circuit is not specialized
court in any meaningful sense because 28 U.S.C. § 1295 brings that court wide array of case
types and legal issues).
21. See Sward & Page, supra note 2, at 397 ("[T]he Federal Circuit is 'generalist' only if
one means by 'generalist' that it specializes in several areas.").
22. See Claims Court Breakout Session, supra note 5, at 226 (noting that Indian claims
compose only 3.5% of all cases heard by Federal Circuit). Similarly, Indian claims represent
only a minor portion of the jurisdiction of the Claims Court in terms of number of cases. See
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
Table G-3a, at 245 (1990) (indicating Indian claims represent 47 out of 1933, or 2.4% of
pending complaints in 1990).
23. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-40 (1980) (adopting Government
position to limit jurisdiction of Tucker Act, such that Indian tribe seeking to initiate breach of
trust action must base claim on statute expressly creating trust for activity at issue and impos-
ing specific statutory remedy in money damages); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,
448 U.S. 371, 407-16 (1988) (assuming restrictive test devised by Indian Claims Commission
that limited liability of government).
24. VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 226 (1974) [hereinafter
DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL]. Vine Deloria, Jr., has been a leading exponent of this point of
view. Deloria contends, for example, that the "high moral purpose of settling the Indian
claims boiled down in the end to a lucrative bonanza for a select group of attorneys possess-
ing the special skills to practice Indian law and the career employees of the United States who
saw the complicated Indian cases as a lifetime career in a specialized field." See VINE DELORIA,
JR. & CLIFFORD LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 142-43 (1983) (criticizing role
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more positive and pragmatic picture of the Indian claims court sys-
tem as proof that the United States continues to try its best to foster
and support Indian tribes. 25 As always, the truth lies somewhere in
between. While rejecting the rosy view and recognizing that there
are solid grounds for distrust of the system, I argue that a greater
understanding of the structural deficits will result in better process
decisions by tribal advocates and Indian tribes. I define structural
issues as those that the tribal advocate cannot change, such as the
fact the claims courts can only award damages. Process issues are
those that the advocate and the tribe can affect, including the selec-
tion of legal theories, the selection of the appropriate forum, and
decisions regarding the appropriate roles of litigation, negotiations,
and congressional intervention to resolve disputes between tribes
and the Federal Government.
Stories serve many different functions in legal scholarship. Rich-
ard Delgado stresses the use of stories to critique the ideology of the
dominant group with its powerful message that current social ar-
rangements are fair and neutral.26 In particular, Delgado focuses on
the use of constructed stories to illuminate the complexity of racial
issues.27 Unlike Delgado, I am not a member of the group about
whom I write; thus, I do not attempt to offer my own story28 or con-
struct stories29 about the Native American experience. The Indian
claims cases themselves, however, are rich sources of true stories.
The claims stories, when broken from the dry legal recitation of the
facts in the cases and placed in context, reveal powerfully the inade-
quacies of the dominant group's stories. The Euromyths of the
of claims attorneys); Robert T. Coulter, The Denial of Legal Remedies to Indian Nations Under U.S.
Law, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 103, 107 (1982) ("The United States has never established,
nor even sought to establish, an honorable and fair means for permanently resolving Indian
claims."); PETRA T. SHATrUCK &JILL NORGREN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 155 (1991) (noting that under U.S. law, "land rights must
yield to power and... legal forms will not change that outcome").
25. See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE Sioux NATION V. TIlE
UNITED STATES 1775 TO THE PRESENr 413 (1991) ("American legal culture, almost uniquely, at
least recognized some legal limits on its conduct toward aboriginal people."); Wilkinson, supra
note 6, at 528 ("Progress has been made but considerable work remains.").
26. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MiCH. L. REV. 2411, 2411-12 (1989) (giving examples of scholarship using narrative, includ-
ing true stories and urging scholars to employ narrative techniques in writing about
outgroups).
27. Id. at 2413.
28. Patricia Williams is the most powerful exemplar of this technique, and the most cou-
rageous. See generally PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A
LAw PROFESSOR (1991) (relating personal experiences as black woman who descended from
slaves to teach about and analyze law).
29. See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (illustrating stories told
by fictional character describing complexities, contradictions, absurdities, and racism re-
flected in law relating to race relations in general and African-Americans in particular).
dominant group,30 in contrast, justify and rationalize the disposses-
sion of Native Americans from their lands and blame them for con-
tinuing to refuse the full benefits of membership in the dominant
culture. 31
What follows, then, are the stories of three claims cases to illumi-
nate the context of Indian claims. Two involve property claims that
have been finally adjudicated but are not really over by any sense of
the word. The third is a claim for breach of trust, presently before
the Claims Court, although hanging by a thread after several suc-
cessful motions to dismiss. These stories illustrate better than any
dry legal exegesis that Indian tribes' grievances against the Govern-
ment, whether based on ancient happenings or present-day affairs,
are very real. The stories also illustrate some of the pitfalls of the
claims system that will be explored analytically in the sections that
follow.
I. TRUE STORIES
A. Confiscation of Land by Judicial Decree: Mary and Carrie Dann
Mary and Carrie Dann are sisters and members of the Dann Band
of Western Shoshones. They raise cattle on 5120 acres in Nevada
within the aboriginal territory of the Shoshone people. Although
much aboriginal Western Shoshone land is now occupied by non-
Indians, the Dann Band has grazed its animals on this acreage since
time immemorial. There has been neither a formal act by the Fed-
eral Government confiscating their land, nor any event that could be
labeled a regulatory taking. The Western Shoshone have never
fought a war against the United States, nor have they ceded the land
claimed by the Dann sisters by treaty.32
In 1974, the United States ordered the Dann sisters to stop graz-
ing on federal land. When they refused, the Federal Government
brought suit against them for trespass. 33 The Government based its
title to the land on an Indian Claims Commission decision, Western
Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States,34 in which the Commission
30. Robert A. Williams,Jr. has described Federal Indian Law as "a brute reflection of the
interests of a conquering nation groping for its own unique colonizing syntax and grammar."
Robert A. Williams, Jr.,Jefferson, The Norman Yoke, and American Indian Lands, 29 ARIZ. L. REv.
165, 167 (1987).
31. For examples of contemporary documents and statements reflecting these views, see
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and
Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 237, 258-78 (1989),
which analyzes case law, commission reports, and congressional bills.
32. United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 43 (1985).
33. Id.
34. 40 Indian Cl. Comm'n 318 (1977).
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entered judgment in the amount of $26 million for the taking by the
United States of the aboriginal title of the Western Shoshone Indi-
ans located in California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, and Wyo-
ming.3 5 Although no single act of taking occurred, the Commission
found that the United States had treated the land as public land.3 6
Later in Temoak Band of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States,37 the
tribal attorney stipulated that all of the groups' Nevada land was
taken by the Government onJuly 1, 1872,38 in order to simplify the
case so that the court could assess the damages owed. Those in-
volved in the claims case, including the tribe's attorney,3 9 apparently
believed that the claim had no effect on present possessory rights,
but only involved land actually held by others at the stipulation
date.40
The Danns were not members of the Temoak Band of Western
Shoshones or the entity known as the Western Shoshone Identifi-
able Group, a group created to be a representative plaintiff in the
claims case. In fact the Danns had supported unsuccessful efforts to
intervene in the claims case for purposes of excluding present pos-
sessory rights.4 1 One of the original claimants, the Temoak Band,
attempted to stay the proceeding in 1977 and even discharged its
attorney in order to stop the claim from proceeding.42 Neverthe-
less, the Government argued that the Dann sisters were barred by
the Indian Claims Commission case.43
35. Western Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 40 Indian Cl. Comm'n 318,
318 (1977) (noting exact figure as $26,154,000).
36. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 11 Indian Cl. Comm'n, 387, 416 (1962) (stating
that gradual encroachment by whites, settlers, and others resulted in taking of Indian lands by
United States for its own use).
37. 29 Indian Cl. Comm'n 5 (1972).
38. Temoak Band of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 29 Indian Cl. Comm'n 5, 6
(1972).
39. The attorney is reported to have stated to the Temoak Band council that "[t]his law-
suit is for compensation. It doesn't change your title one bit." Oral Argument at 21, 25-27,
Temoak Band of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 29 Indian Cl. Comm'n 5 (1972) (No.
326-K), quoted in Caroline L. Orlando, Aboriginal Title Claims in the Indian Claims Commission:
United States v. Dann and Its Due Process Implications, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 241, 266
n.224 (1986).
40. See United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that most West-
ern Shoshone people still live within boundaries of land described in Treaty of Ruby Valley);
Western Shoshone Legal Defense & Educ. Ass'n v. United States, 531 F.2d 495,496 (Ct. Cl.)
(noting that estimates of acreage claimed vary widely, ranging from 3 to 12 million acres), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976).
41. See 14'estern Shoshone, 531 F.2d at 497 (noting that Western Shoshone Legal Defense
Association and Frank Tomohe, as part of Western Shoshone Identifiable Group, were parties
involved in intervening action).
42. Temoak Band of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 593 F.2d 994, 997 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
43. See Dann, 572 F.2d at 225 (noting Government claimed that Indian Claims Commis-
sion decision estopped Danns from asserting that Indians retained beneficial ownership of
Western Shoshone's Nevada lands).
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vindicated the sisters' claim
by applying ordinary principles of collateral estoppel. 44 The Gov-
ernment appealed, however, and the sisters lost in a dry-as-dust
Supreme Court decision, which focused solely on a statutory issue.45
Although the Danns eventually won the right to retain the land on
which their homestead was constructed, they lost the grazing land.4 6
B. Land, Not Money: The Sioux Nation and the Black Hills
The dispossession of the Sioux Tribe's sacred Black Hills is an
often-told story, involving the discovery of gold in the hills by Gen-
eral George Armstrong Custer and leading to the beginning of the
end: the Indian wars of the Great Plains, including the Battle of
Little Big Horn and the massacre at Wounded Knee. 47 When the
Lakota people made their last voluntary concession of land in the
Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868, they insisted on retaining a large,
unbroken tract, including the Black Hills, as the Great Sioux Reser-
vation.48 Each constituent tribe of the Sioux Nation signed the
treaty separately.49 In return, the Government promised that the
land would belong to the Sioux Nation forever, that a supermajority
would be required for any future concessions, and that the Govern-
ment would remove any non-Indian intruders from the reserva-
tion.50 After breaking these and many other treaty promises, the
Government confiscated5 1 the Black Hills in an 1877 statute, taking
44. Id. at 226. The court held that resjudicata did not attach because the decision would
not be final until Congress actually paid the compensation owed to the tribe. The Danns were
not precluded from litigating the title issue because it had not been litigated or decided in the
Indian Claims Commission decision. Ide
45. See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 45-50 (1985) (interpreting Indian Claims
Commission Act, section 22(a) concerning payment of claims by U.S. Government and hold-
ing that payment by U.S. Government to the Western Shoshone of $26 million under section
22(a) does not bar Danns from raising individual aboriginal title as defense in their action).
46. See United States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189, 1200 (9th Cir.) (holding that individual
land title of Mary and Carrie Dann was restricted to land that they or their lineal descendents
actually occupied prior to 1934, and restricted number and type of animals that could graze),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 (1989).
47. See generally DEE BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970) (providing In-
dian history of American West including battle at Wounded Knee); EVAN CONNELL, SON OF
THE MORNING STAR (1984) (providing biography of General Custer and detailing Bighorn
campaign).
48. See generally Treaty of Ft. Laramie, Apr. 28, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, 635 (stating that sign-
ing of Treaty occurred at Fort Laramie in territory of Dakota); see id. art. 2, 15 Stat. 635, 635
(defining parameters of Great Sioux Reservation).
49. Id. at intro., 15 Stat. 635, 635. See generally LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 45-53 (describ-
ing Sioux Tribes and process leading to Treaty with Sioux Indians).
50. See Treaty of Ft. Laramie, supra note 48, arts. 3, 12, 15 Stat. 635, 639 (providing
absolute and undisturbed use of nation and requiring 75% of adult males to approve further
land concessions).
51. I realize this is a term of art, but the legal story of the Sioux is told later in this
Article. A treaty was signed, but it was illegal because only 10% of the adult males signed it,
instead of the requisite 75%. Treaty of Ft. Laramie, art. 12, 15 Stat. 635, 639. The tribe was
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most of the Great Sioux Reservation and giving the Sioux people
rations in return for the land.
The Sioux people never recognized the validity of this action.
More importantly they continuously made demands for the return
of this land, or at least the portion of the Great Sioux Reservation
containing the Black Hills. In 1920, the tribe obtained a special ju-
risdictional statute permitting suit against the Government. 52 In
1942, the Court of Claims dismissed the claim in an opinion remark-
able for its lack of clarity on the basis of the dismissal.53 In 1950,
the Sioux again filed a claim for their land invoking the more liberal
bases in the Indian Claims Commission Act. The Commission held
there had not been a taking, in part because their attorney working
with very limited resources had not made proper offers of proof that
the Sioux land had, in fact, been confiscated. 54 New attorneys for
the Sioux convinced the Court of Claims to reopen the case, on the
grounds that the tribe's former attorney had developed a serious
drinking problem and was incompetent. 55 Finally in 1975, the court
again dismissed the Sioux Nation's case for failure to state a claim. 56
After an intense lobbying effort by the new tribal attorneys in 1978,
Congress revived the claim. 57
By the time of the claim's revival, many members of the Sioux
Tribe decided that the claim was misguided. In 1977, the Oglala
Sioux Tribe, one of the signatories of the Treaty of Fort Laramie,
refused to renew its attorney's contract and passed a tribal resolu-
tion advising Congress of their desire to seek return of the Black
Hills.58 Because taking money for the land created the impression
that the tribe had no right to the land, the Oglala Sioux Tribe de-
cided it did not want the money.59
given rations in return for the concession. It was not until 1981 that the Supreme Court gave
the correct label to these actions.
52. Act ofJune 3, 1920, Pub. L. No. 237, ch. 222, 41 Stat. 738.
53. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613, 689 (1942) (stating that
according to principles governing rights and privileges of Indians and power of Government
in its dealings with Indian tribes, Sioux Tribe is not entitled to recover from United States for
takings or misappropriations of any kind), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 789 (1943).
54. See LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 191 (discussing petition); id. at 194-98 (discussing liti-
gation before Indian Claims Commission).
55. See LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 217-35 (discussing appointment of new counsel to
Sioux Tribe case).
56. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 518 F.2d 1298, 1308 (Ct. Cl.) (holding
claim barred by res judicata), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016 (1975).
57. LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 345-66 (explaining process that revived Sioux claim).
58. Russell L. Barsh, Indian Land Claims Policy in the United States, 58 N.D. L. REv. 7, 21
(1982).
59. See id. at 20 (discussing effect of payment and noting that payment could extinguish
all land rights).
Although this decision may have been ill-considered in light of
the chances of getting any land back, courts usually do not interfere
when litigants dismiss their attorneys. The Court of Claims would
not let the attorneys withdraw from the case, however, and judg-
ment was eventually entered in favor of the tribe.60 The Supreme
Court affirmed in a case briefed and argued by the attorneys who
had been dismissed by the Oglala Sioux Tribe.61 Although the
Court affirmed an award of $122 million to the Sioux Nation, each
of the tribes refused to accept it. The account has now grown to
over $300 million.62
C. Prove Your Case, and You Can Get Jurisdiction: The Cherokee Nation
and the Arkansas River
The Cherokee Nation is one of the "Five Civilized Tribes." Civi-
lized, in this sense, refers to the fact that the Cherokee tried to ac-
commodate their new neighbors by selling land and changing their
lifestyle from nomadic to agrarian traditions. The Cherokee devel-
oped a written language, published newspapers, and developed a
legislative system that "was superior to the wisdom of Lycurgus or
Solon."'63 When the State of Georgia tried to destroy the Cherokee
Nation with the implicit and explicit approval of President Andrew
Jackson, the tribe appealed to the Supreme Court and won techni-
cal, if not real, victories in 1831 and 1832.64 The Supreme Court
victories only added urgency to the task of removing the Cherokee
people from Georgia.65
60. Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1172 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (af-
firming that Act of Feb. 28, 1877 constituted taking of Sioux land in Black Hills and rights of
way acquired thereunder, but reversing holding of Indian Claims Commission declaring that
removal of gold from Great Sioux Reservation constituted taking).
61. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 423-24 (1981) (holding that
Treaty of Ft. Laramie provided for exclusive occupation and that 1877 Act constituted taking
which requires award of interest).
62. Black Hills Account More Than $300 Million, LAKOTA TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at 1 (report-
ing that Sioux trust account balance was $315,398,364.87 as of December 31, 1991).
63. RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS-CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT
65 (1975) (quoting 1827 editorial from NEw YORK OBSERVER, reprinted in CHEROKEE PHOENIX,
Jan. 14, 1829).
64. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 80 (1831) (placing responsibility
for resolution of dispute between State of Georgia and Cherokee in control of Georgia legisla-
ture). Although the Supreme Court held the tribe could not invoke original jurisdiction as
either a state of the union or a foreign nation, the opinion contemplated access by tribes to
the federal courts in other circumstances. Id. In a habeas corpus case brought by an impris-
oned white missionary, the Court courageously declared Georgia confiscatory laws unconsti-
tutional, but the opinion was never enforced. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 595-
96 (1832).
65. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 500, 511 (1969) (noting that Cherokee Nation and Worcester cases created urgency on
part of states to remove Indians because myth of voluntary cessation dissipated).
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In 1835, the Government secured the Treaty of New Echota,
signed by only one faction of the Cherokee Tribe.66 The Govern-
ment promised that if the tribe would relocate from Georgia to four-
teen million acres in the newly created Indian Country in present-
day Oklahoma, the Government would deed the new land to the
tribe in fee simple absolute.67 As in the treaty with the Sioux Na-
tion, the Government also promised to protect the Cherokee from
intrusion by citizens of the United States into their new land.68 The
Cherokee people paid for this treaty not only with their Georgia
land, but also with their blood.69 When most of the tribe refused to
leave, the Army forcibly marched them from Georgia at the begin-
ning of the winter in 1838. A doctor accompanying the marchers
estimated that one-fifth of the Cherokee died.70 This "Trail of
Tears" remains a defining moment for Cherokee people. 71
The Cherokee people rebuilt their community and again accom-
modated the ways of their dispossessors. Pressure to open up the
Indian territory mounted over the years and culminated in the allot-
ment of most of the Cherokee Reservation. 72 By 1906, tribal land-
holdings had been reduced from fourteen million to less than fifty
thousand acres. 73 Still, Congress declared these remaining tribal
holdings to be held in trust for the Cherokee Nation's use and bene-
fit.7 4 The property included valuable land comprising the riverbeds
66. Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, preamble, 1, 7 Stat. 478, 478.
67. Id. art. 2, 7 Stat. at 479.
68. Id. art. 6, 7 Stat. at 481. This promise and other parts of the Treaty were reaffirmed
in a later treaty. See Treaty ofJuly 19, 1866, art. 27, 14 Stat. 799, 806 ("It is the duty of the
United States Indian agent for the Cherokees to have ... [intruders] removed .... ").
69. For a discussion of the Cherokee removal from Georgia, see generally JOHN EIILE,
TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE & FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 361 (1988); GRANT FOREMAN,
THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 281-82 (1934).
70. FOREMAN, supra note 69, at 281-82.
71. See FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 85-87 (abridged ed. 1986) (noting that
"Trail of Tears" episode furnished most controversial episode in removal policy and its tragic
results created continuous reminder of treatment Indians received at hands of U.S.
Government).
72. See Act ofJuly 1, 1902, Pub. L. No. 241, ch. 1375, 32 Stat. 716, 717-19 (providing for
allotment of lands of Cherokee Nation for disposition of town sites and other purposes). Two
books, ROBERT BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 166-75 (1978) and S. LYMAN TYLER,
A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 95-124 (1973), provide a description of the allotment policy and
its devastating effects on Indian landholdings.
73. The figure is the present estimate of the lands possessed by the Cherokee Tribe and
represents tribal interests in the Arkansas riverbed. Plaintiff's Verified Second Amended
Complaint at 8, Cherokee Nation v. United States (Cl. Ct.) (No. 218-89L) (1991). In 1940,
Angie Debo, the leading historian of the Five Civilized Tribes, reported that the Cherokee
owned 365.87 acres of tribal property. See ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE
BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 387 (1940).
74. Act of Apr. 26, 1906, Pub. L. No. 130, ch. 1877, 34 Stat. 148, 148-49. The Act of
June 16, 1906 conditioned Oklahoma's entering the Union on the insertion of a proviso in the
Oklahoma Constitution promising not to impair Indian property rights. Act ofJune 16, 1906,
Pub. L. No. 234. ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267, 267.
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of four rivers, including the Arkansas river, and land adjacent to
those rivers. 75
When Oklahoma entered the Union in 1907, the Secretary of the
Interior issued an opinion advising the Governor of Oklahoma and
the Cherokee Nation that the State acquired title to the beds of the
rivers flowing through the remaining Cherokee property. Although
the Cherokee Nation insisted that title remained with the tribe, the
tribe did not take action until two significant events occurred. First,
from 1940 to 1970, the U.S. Corps of Engineers constructed the
massive Kerr-McLellan Irrigation Project on the Arkansas River,
which straightened the river and also narrowed the channel. As a
result, some 22,000 acres of riverbed land stretching along 96 miles
of the Arkansas River became dry and usable. Second, oil and gas
were discovered in the late 1940s and 1950s, and numerous oil and
gas wells were constructed. In 1970, the Supreme court held the
Cherokee Nation did indeed hold title to the riverbed land.76
During the intervening sixty-two years, the land has been treated
as nontribal land. The land covers rich oil and gas deposits valued
at $40 million in the 1970s before additional large deposits were
identified. Today the land is used for grazing and oil and gas pro-
duction, and could be used for economic development and sand and
gravel production. Very little of this income goes to the Cherokee
Nation, however, because most of the land is illegally occupied by
non-Indian trespassers. 77 In order to determine who is a trespasser,
the tribe needs to know which land is tribal land and identify the
persons occupying it. Such a task is practically impossible for the
tribe. The trespassers purport to be owners, and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers has contributed to the confusion by paying tres-
passers for flood easements and in other ways recognizing them as
legitimate owners of the land.
75. SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, FINAL
REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. No. 60, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 130
(1989) [hereinafter SPECIAL COMM. REPORT No. 60].
76. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 635 (1970) (explaining that tribe,
not State, has legal title to Arkansas riverbed). The tribe was unsuccessful in seeking damages
for the confiscation of the portions of their riverbed land by the Government in constructing
the navigation projects. United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1987). The
Supreme Court held that the projects were merely exercises of the Government's navigational
servitude, a sovereign right of the United States to which all property owners are subject, and
therefore the land had not been taken at all. Id. at 706.
77. SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, FINAL
REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. No. 216, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 129-32
(1989) [hereinafter SPECIAL COMM. REPORT No. 216]. The tribe is losing at least $1 million
per year income on the 15,000 acres of fertile soil and revenues from sand and gravel deposits
worth $32 million.
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The tribe alleges it cannot sue the trespassers to establish title to
the land and recover damages without a survey, and the only survey
that is acceptable in land claims involving Indian land is one pre-
pared by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the
Interior. Despite appropriations, the Bureau has made little pro-
gress on the survey.78 In addition, the Government exercises con-
siderable control over management of many tribal mineral
resources, including gas and oil. Although the Government has en-
tered into some natural gas and mineral leases on tribal lands on
behalf of the tribe, the Government has done nothing else to man-
age the tribal resources on behalf of the tribe.79 In 1990, the Chero-
kee Tribe sued the Government in the Claims Court for breach of
fiduciary duty by mismanagement and nonfeasance.80 The Claims
Court dismissed most of the claim on jurisdictional grounds, except
for the claim for damages based on the Government's failure to re-
move trespassers from oil and gas land. The court, however, has
stated it also will dismiss this claim unless the tribe can name the
trespassers and establish which ones moved onto the land within the
six-year period before filing the suit."' Without the surveys, it is
impossible for the tribe to name the trespassers.
The result in each of the three cases was influenced by the struc-
ture of the claims process. As this Article will demonstrate, some of
these structural provisions are no longer present. Although today
tribes can sue the Government, it is no longer possible for a fictional
tribe to be created as it was under the Indian Claims Commission
Act. On the other hand, some of the structural limitations remain,
such as the limitation to a remedy of money damages. Finally, stra-
tegic decisions regarding whether and how to use the present claims
process still exist.
Part II of this Article provides the necessary background to begin
to parse the arcane world of Indian claims. This section focuses ini-
tially on claims before 1946, claims after 1946 in the Indian Claims
Commission, and claims after 1951 based on the Tucker Act and
special jurisdictional acts. Finally, a description of the Federal
78. SPECIAL COMM. REPORT No. 60, supra note 75, at 129. In 1989, the Special Investiga-
tive Committee of the Senate reported that in the 19 years since the decision, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) had "obtained surveys of only 789 of the 22,000 river-bed acres." Id.
79. See SPECIAL COMM. REPORT No. 216, supra note 77, at 130-31 (noting that Govern-
ment has failed in its basic managerial responsibilities and as result, tribes have lost income
from oil, gas, sand, and gravel reserves).
80. See Cherokee Nation v. United States, No. 218-89L, 1992 WL 41510 (CI. Ct. Mar. 5,
1992) (denying in part Government's motions to strike third amended complaint and denying
motion to dismiss with prejudice).
81. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 117 (1991). See itfra notes 370-73 and
accompanying text (updating status of Cherokee claim).
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Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) will focus on how the FCIA affects
jurisdiction over these classes of claims.
Part III of the Article synthesizes Indian claims law as it is inter-
preted and applied in the Federal Circuit, focusing on two estab-
lished areas, property and breach of trust claims, and one new
development, the enforcement of treaty rights not pertaining to
property. Because the relevant procedural issues are entwined with
the substantive areas, they will be discussed simultaneously rather
than separately. Where appropriate, cases brought in federal courts
for equitable relief will also be assessed to provide useful analogies
and criticisms.
Part IV of the Article assesses the structure of the claims system
and reflects on the extent to which the structure and procedures can
influence the outcome of Indian claims. The goal of the entire Arti-
cle is to provide the context and depth necessary to permit real re-
flection on the utility of the system and to encourage those
interested in advocacy for Indian tribes to work on solutions that
involve land and real power instead of money.
II. INDIAN CLAIMS
Before the Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA), three statu-
tory methods existed for bringing an Indian claim for money dam-
ages: (1) special jurisdictional acts;8 2 (2) the Indian Claims
Commission Act;83 and (3) the Tucker Act.8 4 In each case, the
claims were usually tried in an Article I court, either the Indian
Claims Commission or the trial court of the old Court of Claims. 85
A brief description of these courts and their jurisdiction is thus
necessary.
A. Special Jurisdictional Statutes
Early Marshall Court opinions created doubts about the capacity
of Indian tribes to sue even private defendants without the United
States suing on their behalf as their guardian. 6 This notion was not
82. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text (discussing special jurisdictional statutes
and noting that these statutes are devices granting Court of Claims jurisdiction and waiving
sovereign immunity).
83. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 726, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049
(omitted from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30, 1978).
84. Tucker Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
85. The exception is cases within the concurrent Tucker Act jurisdiction of the district
courts with claims for less than $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988).
86. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886) (noting that courts speak of
Indians as "wards of the nation," "pupils," and as "local dependent communities"); Cherokee
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fully dispelled until 1965, when Congress explicitly stated that In-
dian tribes could bring suit in federal courts without the aid of the
Government. 7 This basis ofjurisdiction increased activism by Indi-
ans and the legal services and public interest movement of the
1960s. It also sparked a revolution in Indian law, as the number of
cases brought by Indian tribes to federal courts increased dramati-
cally, often with favorable results.88
Indian tribes were also disabled from suing the Government with-
out first obtaining a private bill from Congress permitting suit. In
this respect the law treated them the same as it treated other citi-
zens, for the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred suit against the
Government by all The primary purpose for the creation of the
Court of Claims in 1855 was to open the doors to citizens' suits.8 9
The hope of ready access to a court of law in which to air their griev-
ances was dashed in 1863, however, when Congress amended the
law to except claims "dependent on treaty stipulations entered into
with foreign nations or with the Indian tribes."90 Remarkably,
neither the bench nor the bar attempted to read this provision nar-
rowly to permit claims by tribes not based on treaties to proceed in
the Court of Claims. Instead, all assumed that the clause excepted
any claim brought by an Indian tribe against the Government.9 1
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 7 (1831) (enunciating dependent status of Cherokee
Tribe). In denying they were a state within Article III's grant of original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court, Justice Marshall characterized their status as "resembl[ing] that of a ward to
his guardian." Id. The Cherokee Nation finally got to the Supreme Court to protest the State
of Georgia's attempt to destroy them, but only because a white missionary was arrested for
violating the state law barring anyone from entering Indian land without a permit. Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 538 (1832). The Supreme Court held that federal treaties,
statutes, and policy preempted Georgia's laws. Id. at 558-59. In that case, Justice Marshall
more precisely compared Indian tribes to "tributory and feudatory states" which do not sur-
render their self-government. Id. at 561. Nevertheless, the guardian-ward language had a
powerful effect on the development of Indian law, which was mostly negative, but partly posi-
tive. One of the negative aspects was the notion that tribes thus lacked capacity to sue on
their own in federal or state courts. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its
Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 217 & n. 114 (1984) [hereinafter Newton,
Federal Power] (indicating that Indian status as wards of Government sometimes confused issue
of tribal and individual standing to sue).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988). See ROBERT CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 159-60
(1991) (assessing impact of section 1362).
88. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 24, at 151-60 (noting that success of Indian tribes
can be attributed to competent representation by Indian Legal Services attorneys and outspo-
ken interest groups, such as Native American Rights Fund).
89. See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, 612 (creating Court of Claims and
permitting appointment by President of three judges to hear complaints).
90. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (stating thatjurisdiction will not
extend to, or include, any claims against Government that are dependent on treaty stipula-
tions entered into with Indians).
91. See Richard Hughes, Can the Trustee Be Sued for Its Breach? The Sad Saga of United
States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D. L. REV. 447, 461-62 & n.108 (1981) (criticizing virtual exclusion of
Indians from Court of Claims and noting that Indian claims could only be heard in Court of
Claims pursuant to special jurisdictional statutes conferred by Congress).
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This state of affairs continued for eighty-three years during which
Indian tribes had to secure special jurisdictional statutes, granting
the Court of Claims jurisdiction and waiving sovereign immunity for
specific claims. 92 The tribes had varying degrees of success on the
merits because the special acts were construed so narrowly. 93
B. Indian Claims Commission
A cardinal purpose of the Indian Claims Commission Act was to
"grant" Indian tribes equal access to the Court of Claims.94 In addi-
tion, the Indian Claims Commission Act was designed to grant
tribes their long-deferred day in court by permitting them to sue for
historic wrongs in order to settle Indian tribes' grievances against
the Government permanently. 95 Despite these positive intentions,
the Act's major goal was to settle tribes' ancient grievances in order
to prepare them for the termination of their special status under
United States law.96
The Indian Claims Commission Act created the Indian Claims
Commission, which has jurisdiction over so-called "ancient claims,"
92. See FELIx S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 372-80 (1942) (providing
examples of special jurisdictional statutes); see also Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-
Indian Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CAm. U. L. REv. 635, 636 n.10 (1982) [hereinafter
Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship] (discussing requirement of special juris-
dictional act and commenting that Indian tribes sought to establish that Federal Govern-
ment's exclusive regulatory power creates concomitant fiduciary duties). The Article notes
that in response to the essential fairness of the Indian's claim, courts have awarded, in a lim-
ited number of cases, equitable relief and monetary damages for suits against the Federal
Government involving breach of trust. Il
93. Because these statutes waived sovereign immunity, they were construed narrowly.
See Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 336 (1945) (in-
volving special jurisdictional act of Congress permitting claims arising out of Treaty of Box
Elder). The Court held the statute insufficient to vest jurisdiction for a taking of tribal land
because the treaty did not create an interest in land. Id. at 354.
94. See 92 CONG. REC. A4923 (1946) (statement of Rep. Mundt) ("This ought to be an
example for all the world to follow in its treatment of minorities.").
95. See Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 726, ch. 959, § 2, 60 Stat.
1049, 1050 (omitted from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30, 1978)
(defining classes of complaints Commission shall hear against United States on behalf of
Indians).
96. See Russell Lawrence Barsh, Indian Land Claims Policy in the United States, 58 N.D. L.
REv. 7, 37 (1982) (stating Indian claims settlement policy). Scholars wrote a thoughtful col-
lection of essays assessing the Indian Claims Commission and faulting the process on many
grounds. See IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS (Imre Sutton
ed. 1985); see id. at 6 ("[T]he litigation process--once perceived as their only recourse-has
not fully met their expectations of an honorable resolution."). Even the Indian Claims Com-
mission's own historian, Harvey D. Rosenthal, criticized the Commission. See Harvey D. Ro-
senthal, Indian Claims and the American Conscience: A Brief History of the Indian Claims Commission, in
IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA, supra, at 63 ("It became obvious that the commission broke no new
ground and was really a government measure to enhance its own efficiency by disposing of the
old claims and terminating the Indian tribes.").
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or those arising before the jurisdictional cut-off date of 1951.97 The
statute created five broad classes of claims:
(1) claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution, laws,
treaties of the United States, and Executive orders of the Presi-
dent; (2) all other claims in law or equity, including those sound-
ing in tort, with respect to which the claimant would have been
entitled to sue in a court of the United States if the United States
was subject to suit; (3) claims which would result if the treaties,
contracts, and agreements between the claimant and the United
States were revised on the ground of fraud, duress... ; (4) claims
arising from the taking by the United States... of lands owned or
occupied by the claimant without the payment for such lands of
compensation agreed to by the claimant; and (5) claims based
upon fairand honorable dealings that are not recognized by any
existing rule of law or equity.98
The last chair of the Indian Claims Commission, John T. Vance,
criticized the Commission for adopting an adversary model, instead
of the more cooperative model permitted by the legislation. 99 Con-
gress, for example, included a basis to bring nonlegal claims as well
as a provision for the Commission to set up an Investigation Divi-
sion to "make a complete and thorough search for all evidence af-
fecting claims, utilizing all documents and records in the possession
of the Court of Claims and the several government departments,
and shall submit such evidence to the Commission."' l00 In short,
Commissioner Vance argued that the Act did not mandate an adver-
sary system. 0
Unfortunately, the Commission adopted an adversary model and
never established an Investigation Division.' 02 Although all the ini-
97. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 726, ch. 959, § 12, 60 Stat.
1049, 1052 (omitted from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30,
1978).
98. Ie § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (omitted from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Com-
mission on Sept. 30, 1978).
99. See John T. Vance, The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commission, 45 N.D.
L. REV. 325, 332-35 (1969) (attributing failings of Indian Claims Commissions to adoption of
adversarial procedures utilized under various jurisdictional acts prior to its creation).
100. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 726, ch. 959, § 12, 60 Stat.
1049, 1052 (omitted from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30,
1978).
101. See Vance, supra note 99, at 332 (noting, for example, that Congress did not require
Indian to be represented by counsel).
102. See Vance, supra note 99, at 333 (suggesting that Commission set up Investigation
Division, but only on paper). Vance was not alone in criticizing the adversarial structure of
the Commission as was reflected in its failure to set up an Investigation Division. See Sandra
Danforth, Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Claims Commission, 49 N.D. L. REV. 359, 374-80
(1973) (attacking numerous aspects of Indian Claims Court procedures including investiga-
tion); Nancy Oestreich Lurie, Epilogue, in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND
LAND CLAIMS 363, 369-71 (Imre Sutton ed. 1985) (stating that greatest error of implementa.
tion of 1946 Act was first Commissioner's failure to establish Investigation Division).
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tial commissioners were attorneys, none had experience in Indian
law, and only one had experience in claims law. Harvey Rosenthal,
the Commission's official historian, posited several reasons the
Commission reconstituted itself into a court.103 The Government
certainly feared the Commission might adopt the generous Indian
tradition known as the giveaway and simply transfer millions of dol-
lars to undeserving tribes.10 4 Additionally, the tribes' Washington
attorneys were familiar with the adversary system of the Court of
Claims and, no doubt, were opposed to any system that would cut
them out of the process. 10 5 Finally, Rosenthal notes that Indian
people themselves demanded an adversary proceeding.1 06 If this
last point is true, it makes some sense. Indian people have never
spoken with one voice and those who come to Congress to testify
are often selected by congressional committees to express the ap-
propriate viewpoint.10 7 One could imagine why Indian people
might be deeply distrustful of congressional agencies that were sup-
posed to act in their interests, but instead handed down edicts with-
out any tribal input. Perhaps they believed an adversary system
would, at a minimum, permit them to participate in the decision-
making through their attorneys. In other words, viewing their
choices as either governmental paternalism or an adversarial model,
Indian tribes might well have chosen the latter.
Once the Commission became a court, it became a claims court.
In other words, it viewed its remedial arsenal as restricted to money
damages, a view that seems consistent with the legislative intent.' 08
The Indian Claims Commission Act provided for review of Indian
Claims Commission decisions to the Court of Claims, followed by
certiorari review to the Supreme Court. 0 9
103. See Rosenthal, supra note 96, at 35-70 (providing overview of Indian Claims
Commission).
104. Rosenthal, supra note 96, at 47.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. See Barsh, supra note 96, at 11-16 (reviewing testimony before congressional commit-
tee concerning Indian land claims commission).
108. The Act referred to the "amount" of liability, and appropriation of "sums as are
necessary to pay the final determination of the Commission." Indian Claims Commission Act
of 1946, Pub. L. No. 726, ch. 959, §§ 19, 22, 60 Stat. 1049, 1054-55 (omitted from 25 U.S.C.
§ 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30, 1978).
109. Id. § 20(2)(c); see Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 518-19 (noting Court of Claims had
decided 90 appeals by 1966).
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C. The Tucker Act: The Federal District Court, the Court of Claims, and
the Claims Court
As noted above, the Indian Claims Commission Act also removed
the actual barrier regarding treaty claims and the perceived barrier
against all Indian claims by providing Tucker Act jurisdiction for all
claims arising after 1946 in the Court of Claims." t0 The Supreme
Court has stated that this vesting ofjurisdiction did not add any sub-
stantive claims to those already present in the Tucker Act, but
merely removed the impediment to suit by tribes."' Consequently,
Indian tribes can now bring claims against the Government in the
Court of Claims for money damages. In addition, tribes can bring
smaller claims, those under $10,000, to federal district court, with
appeal to the regional courts of appeal, under the Little Tucker
Act. 112 Even after the passage of the Indian Claims Commission
Act, Congress continued to enact statutes permitting tribes to bring
claims in the Court of Claims or the Indian Claims Commission to
remove impediments to adjudicating claims on the merits after the
tribe had been unsuccessful in the Indian Claims Commission."13
When Congress finally dissolved the Indian Claims Commission
in 1978, it transferred its 102 remaining cases to the Court of
Claims.' 1 4 When the Claims Court was created in 1982, the entire
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was transferred to the new Arti-
cle I court. As a result, the new court must resolve ancient claims
that had never been tried in the Indian Claims Commission." 5 It
also must hear claims on appeal from the Indian Claims Commis-
sion, modern claims arising from the Tucker Act, congressional ref-
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988) (stating that Court of Claims would have jurisdiction
over any claims against United States after Aug. 13, 1946).
111. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 -(1980) (Mitchell 1) (stating that
Tucker Act is jurisdictional statute only and does not create substantive rights enforceable
against United States fof money damages). The Court relied on language from United States
v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988). See generally Rogers v. United States, 877 F.2d 1550
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (discussing appeal of Little Tucker Act case raising breach of trust issues).
113. Congress, for example, permitted the Sioux Nation to relitigate their claim to the
Black Hills free from the defense of res judicata. More frequently, the special jurisdictional
act lifts the bar of the statute of limitations. See Zuni Indian Tribe v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct.
670, 676 (1989) (lifting statute of limitations bar with special jurisdictional act to permit claim
based on 19th-century taking of Zuni aboriginal land). The statute provides jurisdiction to
the Claims Court with respect to all claims made by the Zuni Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-280, 92 Stat. 244.
114. See UNITED STATES INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 20 (1978).
115. In 1990, 12 cases remained of the Indian Claims Commission Act cases transferred
to the Court of Claims. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TilE
UNITED STATES COURTS, Table G-3a, at 245 (1990) (reporting statistics from the Claims Court
for year ending Sept. 30, 1990).
erence claims,11 6 and claims from new jurisdictional statutes.11 7 As
a result, the judges, many of them coming from the patent bar or for
other reasons having no knowledge of Indian law, must plunge im-
mediately into the mysteries of the Indian Claims Commission Act's
law.
Although the Claims Court is nearly finished with all ancient
claims, it will never be completely finished, for Congress has re-
ferred to the claims in the Indian Claims Commission as bases for
suit in at least one modern jurisdictional statute and may continue
to do so in the future. 1 8
D. Review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Under the old system, appeals from a Court of Claims decision
was by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, an
internal process operated as a kind of appellate review. A panel of
Article IIIjudges on the Court of Claims automatically reviewed de-
cisions of the Court of Claims trial judges. 119 Under the FCIA, the
Article I Claims Court is the trial court, and appeals from the Claims
Court and from Little Tucker Act cases in federal district court must
be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. 120
To what extent, if at all, has this structure affected the substance
of the law applied in Indian claims? To answer this question, it is
necessary to review the development of Indian law in the claims
courts and assess the Federal Circuit's impact on that law in the ten
years since its inception.
116. 1 am aware of only one congressional reference case involving an Indian claim. In
that case, Congress requested the Claims Court to apply a "fair and honorable dealings"
standard, to determine whether the United States had adequately protected the tribe's aborig-
inal land in Texas. Battise v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 426, 433 (1987) (reporting to Congress
that tribe had not shown exclusive use and occupancy of aboriginal land and that there was no
basis for concluding Government had responsibility for loss of tribe's land).
117. Zuni Indian Tribe v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 670, 675 (1989) (applying special juris-
diction conferred by Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-280, 92 Stat. 244, to hold that
United States took aboriginal, but not recognized title).
118. See Wichita Indian Tribe v. United States, 696 F.2d 1378, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (re-
manding to Claims Court to consider merits of case previously dismissed as beyond scope of
jurisdictional statute).
119. See David Anthony, Decisions to AppeaL" Substantive and Procedural Considerations-Various
Perspectives, Remarks at the Claims Court Breakout Session, First Annual Judicial Conference
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in 100 F.R.D. 499, 541 (1983)
(noting confusion caused by oversimplified statement that trial function of Court of Claims
was transferred to Claims Court, and its appellate function was transferred to Federal Circuit
because Court of Claims had no true appeals); see also Adams, supra note 2, at 66 (noting
Claims Court has virtually same jurisdiction as trial division of old Court of Claims).
120. The FCIA provided that claims based on statutes must still be appealed to the re-
gional court system, but all other claims could only be appealed to the Federal Circuit. See 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (1988) (defining examples of jurisdiction of Federal Circuit).
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III. CLAIMS LAW
The following portions of this Article focus first on the basis, de-
velopment, and scope of a claim for breach of trust. The Article
next focuses on issues arising in property cases, including the
problems arising from the length of time it takes to adjudicate these
cases. Finally, to complete the discussion of law, the Article will fo-
cus on a recent Federal Circuit decision upholding an Indian per-
son's right to sue for tort damages based on a treaty.121 Although
the case sets only a limited precedent, I will discuss it to illustrate
both the importance of the ancient treaties as potential bases for
recovery and also the continued need for creative lawyering in this
field.
A. The Trust Relationship: The Convenient Distinction Between Moral
and Legal Claims
1. Breach offair and honorable dealing
One might justifiably ask why it is necessary to focus on the law
created in these ancient claims, if the Indian Claims Commission is
no longer in existence. The answer is that the formalistic rules de-
veloped in Indian Claims Commission cases, especially those rules
limiting liability and setting the boundaries of the permissible, con-
tinue to be cited and relied on today, even by the Supreme Court.1 22
The widespread belief that tribes could not sue in federal district
court before 1965 also resulted in an acceptance by tribal advocates
and tribes of the basic premise of claims law: that payments of cash
could and perhaps should be the only remedy for wrongs. As tribes
perceived that they had alternatives to money damages claims, such
as claims for equitable relief in federal courts of general jurisdiction,
strategic options dramatically increased. Focusing on these early
cases sets the stage to understand this development and demon-
strates why tribes have begun to reject the equation of lost land and
destruction of peoplehood with money.
Clause 5 of the Indian Claims Commission Act provides for
"claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recog-
121. See Tsosie v. United States, 825 F.2d 393, 394 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing claim
brought pursuant to treaty by member of Navajo Tribe for damages for alleged sexual assault
by hospital employee on Navajo Reservation).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 386 (1986) (quoting
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 690-
94 (Ct. Cl. 1968) and adopting restrictive test devised by Claims Court in review of Indian
Claims Commission decision); Battise v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 426, 432-33 (1987) (apply-
ing concepts of aboriginal title and fair and honorable dealings to congressional reference
case).
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nized by any existing rule of law or equity."' 123 Congress designed
the fair and honorable dealings clause to allow the Commission to
go beyond the confines of existing formal law. The deliberately
open-ended language held out the promise that the Commission
could apply moral principles to the entire course of dealings be-
tween the Government and Indian tribes. Only by this process
could the old wounds be healed and Congress be freed from the
necessity of continually revisiting them.
According to the House Committee Report, "it is essential that
the jurisdiction to hear claims which is vested in the Commission be
broad enough to include all possible claims. If any class of claims is
omitted, we may be sure that sooner or later that omission will lead
to appeals for new special jurisdictional acts."' 124 This clause and
the legislative history emboldened some tribes to lodge complaints
that went beyond seeking accounting for mishandling of funds and
that failed to fit into the neat structure of existing legal principles.
Because the Commission gave priority to land claims, the remain-
ing claims were left to the end. Thus, the Commission's first breach
of fair and honorable dealings case did not reach the Court of
Claims until 1970 in Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v.
United States.125 The Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indians were pros-
perous and peaceful farmers at the time of contact. Because they
sought to accommodate the Euro-Americans, they fought no war
and secured no treaty, merely assurances of good faith and a better
life once they became acculturated. By the 1950s, they were one of
the poorest tribes in the United States, with the highest mortality
rate and the lowest level of education.' 26 They filed several cases
with the Commission, seeking compensation for government ac-
tions depriving them of much of their land base and their water
rights. 127 In addition, they brought an accounting claim seeking
damages for mismanagement of their property, especially leases
made under the authority of the Secretary of the Interior. 128 Their
123. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 726, ch. 959, § 2(5), 60 Stat.
1049, 1054 (omitted from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30,
1978).
124. H.R. REP. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1355, 1355-56.
125. 427 F.2d 1194 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
126. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 427 F.2d 1194, 1195
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
127. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 180,
183 (1970) (bringing cause of action to recover alleged illegal assessment of operation and
maintenance charges collected by United States for delivery of waters of Gila River).
128. See id. (seeking recovery for breaches of contractual obligations in connection with
leasing of land to War Relocation Authority).
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clause 5 claim was truly sweeping. The tribe argued that the Gov-
ernment had reduced them to wardship with no concomitant bene-
fits.129 The Government had undertaken to provide them with
educational and medical services, but the services actually provided
were inadequate. Most seriously, the reduction to wardship, accord-
ing to the tribe, resulted in "a stagnation of self-expression... [and]
bridled petitioner into cultural impotency."' 3 0
Declining to give the fair and honorable dealings clause an expan-
sive interpretation, the Court of Claims upheld the Commission's
grant of summary judgment.' 3 ' The court reasoned that the broad
language regarding moral claims must be balanced against the fact
that the Indian Claims Commission Act abrogated sovereign immu-
nity from suit. 13 2 "While the remedial purpose and intent of [clause
5] should be effectuated, its scope should not be unduly ex-
tended."' 3 3  Because the Indian Claims Commission Act was
designed to obviate the need for further special jurisdictional acts,
the Court of Claims reasoned that Congress intended that clause 5
could only encompass the same kinds of claims brought earlier.' 3 4
Conveniently ignoring the many cases upholding the Department of
Interior's administrative power to govern Indians without the need
for statutory authority, the Court of Claims held that a claim by a
tribe seeking compensation based on actions undertaken by the
Government had to rely on a "treaty, agreement, order or statute
which expressly obligated the United States to perform [any] serv-
ices." 3 5 Because there was no such formal promise in this case, the
claim was dismissed and the tribe was relegated to the "political
process."' 3 6
In his concurrence, Judge Davis was a little more honest about the
reasons for the crabbed interpretation of the statute. Given the
"historic national policy of semi-apartheid," permitting the Gila
River Pima-Maricopa Tribe to recover would subject the Govern-
ment to far greater liability than legislators must have intended.1 7
Judge Nichols concurred in the result, noting that the Commission
structure could not accommodate "every possible dispute that
129. Gila River, 427 F.2d at 1195.
130. See id. (quoting petition of Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community).
131. Id. at 1200.
132. Id. at 1198.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1200.
137. Id. at 1201 (DavisJ., concurring).
might have arisen between the United States and the Indians in 170
years of history." 3 8
The Gila River opinion represents a classic example of claims
doublespeak. The court dismissed the tribe's broad claims as moral
claims beyond the scope of clause 5. At the same time, the court
also refused to treat the tribe like a person injured by a good samari-
tan. 3 9 Such a claim would not fall within clause 5 not because it was
too broad, but because it resembled a tort claim and clause 5 was
limited to claims other than those "fall[ing] within established legal
or equitable principles." 140 This statement at least provided some
hope that a tribe properly pleading a tort claim cognizable under
section 2(2) of the Indian Claims Commission Act 14 1 could recover
for destruction of its right to exist as a tribe, or in the words of
Judge Davis, its "peoplehood." 142
The small hope of a tort suit was dashed by the decision in Fort Sill
Apache Tribe v. United States in 1973.143 The Apache Tribe crafted a
tort suit for loss of tribal identity caused by the tribe's unlawful in-
carceration for twenty-seven years. The Apache people had resisted
the Government's attempt to make them stay on the San Carlos Res-
ervation to which they had been moved during 1876 and 1877.144
By 1886, the Government decided that something had to be done to
end the constant outbreaks of hostilities. Although most of the
Chiricahua Apaches had not joined Geronimo, the Government in-
carcerated the entire tribe as prisoners of war in Florida, Alabama,
and finally, in Fort Sill, Oklahoma. 145 After imprisoning the main
part of the tribe, the Government concentrated on rounding up the
Bands of hostile Indians. 146 With the defeat of Geronimo in 1886,
the armed.resistance of the Chiricahua Apaches came to an end. 147
138. IA (Nichols, J., concurring).
139. Ia at 1200.
140. Ia at 1200 n.3.
141. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 726, ch. 959, § 2(2), 60 Stat.
1049, 1054.
142. Gila River, 427 F.2d at 1201 (Davis,J., concurring) (commenting on Indian complaint
that Federal Government destroyed Indian peoplehood by failing to provide proper educa-
tion, medical care, and self-government).
143. See Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. United States, 477 F.2d 1360, 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (ad-
dressing Apache claim to recover compensation for wrongdoing to tribe as result of 27 years
of internment).
144. See id. (clarifying that it was ancestors of Chiricahua Apache Tribe that did not wish
to be removed to San Carlos Indian Reservation).
145. See id. (noting that court uses sanitized term "relocation" instead of imprisonment).
The imprisonment plan was designed by General Philip Sheridan. Id.
146. See id. (commenting that Indian rebel leaders were Mangus, Geronimo, and Natchez).
147. See id. (stating Geronimo surrendered in Mexico on Sept. 4, 1986, and was interned
at Fort Pickens, Florida).
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The imprisonment devastated the Chiricahua people and de-
stroyed the tribe as an entity. During the first three and one-half
years of confinement, 119 of the 498 tribespeople died. 148 One
hundred twelve of the Apache children were dispatched to boarding
school at Fort Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 149 where thirty died during the
first year of instruction. The court carefully noted, however, that
these deaths occurred "despite good sanitary conditions."'150
In 1913, after twenty-seven years of what the court assumed to be
"wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and excessive punishment of some
individual Indians," the Government finally released the
Apaches.' 5 ' The remnants of the tribe stayed on the Fort Sill Reser-
vation, although most of them moved to the Mescalero Apache Res-
ervation in New Mexico. 15 2
The tribe sued for the loss of its tribal identity, arguing that the
destruction of the tribe's political structure was both a tort compen-
sable under clause 2 and a breach of fair and honorable dealings
under clause 5.153 The Indian Claims Commission dismissed the
claims.154 Although the tort of wrongful imprisonment existed as a
legal claim, the Commission held that the Indian Claims Commis-
sion Act waived sovereign immunity only for tribal claims, and not
individual claims.' 55 As to fair and honorable dealings, the Com-
mission relied on the court's insistence in Gila River 156 on evidence
that the Government expressly undertook some finite duty to the
tribe.' 57
The Court of Claims affirmed. 158 The court held that the tribe
could not bring a tort claim based on harm to a group right or inter-
est because Congress had not intended to recognize a "distinct right
in the tribe to foster and protect its own form and structure."' 5 9
According to the Court of Claims, the case presented the same
148. Id. at 1366.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1361.
152. Id. at 1362.
153. Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. United States, 26 Indian Cl. Comm'n 281, 285 (1971).
154. Id. at 301 (dismissing Indian claim without trial on grounds of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state claim).
155. Id. at 287.
156. See Gila River, 427 F.2d at 1199 ("Affirmative acts such as those allegedly undertaken
in our case may lead to liability if they are indeed less than 'fair and honorable,' and if there is
a duty owed; they do not of themselves, create that duty.").
157. Fort Sill Apache Tribe, 26 Indian Cl. Comm'n at 288.
158. Fort Sill Apache Tribe, 477 F.2d at 1368.
159. Id. at 1365. The court distinguished a successful nuisance claim brought by a church
on the ground that the church asserted property rights. Id. at 1363 (citing Baltimore & P.
R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 329 (1883)).
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problem as Gila River: "Each [tribe] felt Government action caused
damage to the power structure and viability of the tribal unit; that is,
damage to Indian peoplehood in general. Opening the door to ap-
pellants in this case would leave it open for a multitude of other
claims based on facts more closely akin to those in Gila River."' 60
Although admitting that "the tribe did not prosper from the inju-
ries suffered by its constituent members,"'' 61 the court stated that, at
best, the claim was one for a multitude of individual claims for
wrongful imprisonment, and thus outside the jurisdiction of the In-
dian Claims Commission Act.162
In discussing the scope of clause 5, the court also relied on Gila
River, noting, apparently without irony, that the clause "is limited to
somewhat fewer situations than a literal reading would imply."' 63
To satisfy the requirements of Gila River, the tribe would have to
demonstrate that the Government undertook a duty to protect the
tribe's power structure.164 Most assuredly, the Government had not
undertaken such a duty in treaties or statutes. 65 The court re-
counted the history of the Apache wars, stressing the wars were long
and hard-fought by both sides.' 66 In this context, the imprisonment
of the "sagacious savages"'167 was an act of war. Perhaps it was "un-
warranted and reparations should be given to the Apache Indians
for their suffering after surrender."1 68 Nevertheless, while not con-
doning the Government's action, the majority concluded it had no
jurisdiction: "We take the law as we find it."' 169
Judge Davis concurred with his customary frankness, noting that
permitting a claim for destruction of tribal existence would permit
tribes to argue that the Government had no power to terminate its
tribal existence by "unilaterally but peacefully disbanding the tribe
and insisting that its members assimilate into the general popula-
tion." 170 Such an interference with congressional power was clearly
unthinkable to Judge Davis.
Judge Nichols's dissent doubted the tribe's ability to recover, both
because of the passage of time and because of the difficulty of mea-
suring damages, but argued that the tribe should be given its chance
160. Id. at 1364.
161. Id. at 1365.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1364.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1361-62.
167. Id. at 1367 (quoting Scott v. United States, 33 Ct. CI. 486, 488 (1898)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1368 (DavisJ, concurring).
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to air its grievances in the public forum of a Commission proceed-
ing.' 7 ' Given the violence of that war, he noted that "justifying the
imprisonment may well prove easier than condemning it; in any
case, we should not fear to cast the light of day on this murky chap-
ter of our nation's past, if Congress wished it. ' '172
Judge Nichols criticized the majority's rejection of the aggregated
claims of individuals drawing on analogies from international law in
which the U.S. Government settled claims brought by foreign coun-
tries on behalf of their individual citizens. 173 In a particularly elo-
quent portion of his dissent, Judge Nichols criticized the Court of
Claims and the Commission for taking an excessively narrow view of
the Commission's role:
[W]e must watch ourselves to avoid slipping into the excessive le-
galism we as lawyers, are normally prone to, wrongly limiting out
task to the intellectual games so revolting to Mr. Justice Jackson:
The Congress sought to put us on a broader plateau. It is error to
pretend we face purely legal issues. Excessive legalism, a forget-
ting that the tribunal is called on not just for legal niceties, but
statecraft too, produces ... absurdities.' 74
Tracing the history of the Indian Claims Commission Act and fo-
cusing on its expansive language, Judge Nichols stated: "It is hard
to imagine how Congress could have written a more broadly worded
jurisdictional statute."' 175 Judge Nichols concluded that those who
argued that claims should be limited to land and property rights
were mistakenly relying on language by President Truman in his
signing statement that referred to opening the doors of the Court of
Claims to modern claims brought after 1946 under the Indian
171. Id at 1368-69 (Nichols, J., dissenting). Judge Nichols took the same position in a
1981 case in which the majority refused to reopen a claim. Compare Pueblo of Santo Domingo
V. United States, 647 F.2d 1087, 1088-89 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (dismissing as untimely motion to
present new evidence that attorney's stipulation was unauthorized) with id. at 1089 (Nichols,
J., dissenting) (urging remand and chiding court for refusing to take any testimony or set case
for argument).
172. Fort Still Apache Tribe, 477 F.2d at 1370 (Nichols J., dissenting).
173. See id (analogizing to Alabama claims where privately owned ships and cargoes were
destroyed by Confederate cruisers fitted for war by England in violation of country's duty to
be neutral under international law).
174. Id. at 1375 (Nichols, J., dissenting). In 1955, Justice Jackson wrote a concurring
opinion expressing belief that Indian concepts of property were so foreign to U.S. concepts
that application of private property law to tribal property was artificial. Northwestern Bands
of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 354 (1945) (Jackson,J., concurring). But
see Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS
LJ. 1215, 1249-51 (1980) [hereinafter Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign] (criticizing Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians).
175. Fort Sill Apache Tribe, 477 F.2d at 1376 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
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Tucker Act, 176 which did not contain a fair and honorable dealings
provision.
Fort Sill and Gila River reduced the fair and honorable dealings
clause to nothing more than a statutory or treaty claim, 177 duplicat-
ing claims adjudicated under other provisions of the Indian Claims
Commission Act. Consequently, clause 5 became practically a dead
letter. Of the more than 600 claims adjudicated by the Claims Com-
mission, in only one did clause 5 provide the sole basis for relief. In
Aleut Community v. United States,178 the Court of Claims held that the
Aleut people of St. Paul Island, who were kept in virtual slavery for
seventy-six years, could recover damages, not because they were
forbidden to leave the island, forbidden to marry anyone off the is-
land, and forced to work in the seal trade at less than minimum
wages for a lessee of the U.S. Government, but because two statutes
authorizing leases of rights to trade in seal furs contained provisions
specifically protecting the natives. 179 Aleut Community established the
reach of the fair and honorable dealings clause as requiring the
plaintiff to show (1) the United States undertook an obligation to a
tribe by treaty, statute, or agreement; (2) the United States failed to
meet the obligation; and (3) this failure resulted in damages.180 Un-
fortunately, as of March 1983, this claim was still pending.' 8 '
As Nancy Oestreich Lurie stated, the judicial interpretation of the
fair and honorable dealings claims pushed the claims process in the
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988).
177. See supra notes 125-38, 143-62 and accompanying text (explaining judicial reluctance
to entertain broad moral claims under ICCA's fair and honorable dealings clause as unwilling-
ness to subject Federal Government to seemingly unlimited liability).
178. 480 F.2d 831 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
179. See Aleut Community v. United States, 480 F.2d 831, 839-41 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (listing
wide range of civil rights abuses endured by St. Paul Island Aleuts, but pointing to two federal
seal-trade statutes as source of U.S. responsibility for protection of Aleuts). The first statute
discussed is the Act ofJuly 1, 1870, ch. 189, § 1, 16 Stat. 180, which states that the "natives of
[St. Paul Island] shall have the privilege of killing such ... seals as may be necessary for their
own food and clothing.., and for the manufacture of boats for their own use ...." Id. This
provision explicitly recognizes the reliance placed by these Aleuts on seal hunting, and thus
the Act acknowledges the impact government-sanctioned hunting will have on the Islanders
by mandating that federal authorities "shall have due regard [for] the ... comfort, mainte-
nance, and education of the natives ...." Id. § 4. The second statute discussed is the Act of
April 21, 1910, ch. 183, § 3, 36 Stat. 326, which protects the Aleuts from exploitative fur
traders by providing that they "shall receive for their labor fair compensation." The court in
Aleut Community used this language to find that the U.S. Government was party to a "special
relationship" with the Aleuts and was thus obliged to provide for the well-being of the natives.
Aleut Community, 480 F.2d at 840.
180. Aleut Community, 480 F.2d at 839.
181. See Aleut Tribe v. United States, 702 F.2d 1015, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (relating that
Government filed motion to dismiss fair and honorable dealings claim in Court of Claims in
1980 and dismissing interlocutory appeal with leave to seek another appeal in future).
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direction of very simple, easily quantifiable claims.' 8 2 But what
made this fact inevitable was the very structure of the system for
judicial resolution of ancient claims. The determination that money
damages can be the only remedy for ancient wrongs inevitably
shapes the kinds of wrongs that can be remedied. Ironically then,
the worst crimes against tribes were the least remediable.
2. Breach of trust in the federal district courts
Indian cases were relatively rare in the federal courts until 1965,
when Congress opened the doors of the federal district courts to
tribal suits. 1 83 Tribes retained local legal services and private attor-
neys to represent their interests in regional courts. The diversity of
cases and numbers of attorneys taking an interest in Indian law con-
tributed considerably to the development of Indian law. In addi-
tion, tribes often discovered a more hospitable forum, and favorable
precedents from the district court in turn influenced the claims
courts. One of the great contributions of the tribal rights movement
of the 1960s was the development of a cause of action seeking equi-
table relief for breach of trust. Relying on language in one early
Supreme Court case likening the Government's responsibility to-
ward Indian tribes as "that of a ward to his guardian"' 8 4 and on
language in several Court of Claims cases decided under jurisdic-
tional statutes that instructed the Court of Claims to apply trust
principles, 8 5 advocates argued that a general trust relationship ex-
isted that imposed duties on the Government that were remediable
under the general equitable powers of the federal courts.' 8 6
182. See Lurie, supra note 102, at 372 (discussing dismissal of Fort Sill Apache case on
grounds that claim involved multiple individual grievances rather than single collective griev-
ance of tribe, band, or group).
183. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (stating that Congress explicitly specified
that federal courts could hear Indian claims without United States serving as guardian).
184. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
185. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (stating that Federal
Government has repeatedly assumed "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and
trust" with respect to Indians and therefore should be "judged by the most exacting fiduciary
standards"); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 19 (1944) (finding
it is settled doctrine that United States acts as trustee for Indian's property). A major portion
of the Indian Claims Commission's docket was comprised of claims for accounting of property
and money managed by the United States. Rosenthal, supra note 96, at 50. In these cases, the
Commission applied principles from the common law of trusts to measure the Government's
duties. See Temoak Bands of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 31 Indian Cl. Comm'n
427, 429 (1973) (stating that Federal Government is not private law trustee, but that in its
capacity as fiduciary for Indian funds, Government is held to standard no less exacting than
that applicable to private trustees), rev'd in part sub nor. United States v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 518 F.2d 1309 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
186. See generally Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975) (discussing development of trust theory via federal
common law adjudication).
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Unlike their colleagues on the Court of Claims, federal judges had
not been schooled in the complexities of Indian law. Moreover, the
Federal Rules did not accord the Government as much deference as
the old Court of Claims rules in the matter of discovery and sanc-
tions. 18 7 For example, a tiny Band of Pomo Indians inhabiting the
Manchester-Point Arena Rancheria sued for mismanagement of
funds earned from their tribal dairy business.188 Their trustee, the
Government, failed to pay interest on some funds, and paid only a
minuscule amount on another fund. Because the amount in contro-
versy was under $10,000, the Band's legal services attorneys filed
suit in federal court in Northern California under the Little Tucker
Act.18 9 When the Government defendants repeatedly refused to
supply the court with an accounting of the funds, the federal judge
imposed sanctions, finding the facts alleged by the plaintiffs to be
true.1 90 The Government then argued that it had authority under
its plenary power to hold tribal money in the Treasury without pay-
ing interest because of a statute that stated that four percent interest
could be assessed on some funds. The Government also invoked
the "no interest rule" to argue that four percent simple interest was
the most the tribe was entitled to recover. This rule provides that,
absent a constitutional claim or a statute requiring it, interest cannot
be paid by the United States. 19 1 The trial judge disagreed with this
argument and chose instead to apply the prudent investor's rule of
private trust law to the Government in its capacity as a trustee.19 2
187. See Nelljessup Newton, Note, Indian Tribal Trust Funds, 27 HASTINGS LJ. 519,540-41
(1975) [hereinafter Newton, Note, Trust Funds] (criticizing Court of Claims procedures with
regard to discovery).
188. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1240-
41 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988) (providing concurrent original jurisdiction to
United States district courts and Claims Court for civil claims against Federal Government not
exceeding $10,000).
190. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, 363 F. Supp. at 1250-52; see FED. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A) (defining procedure by which certain facts will be deemed established ifone party
in litigation fails to obey court order to present evidence). Although the Court of Claims
rules also provided for sanctions, they were rarely imposed. See W. Ney Evans, Current Proce-
dures in the Court of Claims, 55 Gao. L.J. 422, 439-40 (1966) (stating that Court of Claims rarely
penalizes Government for delaying litigation; in fact, extensions are almost uniformly granted
to Government attorneys). The same is true today. See Newton, Note, Trust Funds, supra note
187, at 540-41 (analyzing similar modern day Claims Court practices).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1988). The purpose of this rule is to prevent assessment of pre-
judgment interest on claims against the Government. See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478
U.S. 310, 315-16 (1986) (tracing rule's origins to sovereign immunity from lawsuits in absence
of consent). For an excellent analysis on the impact of this rule on Indian claims, see Howard
M. Friedman, Interest on Indian Claims: Judicial Protection of the Fisc, 5 VAL. U. L. REv. 26 (1970).
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181 cmt. c (1957) (describing trustee's duty
to beneficiary to use reasonable care and skill to invest monetary trusts so that trust fund
produces income; trustee who fails to invest funds is liable for amount of income that would
normally accrue via proper investment).
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Although statutes permitted the Government to hold trust money at
four percent simple interest, the court interpreted the entire statu-
tory scheme as one setting four percent as a floor. When safe in-
vestments earning more than four percent are available, the court
held that the Government must invest the funds at the prevailing
rates. 93 Accordingly, the court held that the tribe could recover as
damages what its funds would have earned if they had been properly
invested.1 94
At the time of the decision in Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, ap-
peal from Little Tucker Act cases went to the courts of appeal, as the
Federal Circuit was not yet in existence. Given the relatively small
amount of damages, it is not surprising that the Government de-
cided not to appeal the district court's decision.' 95 From the Gov-
ernment's perspective, the generalist judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit could be expected to be as
open both to the general principles of trust law and to the basic
appeal of the tribe's trust theory as had the district court.
3. Breach of trust in the Court of Claims
These innovative cases applying trust principles to the Govern-
ment had a salutory impact on the development of a claim for
breach of trust under the Tucker Act. Tribes began to bring claims
for mismanagement of property and money in the Court of Claims,
invoking the Tucker Act provision that permits claims "founded...
upon ... any Act of Congress."' 96 Its role in reviewing breach of
accounting claims and deciding special act cases had familiarized the
Court of Claims both with the chronic problem of mismanagement
and with the possibility of consulting private trust law for standards.
Consequently, the Court of Claims interpreted its jurisdictional
mandate broadly, permitting tribes to specify even general statutes
as creating a special relationship between the tribe and the Govern-
ment as a basis for a claim for damages owing to mismanagement.
193. The court interpreted 25 U.S.C. § 162a, which authorizes investment of Indian trust
funds, to be sufficient to permit assessment of lost investment interest. Manchester Band of
Porno Indians, 363 F. Supp. at 1244-45. Cf United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d
1309, 1316-18, 1320-22 (Ct. CL. 1975) (applying no-interest rule to claim that accrued before
enactment of 25 U.S.C. § 162a in Indian Claims Commission action for breach of trust in
mismanaging tribal trust funds and rejecting argument that interest, technically speaking,
would be part of direct damages flowing from breach), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
194. Manchester Band of Porno Indians, 363 F. Supp. at 1247-48.
195. See id. at 1247-48 (explaining that exact computation of damages resulting from mis-
management of funds is not possible without more detailed evidence, but that magnitude of
damages is on order of 4% or higher annual interest on $7500 for years 1938-1956 and on
$3500 for years 1957-1973).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988).
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Once the court concluded the relationship existed, it then applied
common law principles defining the duties of a trustee and the ap-
plicable remedies to grant relief.
In United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell 1),197 for example, Indian allot-
tees claimed damages for mismanagement of their timber resources
and trust funds. The Court of Claims held that the General Allot-
ment Act,198 a statute applying to many of the tribes in the West,
whose reservations were carved up into individual allotments during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was by itself suffi-
cient to create a trust relationship because it specified that the land
would be held in trust for the allottees.' 99 Unfortunately, although
the Indian plaintiffs also invoked many statutes specifically address-
ing both management of timber resources and trust funds,200 the
Court of Claims held that the language stating the allotted land was
to be "held in trust" in the General Allotment Act made considera-
tion of other more specific statutes unnecessary. 201 Because the
U.S. Government claims to hold most Indian tribal land in trust
under either the General Allotment Act or the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act,20 2 the analysis in Mitchell had the potential to open the
doors of the Court of Claims to many other breach of trust suits.
The opinion in Mitchell I seriously undermined not just Indian
claims but also Tucker Act jurisdiction in general. The Court held
that the Tucker Act itself did not waive sovereign immunity for
claims based on statutes.20 3 As a result, a claimant had to rely on a
separate statute waiving sovereign immunity and creating a claim
that could "fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government for the damage sustained. ' 20 4 Because waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity are strictly interpreted against the claim-
ant, the Supreme Court's approach raised the question whether any
Indian claim for breach of trust could be brought in the Court of
Claims absent clear language expressly stating that the tribe could
sue for the particular type of mismanagement. The reaction to the
197. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
198. Indian Gen. Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-358, 381 (1988)).
199. Mitchell v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300, 1302-04 (Cl. Ct.), rev'd and remanded, 445
U.S. 535 (1979).
200. Id. at 1304 n.18 (citing specific statutes).
201. Id. at 1302 (construing 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988)).
202. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988)).
203. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (Mitchell 1). This was the position
advanced by the Justice Department in its brief. See Brief for United States at 32-33, United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (No. 78-1756).
204. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 546-47 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v.
United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
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Mitchell I case was immediate and critical. Richard Hughes pointed
out that the Court was deviating from well-established precedent
because the Tucker Act itself constituted a waiver of sovereign im-
munity, 20 5 and I argued that permitting the Government to manage
property without a clear statutory basis, while denying the tribe a
money damages action to deter future mismanagement, was funda-
mentally unfair. 20 6
On remand, 20 7 the Court of Claims focused on the statutes deal-
ing specifically with timber resource management, noting that the
statutes required the Secretary of the Interior to use the income
from the timber for the benefit of the tribe,20 8 and also to operate
the forests on a sustained-yield basis. 20 9 Moreover, the court em-
phasized that situations such as the timber management in Mitchell,
in which the Government was pervasively involved, created "a gen-
eral fiduciary obligation on the Government in the management and
operation of the forest lands with which Interior was entrusted. ' '210
This general fiduciary obligation provided the basis for the court to
interpret the statutes liberally as creating a duty that could be the
basis for a claim in the Court of Claims. Moreover, the existence of
this general fiduciary obligation permitted the court to consult pri-
vate trust principles to determine whether the breach of the statu-
tory duty is one that requires compensation in money damages.
Reasoning that a claim for money damages is essential for a benefi-
ciary of a private trust, the court held that the timber management
scheme as a whole created a claim for which money damages were
mandated. 211
When the Government appealed, 212 the Supreme Court con-
fessed to having caused a little confusion in its earlier opinion inti-
mating that the Tucker Act did not waive sovereign immunity for
statutory claims. Once the issue was framed in terms of finding a
statutory claim, rather than in terms of finding a waiver which re-
205. Hughes, supra note 91, at 456-60, 490-93.
206. Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship, supra note 92, at 644-45 (argu-
ing that Mitchell I decision leaves Indian tribes "in the unhappy position they were in during
the six decades before the trust law victories" in that Government manages their assets and
resources but cannot be held accountable for mismanagement in any way).
207. Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981), aft'd, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
208. See id. at 269 (quoting from 25 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1988) that timber sales shall "be
based upon a consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his
heirs").
209. See id. (quoting from 25 U.S.C. § 466 (1988) that regulations regarding "the opera-
tion and management of Indian forestry units" should be made "on the principle of sustained
yield management").
210. Id. at 270.
211. Id. at 273.
212. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II).
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quires strict construction, principles of liberal construction favoring
Indian interests came into play. Consequently, the Court did not
require explicit statutory statements that created a trus't especially in
cases in which there was in fact pervasive involvement of the Federal
Government in tribal resource or money management. 213
The dissenting justices accused the majority of "overruling Mitch-
ell Isub silentio,"214 and, at least as to Tucker Act jurisdiction, I agree
with them, although I am delighted where they were dismayed.
Mitchell II is a rare victory for Indian tribes. To permit the Govern-
ment to manage tribal resources without granting the tribes an ef-
fective remedy loads the dice too heavily in the Government's
favor. 215 Nevertheless, the Mitchell cases have certainly called a halt
to the kind of free-wheeling trust analysis that the Court of Claims
and district courts employed in Little Tucker Act cases to impose
wide-ranging trust duties, at least as far as damages remedies are
concerned. Since the Mitchell cases, Tucker Act jurisdiction for
breach of trust must be carefully based on either statutes that speak
fairly specifically to trust obligations or on actual management by
the Government of most phases of a tribe's resources under some
sort of comprehensive regulatory scheme.
Mitchell II was decided after the Federal Courts Improvement Act
created the new claims system. Consequently, the newly created
Claims Court was left with the task of sketching the contours of
trust-based claims.
4. Breach of trust in the Claims Court and Federal Circuit
Despite the promise of Mitchell II, Indian tribes have been remark-
ably unsuccessful in breach of trust claims in the Claims Court and
the Federal Circuit. The claimants have succeeded in only two in-
stances of the twenty Tucker Act cases addressing trust issues in the
last ten years.216 First, individual members of the Northern Paiute
213. Id. at 225. The Supreme Court quoted from the Court of Claims' opinion in Navajo
Tribe v. United States as follows:
Where the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal
monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such
monies or properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though nothing
is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute (or other fundamental docu-
ment) about a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary connection.
Id. (quoting Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
214. Id. at 233 (Powell, J., dissenting).
215. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1137, 1181-83 (1990) (discussing Mitchell cases and con-
cluding that Mitchell II struck an appropriate balance between trust accountability and judicial
intrusion into executive affairs).
216. Two of the Federal Circuit opinions involved review of fair and honorable dealings
clause claims based on breach of trust. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v.
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Nation who had been wrongly denied their share in ajudgment fund
received $5000 each. 217 Second, the Short plaintiffs, Indians living
on the Hoopa Valley Reservation who had been wrongfully denied
their share in proceeds from timber sales, succeeded in the court, 218
although they were ultimately defeated in Congress. 21 9 Neither case
raised difficult issues regarding the existence or scope of a trust re-
lationship. The Government won dismissals in most of the other
cases either because the statute of limitations had run220 or for lack
of jurisdiction under the standards articulated in Mitchell H.221
In fact, the Mitchell claimants themselves, almost ten years after
the Supreme Court decision on jurisdiction, have yet to recover any-
thing for the breaches of trust alleged in that case, first filed in
1971.222 The Claims Court held that the statute of limitations bars
United States, 877 F.2d 961, 965 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding no breach of trust or fair and
honorable dealings in leasing and managing land and water resources); Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe Red Lake Band v. United States, 768 F.2d 338, 342 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (requiring United
States to provide separate accountings to each tribe beyond scope of original complaint only
if Government is clearly notified of accounting request and if such request is held to be valid).
217. See Rogers v. United States, 877 F.2d 1550, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding Bureau
of Indian Affairs' failure to notify potential recipients of compensation for taking of Northern
Paiute aboriginal homelands as breach of trust).
218. Short v. United States, 719 F.2d 1133, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding governmental
breach of trust in arbitrary distribution of proceeds from timber sales to Hoopa Valley Tribe
only, instead of to all "Indians of the Reservation"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984).
219. The Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 100-580, 102 Stat. 2924 (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 1300i (1988)).
220. SeeTunica-Biloxi Tribe v. United States, No. 90-5145, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 17865,
at *3 (Fed. Cir. May 17, 1991) (unpublished opinion) (finding statute of limitations bars claim
for damages based on failure to protect tribal land base in Louisiana), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
197 (1991); Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (dismissing claim for unlawful termination of rancheria as barred by statute of limita-
tions); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 726 F.2d 718, 723 (Fed. Cir.) (holding
forest mismanagement claims barred), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
221. See Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187, 191-92 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding oil and
gas royalties claim barred under Mitchell II because Federal Government acted in complete
accordance with oil and gas regulations and leases, and thus did not breach its fiduciary duty),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Grey v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285, 292-94 (1990) (distin-
guishing water resource and management scheme from pervasive governmental timber man-
agement of Mitchell II), aff'd, No. 91-5001, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11705 (unpublished
opinion) (Fed. Cir. May 24, 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S.Jan. 21, 1992); Begay v.
United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 107, 124-30 (1987) (finding claim for economic, social, cultural, and
psychological damages resulting from relocation lacks essential elements of trust to fall under
ambit of Mitchell 11), aft'd, 865 F.2d 230 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v.
United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 75, 78 (1988) (dismissing suit for equivalency funding for school as
failure to meet trust requirement of Mitchell 1).
222. See Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272, 1273 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (stat-
ing that initial petition in Mitchell litigation was filed on Mar. 15, 1971), later proceeding, 485
F.2d 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974), later proceeding sub nom. Mitchell v.
United States, 591 F.2d 1300 (Ct. Cl. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 445 U.S. 535, reh " denied, 446
U.S. 992 (1980), on remand, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl, 1981), aff'd and remanded, 463 U.S. 206
(1983), on remand, 10 Cl. Ct. 63, modifiedon reconsideration, 10 Cl. Ct. 787 (1986), later opinion, 13
Cl. Ct. 474 (1987), later proceeding, No. 772-71, 1988 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 99 (June 10, 1988). In
its petition for certiorari in Mitchell II, the Government claimed that over $100 million was at
issue in this litigation. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 211 n.7.
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presentation of many of their claims. 223 In 1988, the Government
continued to attempt to interpose jurisdictional barriers, including
many of those rejected by the Supreme Court and the Claims Court
in the past.224 The major claim involving mismanagement of timber
sales has yet to be resolved, partly because the parties strongly disa-
gree on the standard of care owed by the Government. 225 A great
deal of money was expended in this litigation, with two trips to the
Supreme Court and eight opinions issued by the old Court of
Claims and the new Claims Court. Yet, in the world of Indian
claims, Mitchell is regarded as a victory. Whether it constitutes only
a symbolic victory, as did the Cherokee Cases2 26 of old, remains to be
seen.
In cases raising breach of trust issues after the enactment of the
FCIA, the Federal Circuit has affirmed the Claims Court for the
most part, thus indicating its satisfaction with the job done by the
Claims Court in determining the reach of the trust relationship. In
so doing, the Federal Circuit has put its imprimatur on a liability-
reducing theory regarding the statute of limitations requirements
that has had a devastating effect on most of these claims.227 In addi-
tion, the Federal Circuit has affirmed several cases in which the
Claims Court has adopted very strict readings of the nature and
scope of the trust relationship. For the most part, the courts have
settled the contours of the trust relationship, at least for the pur-
poses of Tucker Act jurisdiction. An important issue remains open,
however, and that is the standard that should be applied to breach
of trust cases. 228 While the Government consistently argues for
either a strict statutory standard or a standard that would only im-
pose liability for arbitrary actions, Indian tribal advocates argue for
standards based more solidly on private trust law. After a brief syn-
223. See Mitchell v. United States, 13 CI. Ct. 474, 478-83 (1987) (holding road use permit
claims and mismanagement of funds barred except for six-year period prior to filing suit);
Mitchell v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 63, 68-77 (holding stumpage and regeneration of timber
claims barred by statute of limitations except for period within six years prior to filing suit),
modifiedon reconsideration, 10 Cl. Ct. 787, 788-89 (1986) (clarifying that allottees can bring claim
for any trees not regenerated within six year period prior to filing suit).
224. See Mitchell v. United States, No. 772-71, 1988 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 99, at *7, 14 (June
10, 1988) (calling one jurisdictional argument "astonishing" and noting, as to another argu-
ment, that "it would be fair to question why the point was raised at all for the history of these
cases shows that the Court of Claims had previously rejected precisely the same argument
when it was raised as a defense to other claims in these suits").
225. Id. at *65 (suggesting the parties moderate their positions, noting that "[n]either
position is reasonable").
226. See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text (discussing Cherokee cases).
227. See supra note 220 (listing examples of Federal Circuit opinions limiting Federal Gov-
ernment liability for finding Indian claims time barred).
228. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text (delineating breach of trust argu-
ments put forth by Indians and Federal Government in context of Mitchell I case).
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thesis of the state of the breach of trust claim in the Claims Court
and Federal Circuit, the Article analyzes these developments.
a. Tolling the statute of limitations
One of the reasons given by Justice Marshall in Mitchell H for rec-
ognizing the existence of a claim for money damages was the inef-
fectiveness of equitable relief.229 He noted that tribes and Indian
people who had been told they were not capable of managing their
own resources could hardly be expected to undertake the kind of
sophisticated monitoring required to ensure that the Government
complied with court orders. 230 Second, equitable relief may come
too late, as would be the case with the timber resources in Mitchell:
"[B]y the time Government mismanagement becomes apparent, the
damage to Indian resources may be so severe that a prospective
remedy may be next to worthless." 23' Although this statement
seems premised on a tribe's ability to sue upon discovery of govern-
mental mismanagement, later cases in the Claims Court and the
Federal Circuit have adopted a rule of constructive knowledge that
has resulted in the dismissal of many claims and has greatly limited
the period for which claims can be brought.
Probably the most significant development in this area is the Fed-
eral Circuit's significant modification of two theories first adopted
by a California district court in Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v.
United States, discussed earlier.232 The district court held that the
Tucker Act's six-year statute of limitations did not bar the claim,
applying the rule from private trust law that the statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run until the trustee repudiates the trust.2 33
The court saw no reason to deviate from this rule in a case in which
the breach of trust was a failure to credit a trust fund with trust in-
come.23 4 As an alternative basis, the court applied the rule that the
statute does not run until the plaintiff has reason to know the facts
giving rise to a claim for breach of trust.23 5 The court stated that
229. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 227-28 (1983).
230. Id at 227 (explaining Indian's inability to manage lands is due to poor education,
absence from lands, and lack of knowledge of precise physical location of allotments).
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text (discussing Manchester Band of Poino
Indians).
233. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1249
(N.D. Cal. 1973).
234. See id. (acknowledging lack of precedential support for extension of rule but reason-
ing that rule " 'concentrates on the necessity of dealing fairly with a group of people still
placed under a disability of dependency and to which a greater obligation is owed than a
narrowly legalistic view of what constitutes a technical "duty". (quoting Dodge v. United
States, 362 F.2d 1810, 1813 (Ct. Cl. 1966))).
235. Id.
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the Band could not determine there had been a breach until discov-
ery because the Government had managed the funds without mak-
ing either regular payments to the Band or supplying the Band with
periodic accountings. 23 6
An expansive interpretation of either of these theories for tolling
the statute of limitations, the "trust" theory or the "blameless igno-
rance" theory, could open the courts to many mismanagement
claims. The theory that a tribe could base a claim on the trust rela-
tionship was just developing. Although many of the ancient claims
filed in the Indian Claims Commission turned into breach of trust
claims at the accounting stage, tribes had not been aware that they
could base a claim against the Government on the trust relationship
until the beginning of the 1970s. Tribes could be expected to take
every advantage of this new theory of liability.
The Federal Circuit addressed tolling issues first in Menominee
Tribe of Indians v. United States,237 reversing a Claims Court decision
that awarded the tribe $7.2 million for mismanagement of its forest
resources for the period 1951-1967. Specifically, the tribe claimed
that the Government failed to manage the forest prudently by set-
ting too low an annual limitation on the number of trees harvested,
thus reducing the amount of income generated by timber sales. Un-
fortunately, because the Government terminated its trust relation-
ship with the Menominee Tribe in 1961 and turned the
management of the forest over to the tribe, there was only a four- or
five-day period in the six years prior to filing the claim during which
the U.S. Government had any responsibility to manage the forest.
The court held that both the blameless ignorance and the trust the-
ories justified tolling the statute of limitations. 23 8
. In reversing the Claims Court decision, the Federal Circuit first
addressed the "blameless ignorance" argument.23 9 Noting that ig-
norance as to the law is never sufficient to toll the statute, the court
criticized the trial court's fact finding as being merely an uncritical
adoption of the plaintiff's argument.240 The Federal Circuit cited
evidence that the Menominee Council had asked the Government to
increase the harvest limitation in 1956. Moreover, the court
stressed the Menominee's ability to seek legal counsel, the fact that
they had representation during the termination procedure, and the
236. Id. at 1249-50.
237. 726 F.2d 718 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
238. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 726 F.2d 718, 722-23 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
239. Id. at 720-21.
240. Id. at 721 n.8.
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fact that they had brought a successful claim for forest mismanage-
ment under the Indian Claims Commission Act as evidence that
"the Indians were capable enough to seek advice, launch an inquiry,
and discover through their agents the facts underlying their current
claim."' 241 For a tribe successfully to rely on the blameless igno-
rance theory to toll the statute, it must argue that the facts were
"inherently unknowable." 242
Apart from a case involving active concealment by the Govern-
ment,243 it is hard to imagine what kind of trust claim could be in-
herently unknowable by a tribe that was represented by an attorney
to broker its relations with the Government regarding resource
management. Although the rule that failure to know about the law
does not toll the statute of limitations is a rule applied outside the
Indian law context, like many "neutral" rules, it has a special bite in
the context of Indian claims. Surely the facts regarding mismanage-
ment have been known to tribes for many years, but it was not until
cases like Manchester Band of Pomo Indians that tribes began to have
hope that courts would require the Government to answer for its
mismanagement. 244
The trust theory advanced by the plaintiffs in Menominee Tribe
proved equally unsuccessful. 245 The Federal Circuit rejected any
kind of blanket tolling because of a trust relationship, leaving open
only the possibility that tolling might be permissible in a claim for
breach of an express trust.2 46 This possibility was soon foreclosed
by Jones v. United States,247 in which successors to an allottee claimed
damages against the Government for failure to protect their allotted
trust land from sale in 1937 to pay county taxes. In 1972, they sued
the county, the purchasers, and the United States for return of the
land and damages for loss of use. The Government realigned as a
plaintiff in 1977, and the claimants' land was restored.2 48 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
lower court on liability, but stated that the district court could re-
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. The court was willing to concede that active concealment would be sufficient to toll
the statute of limitations. Menominee Tribe, 726 F.2d at 721. Such concealment was held suffi-
dent to toll the statute of limitations in a case brought by japanese-Americans for compensa-
tion for their relocation during World War II. The claimants, however, lost on the merits.
Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 (1987).
244. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text (describing success of Manchester Band
of Pomo Indians lawsuit in obtaining interest damages for governmental mismanagement).
245. Menominee Tibe, 726 F.2d at 721-22.
246. Id. at 722.
247. 801 F.2d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987).
248. Jones v. United States, 801 F.2d 1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1013 (1987).
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duce the damages if it found "[I]ack of diligence by the Government
in exercising its role as trustee" during the ensuing fifty-four years
out of fairness to the county. 249 On remand, the district court re-
duced the award by half to $108,000, finding the "Government was
most dilatory in the exercising of its role as trustee" in prosecuting
the claims.250 As a result, the claimants sued the Government for
breach of trust in the Claims Court for the reduction. 251
Judge Kozinski, then Chief Judge of the Claims Court, expressed
sympathy for the plaintiffs, but held the statute barred the claim.252
As to the trust theory, the court distinguished actions for the trust
corpus from actions for misfeasance or nonfeasance of the trust.
Actions for the trust corpus are not tolled until repudiation because
the beneficiary always has the right to demand the trust corpus from
the trustee. 253 At repudiation, the trustee claims the corpus adverse
to the beneficiary, which is why repudiation tolls the statute.254 In
contrast, mismanagement and nonfeasance cases are more like
breach of contract cases. When a contract is breached, the parties
dispute both the fact and extent of liability; thus the statute of limi-
tations runs from the time of the breach.25 5 Moreover, the incredi-
bly long period of inaction by the United States could be likened to
an implicit repudiation. 256 The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims
Court decision, but based its affirmation on this last narrower
ground.257 The rule regarding repudiation is the general rule, the
court stated, but a repudiation need not be express. 258 The trustee
in this case took actions 259 inconsistent with its duties.260
249. Brooks v. Nez Perce County, 670 F.2d 835, 837 (9th Cir. 1982) (remanding damages
claim to district court which reduced damages by 50%). PlaintiffJones later sued in United
States Claims Court to recover the amount of the reduction. Jones v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct.
292 (1985), af'd, 801 F.2d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987).
250. See Jones v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 292, 294 (1985) (quoting from remanded opin-
ion, Brooks v. Nez Perce County, No. 2-72-27, slip op. at 3 (D. Idaho Mar. 3, 1983)), aff'd, 801
F.2d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987).
251. Jones, 9 Cl. Ct. at 292.
252. Id, at 295-96.
253. Id. at 295.
254. Id. at 295-96.
255. Id. at 296 (citing GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 861-880
(2d ed. 1984)).
256. Id.
257. Jones, 801 F.2d at 1335-36.
258. Id.
259. The "actions taken by the Government as trustee" were actually failures to act. The
Government obtained a district court decree in 1918 voiding a tax assessment on the plain-
tiff's property and enjoining any future taxation of the property. In 1923, the county levied
another tax on the property; the Government failed to challenge the assessment or take any
other action to enforce the 1918 decree, and thus the plaintiff was evicted in 1927 for failure
to pay property taxes. Jones, 9 Cl. Ct. at 293-94.
260. Jones, 801 F.2d at 1336. Had the court reached the merits, it could have resolved an
important open issue with regard to the trust relationship: to what extent does a statute that
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What does the analysis in Jones have to do with the theory ad-
vanced in Manchester Band of Pomo Indians? The latter case also in-
volved mismanagement rather than repudiation of an express trust.
Judge Kozinski stated in a footnote that "[t]o the extent that
Manchester Band ... suggests a contrary rule, the court is unper-
suaded and declines to follow." 26 1 The Federal Circuit made no ref-
erence to the tolling theory relied on in Manchester Band of Pomo
Indians.262
Not until 1988, in another case involving California Rancheria In-
dians, 263 Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States,264 did the Fed-
eral Circuit give full-dress attention to the trust tolling theory. In
1978, a Hopland Band member sought injunctive and declaratory
relief against the Government in federal district court on the
grounds that termination of the Hopland Rancheria had been un-
lawful. In response to the suit, the Government formally notified all
Band members that the termination had in fact been unlawful. 265
The district court held that a trust relationship continued to exist
between the Hopland Band and the Government because of the un-
lawful termination.266 The district court's remedy was limited to eq-
uitable relief. The court declared that the individual Indian
distributees of the former rancheria lands could reconvey the land
to the Government for restoration to trust (and common ownership)
status.2 67 Nevertheless, the court could do nothing about the land
that was then held by non-Indian bona fide purchasers. Eventually,
other distributees joined the suit and the parties stipulated to a final
judgment.
In 1980, the Government formally assumed a government-to-gov-
ernment relationship with the Band, and in 1981, the Band adopted
a constitution. 268 With tribal officials to act on its behalf, the Band
then sued the Government in the Claims Court for damages caused
has been interpreted (despite the use of the word "shall") as authorizing the Government to
represent Indians in land cases impose any duty to do so if the failure to act causes loss of the
land?
261. Jones, 9 Cl. Ct. at 296 n.l.
262. See Jones, 801 F.2d at 1334-36 (failing to cite or discuss result in Manchester Band of
Pomo Indians).
263. See generally Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trnst Relationship, supra note 92, at
649-51, 664-66 (discussing California rancheria cases).
264. 855 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
265. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
266. Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (discussing case of
Hopland Band member); see Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 38-49 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (de-
tailing history of California rancheria legislation), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1228 (1983).
267. Smith, 515 F. Supp. at 61.
268. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians, 855 F.2d at 1576.
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by the unlawful conveyance of the Band's property and also for
damages based on lost benefits during the period of wrongful termi-
nation.269 The Band's goal was to gain sufficient damages to repur-
chase Parcel 1 from its non-Indian owners to make the rancheria
whole again.270
Although the district court addressed the merits of some of these
complaints, albeit adversely to the Band, the Federal Circuit re-
manded with instructions to dismiss the action as time-barred. 271
Reiterating the now familiar injunction that the statute of limitations
is a jurisdictional requirement, Judge Michel, writing for the court,
explained that tolling of the accrual of a cause of action is routinely
permitted, but once a cause of action has accrued, the courts do not
have jurisdiction in light of Congress' explicit setting of a six-year
limit to toll the running of the statute itself.272 These conclusions
are not surprising because the Federal Circuit and the Claims Court
interpret the limitations period strictly as part of the Government's
waiver of sovereign immunity.273 Since the six-year statute of limita-
tions is quite clear, the court has been unwilling to find any implied
exception. 274
In addition, Judge Michel noted that the trust theory appeared to
apply to this case because the plaintiff was seeking return of the part
of the trust corpus called Parcel 1.275 Nevertheless, even applying
the trust theory, the court held that the Band had waited too long
because the sale took place in 1964, and at the very latest, the repu-
diation took place when the Government illegally terminated the
rancheria in 1967.276
The Hopland Band argued that it was unable to bring suit be-
cause the Government terminated its relationship with the tribe;
thus it was only after the Government reestablished the relationship
that they could form a recognized Indian tribe again. The tribe ar-
269. Hopland Band of Porno Indians v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 276, 279 (1987), vacated
and remanded, 855 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
270. See id at 278-79 (describing "Parcel 1" as 1400 acre tract of grazing and recreation
land that was sold to hunting club when rancheria was terminated).
271. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians, 855 F.2d at 1582.
272. Id. at 1577-78.
273. See Williams v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 189, 191 (1986) (stating that where U.S.
Government gives its consent to be sued, terms of such consent define court's jurisdiction and
is strictly interpreted), aff'd, 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Because the statute of limitations
is jurisdictional, it can be raised by the parties at any time or by the court sua sponte. See Bray
v. United States, 785 F.2d 989, 992 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (listing cases holding statute of limita-
tions as jurisdictional in nature).
274. See Hopland Band of Pomo Indians, 855 F.2d at 1577-78 (stressing explicitness with
which Congress mandated six-year statute of limitations).
275. Id. at 1578.
276. Id. at 1580.
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gued that the Government's acts in terminating the tribe thus pre-
vented the tribe from suing, and were thus similar to acts of
concealment. 277
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that congressional ple-
nary power over Indian tribes justifies Congress in abrogating tribal
sovereignty completely.278 The Claims Court's discussion of the
Government's ability to prevent the Band from suing to protest its
termination demonstrates either a lack of familiarity with these cases
or an unargued conclusion that they are no longer accurate state-
ments of the law.
The court stated that Congress had no-power to prevent the Band
from suing as an Indian tribe. To do so would mean that a termi-
nated tribe would have no legal remedy to protest its termination.
According to the court, "that simply cannot be the rule." 279 This
argument must have come as a great surprise to all the terminated
tribes of the 1950s, who came to that precise conclusion. Smith v.
United States280 was brought in federal court by individual members
of the Hopland Band because federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362 applies only to "recognized" Indian tribes.28 1 Admittedly,
the Indian Tucker Act does not specifically require tribes to be fed-
erally recognized to bring suit in the Claims Court, but the force of
the plenary power doctrine is such that it has generally been as-
sumed that unrecognized tribes could not sue.28 2 Unfortunately,
the result of this good news about the Government's inability to de-
277. Id. at 1579.
278. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (recognizing that
Congress has "plenary authority to... eliminate the powers of local self-government .. ");
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (stating that sovereignty of Indian tribes is
of limited character and that it exists "only at the sufferance of Congress"); Newton, Federal
Power, supra note 86, at 196-97 (discussing development of plenary power doctrine and stating
that although doctrine has been narrowed, courts continue to invoke it).
279. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians, 855 F.2d at 1579-80.
280. 515 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
281. HoplandBand of Pomo Indians, 855 F.2d at 1579. Section 1362 states that the "district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band
with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in
controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (1988).
282. Cf Hopland Band ofPomo Indians, 855 F.2d at 1579 (citing Menominee Tribe of Indi-
ans v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 445 US. 950 (1980), for propo-
sition that Indian tribes are not powerless to sue Government for wrongful termination in
absence of governmental acknowledgment of wrong). In Menominee Tribe, a terminated tribe
was permitted to sue for violation of termination statutes, but the termination process for the
Menominees explicitly provided that they would retain their legal status as an Indian tribe.
Menominee Tibe, 607 F.2d at 1338 n.l. The case, therefore, does not contradict the general
understanding that unrecognized tribes may not sue under the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1505 (1988).
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stroy tribal existence is that the relevant facts took place six years
before' the re-recognized tribe brought suit.
The Claims Court has recognized a factor mitigating the strict ap-
plication of the statute of limitations in cases in which the Govern-
ment's actions can be classed as a continuing wrong.28 3 In such
cases, a tribe can recover damages incurred in the six years prior to
the date of filing suit on the theory that partial liability is better than
permitting the defendant to gain a license to continue its wrong be-
cause of the lapse of the statute of limitations. For example, in
Mitchell I, the court permitted the plaintiffs to pursue their timber
claim on the theory that failure to regenerate the timber creates a
continuing wrong.2 84 Yet, although the Hopland Band sought to
recover damages for the six years prior to filing suit, they were un-
successful because the Government reinstated its relationship with
the Band in 1980. From that period until the date of suit, the Band
was eligible for services and suffered no further damages. 28 5 In
other words, there may only have been one or two days in which the
Government could be charged with liability.
Again, this case serves as a wonderful example of the application
of a perfectly neutral rule that creates perverse results in the case of
Indian tribes. The reason for applying a six-year statute of limita-
tions to a group is that it may take time for the individuals who be-
come cognizant of an injury to form into a group capable of taking
action. Yet, it operates unfairly against an Indian tribe that has been
wrongfully terminated and left with the perfectly logical belief,
given the history of United States-Indian relations, that no action
could be taken.
283. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 776,
779 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (adopting rule in accounting case on appeal from Indian Claims Commis-
sion, stating that "[i]t is the usual rule that a court once having obtained jurisdiction of the
persons and subject matter of a suit, retains such jurisdiction for all purposes including the
awarding of all damages accruing up to the date ofjudgment. This is a good rule and we find
nothing that would prevent its application here.").
284. See Mitchell v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 63, 68-77 (1986) (finding stumpage and re-
generation of timber claims barred by statute of limitations except for period within six years
prior to filing suit), modified on reconsideration, 10 Cl. Ct. 787, 788-89 (1986) (clarifying that
allottees can bring claim for any trees not regenerated within six-year period prior to filing
suit).
285. Hopland Band ofPomo Indians, 855 F.2d at 1581-82. The Claims Court has been reluc-
tant to extend the use of this doctrine beyond claims for mismanagement of trust funds. See
Navajo Tribe v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 227, 269-70 (1985) (ruling that Claims Court lacked
jurisdiction over tribe's claim that Government breached its fiduciary duty to clean up tailings
from mills). The Claims Court rejected the tribe's argument that its pre-1946 claim could be
extended to include a charge that the Government breached its fiduciary duty to the tribe by
not covering up uranium mines. Although the mines had been opened up before the jurisdic-
tional cut-off date, the Court held that the continuing wrong theory would only apply if mines
had been abandoned in an unsafe condition before 1946. Id
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The Hopland Band case has been cited frequently by the Claims
Court and the Federal Circuit in non-Indian law cases for the
learned exegesis it contains about tolling the statute of limita-
tions. 286 Hopland Band and Jones have also settled the fact that the
trust theory of tolling has only a limited effect. The theory does not
apply to mismanagement or nonfeasance claims, which comprise the
largest class of trust claims;287 it applies to actions to recover the
trust corpus, which mainly arise in termination cases. In other
words, the breach of trust itself acts as the repudiation. Because the
fact of termination was known to the individual Indians at the time
of termination, Hopland stands for the proposition that the termi-
nated tribe as an entity must bring the case in a timely fashion.
Thus, only a terminated tribe that has not been reinstated can bring
a claim based on the continuing wrong theory.
b. The trust relationship after Mitchell II
A brief review of Mitchell I is necessary to focus on the questions
left unanswered by that decision. The major contribution of Mitchell
II was the Supreme Court's clear assertion that the Tucker Act
waives sovereign immunity for statutory claims.288 By this conces-
sion, the Court took the waiver issue and its concomitant require-
ment of strict construction out of the calculus. As a result, what
remained were two related but independent questions 289 of whether
a statute or statutory scheme creates a claim and whether that claim
is remediable by money damages. Moreover, the Court noted that
principles of strict construction need not, and indeed should not,
apply in this determination. 290 Instead, the Court referred to the
286. See Broughton Lumber Co. v. Yeutter, 939 F.2d 1547, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (litigat-
ing takings claim); Lunaas v. United States, 936 F.2d 1277, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (analyzing
loan repayment scheme), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 967 (1992); Laughlin v. United States, 22 Cl.
Ct. 85, 99 (1990) (discussing inverse condemnation claim for flooded farmland); Woods Psy-
chiatric Inst. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 324, 344 (1990) (discussing health care claim), a]J'd,
925 F.2d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Tarnopol v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 89, 92 n.5 (1989) (fail-
ing to return business records), aff'd, 904 F.2d 46 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
287. See Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. United States, No. 90-5145, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 17865,
at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. May 17, 1991) (unpublished opinion) (illustrating typical claim for damages
caused by governmental failure to protect tribal land base and maladministration of land com-
mission and finding statute of limitations not tolled by mismanagement trust claim), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 197 (1991).
288. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212-16 (1983) (Mitchell II) (explaining
history of Tucker Act and finding waiver of sovereign immunity in claims brought under
Court of Claims jurisdiction).
289. See Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 283 (11 th Cir. 1981) (Nichols,J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (stating that obligation to pay money damages under General Allotment
Act must be alleged as "semantically separate and analytically independent proposition"),
aff'd and remanded, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
290. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 219 (quoting United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty
Co., 237 U.S. 28, 32 (1915) ("[The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship
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general trust relationship between tribes and the United States as
reinforcing its liberal construction of the statutes.291 Nevertheless,
in later cases, the Government has continued to insist that a strict
construction is necessary and has often succeeded.
In Mitchell II, the Court interpreted the statutes and regulations
governing timber management as so pervasive and comprehensive
as to create a trust relationship with respect to timber management.
Once the Court concluded that the scheme created a trust relation-
ship, it reasoned that the statutory scheme could fairly be read as
mandating damages for two reasons: (1) a damage remedy is inte-
gral in the scheme of private trust law; and (2) equitable relief alone
is not sufficient either to deter or remedy breaches because "by the
time Government mismanagement becomes apparent, the damage
to Indian resources may be so severe that a prospective remedy may
be next to worthless. 292
Analysis of the post-Mitchell II cases fails to reveal clarity or con-
sistency of terminology, much less the law that is applied. For clar-
ity of analysis, this Article will adopt the Supreme Court's
terminology, which refers to three kinds of trust relationships: a
general trust, a limited or bare trust, and a fiduciary relationship. 293
A general trust is merely the statement of the historic relationship
between Indian tribes and the Government, tracing back to Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia and the sentiment expressed in Seminole Nation v.
United States that the Government's obligations to Indian tribes
should be judged by the highest fiduciary standards. This phrase
states an aspiration but is certainly not enforceable in the Claims
Court. At the most, it provides the rationale for reading statutes
liberally.294
A bare or limited trust refers to a trust established for a narrow
and limited purpose. 295 The Court characterized the General Allot-
enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of
construction where consent has been announced.")).
291. Id. at 225.
292. Id. at 227.
293. Id. at 224.
294. Id. at 225-26; see Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 223, 231 (1983) (noting
statutes and regulations are to be read in light of general trust relationship existing between
Indians and United States); supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting that in Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia, court held that Georgia confiscatory laws are unconstitutional); supra note 185
(stating that Government in Seminole Nation v. United States assumed highest responsibility with
respect to Indians and, therefore, should be judged by exacting fiduciary standards).
295. See Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 224 (implying that, unlike fiduciary relationship, bare trust
does not give Federal Government responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for
benefit of Indians); Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980) (stating that limited trust does not
impose duty on Federal Government to manage timber resources). Some of the judges on the
Claims Court use the term "special relationship" to refer to this kind of statutory trust. Gila
1992]
802 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:753
ment Act provision that allotted lands to be held in trust as creating
such a limited trust. The trust is limited to the original purpose for
the statute, which is protecting Indian land from taxation and invol-
untary alienation because of failure to pay taxes or debts.2 96 For a
damage remedy, the obligation for money compensation must be
clear and strong.2 9 7
The third category is illustrated by Mitchell H itself. The statutes
in that case created a fiduciary relationship for two apparently alter-
native reasons: first, because the timber management scheme was
comprehensive and second, because of the pervasive federal man-
agement that took place.2 98 As to the latter aspect, the Court
quoted with approval from Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States that
Federal Government supervision of tribal monies or properties
gives rise to a fiduciary relationship "unless Congress has provided
otherwise even though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing
or underlying statute or other fundamental document about a trust
fund, or a trust or a fiduciary connection. ' 299 To distinguish this
kind of trust more precisely from the two others, the term "full fidu-
ciary relationship" will be used. 00
While permitting breach of trust cases to go forward, the opinion
in Mitchell I1 left important issues unresolved regarding both the
creation and scope of this new claim for breach of trust. The resolu-
tion of these important questions will greatly affect the utility of a
claim for breach of trust.30'
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 427 F.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (Cl. Ct.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
296. Mitchell I1, 463 U.S. at 217-18; Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 542.
297. See Cape Fox Corp., 4 CL. Ct. at 232-34 (holding that Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act (ANCSA) created limited trust and that even if Government owes duties under ANCSA,
breach of those duties is not remediable by money damages without clear and strong indica-
tion of congressional intent).
298. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
299. led at 225 (quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct.
CL. 1980)).
300. Compare Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224 (referring to governmental duties created by stat-
utes as "full responsibility" fiduciary obligations) with id. at 226 (calling presumably same
governmental duties simply "fiduciary obligations"). Some of the Claims Court judges use
the term "general fiduciary obligation."
301. Not all questions arising in breach of trust cases are of equal importance or are even
controversial, at least in the legal sense. For example, the beneficiaries of a trust can enforce
it, but the courts may have to interpret statutes and treaties to determine who the benefi-
ciaries are. In the longest running modern case dealing with interpretation of Indian trusts,
Short v. United States, 719 F.2d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1983), ceri. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984), the
Federal Circuit upheld Claims Court decisions maintaining that an 1864 treaty setting aside
the Hoopa Valley Reservation for the "Indians of the Reservation" meant that all Indians
subsequently placed on the land became part of the reservation and were entitled to share
equally in the trust proceeds. As a result, the court held that the Government's distribution of
trust monies to members of only one tribe, the Hoopa Valley Tribe, was a breach of trust. Id.
at 1143; see Rogers v. United States, 877 F.2d 1550, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (examining
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5. Creation of the trust
Obviously the timber management statutes at issue in Mitchell I
are sufficient to create a full fiduciary relationship imposing obliga-
tions in favor of allottees.30 2 The Government, however, has not
conceded Mitchell 11 any force beyond its narrow terms. In Short v.
United States,30 3 for example, the Government argued that Mitchell H
did not apply to a timber mismanagement claim brought by a tribe
rather than by individual allottees because individual allottees are
covered by a different statutory provision than the one at issue in
Mitchell 1.304 The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument for two
reasons. First, the court noted that the Court in Mitchell H treated
both provisions as imposing a fiduciary duty on the Government.305
Moreover, the statute governing tribal timber had the same purpose
and was substantially the same in wording as the statute governing
individually owned timber. Each requires the timber to be sold to
benefit the tribe, or the tribal or individual beneficiaries.30 6 Second,
the Federal Circuit reasoned that the Government's elaborate con-
trol over the timber resource was an alternative, if not the primary,
reason for imposing fiduciary obligations.30 7
The statutes and regulations regarding the Government's role in
regulating mineral leasing are similar to those dealing with timber
management. It was thus not surprising when the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Mineral Leas-
Secretary of Interior's failure to provide notice to plaintiffs of available compensation for gov-
ernmental taking of Northern Paiute aboriginal homelands, and analyzing Secretary's failure
as "breach of trust").
302. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 726 F.2d 718, 721 (Fed. Cir.) (cit-
ing Mitchell II in support of assumption that trust relationship exists between Indians and
Federal Government regarding management of Indians' forests), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826
(1984); Short v. United States, 719 F.2d 1133, 1134-35 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (invoking Mitchell II
to find fiduciary relationship between Indians and Federal Government with respect to distri-
bution of timber sale proceeds), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984).
303. 719 F.2d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984).
304. See Short v. United States, 719 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussing Gov-
ernment's contention that Mitchell H dealt only with allotted trust lands under 25 U.S.C.
§ 406, whereas Short litigation involved unallotted lands under 25 U.S.C. § 407), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1256 (1984).
305. See id. (citing Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 208-11, 219-28, for proposition that no differ-
ence exists between Government's fiduciary obligation to Indians under 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-
407).
306. Compare Act ofJune 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 8, 36 Stat. 857 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 406(a) (1988)) (requiring proceeds from timber sales to be paid to individual owner
or owners of timberland or otherwise disposed of for their benefit by Secretary of Interior)
with Act ofJune 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 7, 36 Stat. 857 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 407
(1988)) (allowing proceeds from timber sales to be used as determined by governing bodies
of tribes or, in absence of governing body, as determined by Secretary of Interior for tribe
involved).
307. Short, 719 F.2d at 1135-36.
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ing Act of 1938308 and its accompanying regulations together com-
prised a comprehensive regulatory scheme creating a full fiduciary
relationship upon which a tribe could base its claim for equitable
relief.309 Although the Claims Court came to a different conclusion,
distinguishing the Tenth Circuit case as involving tribal leases while
the case before it involved individual allottees' leases, 310 the Federal
Circuit held there was jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.311 While
the statute regulating Indian allottees' mineral rights was less exten-
sive, the regulations and the amount of control exercised by the
Government were the same.
Actual elaborate governmental management was stated as suffi-
cient to create a full fiduciary relationship in Mitchell I. Is this a
separate basis for creation of a full fiduciary relationship even in the
absence of a comprehensive scheme? Perhaps there is no real dis-
tinction between elaborate control as a basis for the full fiduciary
relationship and a comprehensive scheme. It seems that any time
Congress enacts a comprehensive legislative scheme there would be
elaborate control of the resource. The significance of the focus on
elaborate control appears to be that, absent a comprehensive
scheme and assuming a statutory basis at least permitting the action,
actual control may be a sufficient factor on which to base a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty by mismanagement of the trust. The man-
agement of tribal and individual Indian trust funds appears to fit
within this framework, for although the Government controls and
even gets the benefit of tribal trust money, the statutory scheme is
less comprehensive. As long as the Government, and not the Indian
or the tribe, has actual control over the management of a resource,
the exercise of this control can create a trust claim.
Until the Manchester Band case was decided, Indian tribal trust
funds were kept in the United States Treasury at rates as low as four
percent simple interest.31 2 The Mitchell II case involved manage-
308. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-g (1988).
309. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855, 857 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 970 (1986).
310. Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187, 188-89 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1032 (1988).
311. See id. at 189-90 (finding Federal Government owes fiduciary obligation to Indians
for administration, collection, and payment of royalties under oil and gas leases).
312. As an added insult, the amount of interest earned on tribal trust funds was placed in
a separate fund earning no interest, so as not to violate the "no-interest rule" that interest
cannot be paid by the United States, absent a treaty or statute requiring such payment. See
supra note 191 and accompanying text (explaining no-interest rule in context of Manchester
Band ofPomo Indians v. United States). Furthermore, the court applies strict construction to the
rule barring governmental payment of interest. See JOHN M. STEADMAN ET AL., LITIGATION
WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 6.120 (2d ed. 1983) (explaining function of no-interest rule
in context of Claims Court).
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ment of trust funds into which timber proceeds had been placed
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 162a, authorizing the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to invest such funds.313 While not discussing the funds sepa-
rately, the Court noted that "the pattern of pervasive federal control
evident in the area of timber sales and timber management applies
equally to grants of rights-of-way and to management of Indian
funds." 314
The conclusion that tribes should be able to bring claims for mis-
management of any trust funds held by the Government, no matter
the source, is consonant with an earlier Court of Claims decision
holding that funds subject to section 162a are trust funds on which a
Tucker Act claim could be based. Since Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v.
United States,315 the Federal Government has begun investing the
$1.6 billion it holds in trust for Indian tribes and individuals. 31 6
Thus, the threat posed by successful breach of trust suits has yielded
greatly improved management of Indian trust funds and much
greater revenue for the tribes. In short, it appears fairly well estab-
lished that any money held in trust for tribes or individual Indians
pursuant to some statutory or treaty authority comprises a trust
fund, and mismanagement of these funds is a breach of trust reme-
diable by money damages in the Claims Court.31 7
In addition to timber, mineral resources, and trust funds, it seems
that any governmental mismanagement of tribal natural resources
should suffice as a basis for a breach of trust claim. If the statutory
scheme is not comprehensive, pervasive actual control will probably
suffice, with the caveat that control must rest with the Government
and not the individual. Although there are no Tucker Act cases
since Mitchell II applying this theory to management of other re-
sources, one Indian Claims Commission opinion involving breach of
trust has relied on the reasoning in Mitchell II to hold that manage-
313. See Mitchell H1, 463 U.S. at 223 n.24 (describing broad authority allocated to Federal
Government to invest tribal and individual Indian trust funds if "deemed advisable" and for
"best interest" of Indians); see also Act ofJune 24, 1938, ch. 648, § 1, 52 Stat. 1037 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 162a (1988)) (authorizing Secretary of Interior to invest and man-
age Indian trust funds and detailing procedures to be followed to guarantee protection of
Indians' "best interest[s]").
314. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225 n.29.
315. 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. CI. 1975).
316. See Hearing on S. 1999 and S. 2000 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984) (statement of Hon. Kenneth L. Smith, Assistant Secretary for In-
dian Affairs, Department of Interior) (discussing disposition of $1.6 billion trust fund held for
Indians).
317. See Short v. United States, 719 F.2d 1133, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding accounts
containing proceeds of individual Indian labor, and interest thereon, to be designated as trust
funds), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); see also Rogers v. United States, 877 F.2d 1550, 1553
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (interpreting damages award f6r taking of aboriginal homelands as trust fund
subject to statutory duty to invest).
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ment of a resource created a statutory duty upon which a tribe can
premise its claim.A' 8
Failure to find a full fiduciary relationship does not, however, nec-
essarily leave a tribe without remedy. The tribe may have a remedy
in federal district court or the tribe may have a money damages rem-
edy, but in much more limited circumstances. In Mitchell I, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court held that the General Allotment Act
provision stating that the Government would hold allotted land "in
trust" for the allottee was not sufficient to create a full fiduciary rela-
tionship, but only imposed a limited trust.3 1 9 The Court interpreted
the Act's general language in light of the purpose of the statute,
which admittedly fulfilled the counter-trust goal to break up Indian
tribal land holdings.3 20 The limited purpose of holding the land in
trust was only to prevent its improvident alienation or sale by the
state to pay taxes until the allottee became sufficiently westernized
to manage their own affairs. Nevertheless, if an allottee could estab-
lish that the Government stood by and did nothing while the state
taxed the land and subsequently sold it to collect taxes, it would
seem that this failure to act in contravention of the purpose of the
limited trust would ground a claim for money damages.3 21
Consequently, while claims fitting within the narrow statute may
be permissible, general statutes setting policy for all tribes, such as
the Indian Reorganization Act3 2 2 or the Allotment Act, or for one
group of Indians, such as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act,3 23 do not create full fiduciary obligations.3 24
318. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 626-28 (1987)
(finding that elaborate governmental control over tribal water resources did not exist but that
governmental exercise of statutory authority to approve all tribal expenditures for irrigation
purposes provided sufficient actual control to establish enforceable duty to protect existing
water resources), dismissed on other grounds, 20 Cl. Ct. 371 (1990).
319. MitchellI1, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
320. See id at 544 n.5 (explaining partial justification for General Allotment Act as con-
gressional desire to persuade Indians to abandon tribal life and become private landowners).
321. SeeJones v. United States, 801 F.2d 1334, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding claim
fitting this fact pattern to be barred by statute of limitations), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013
(1987).
322. See Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n v. United States, 667 F.2d 64, 67-68 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (con-
struing § 5 of Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465, as creating limited trust imposing
duty on Government to prevent alienation of Indian lands, but not to promote all assets or
enterprises acquired by Indians), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 905 (1982).
323. See Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 784,799 (D. Alaska 1978) (quoting
explicit congressional language stating that Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act does not
create trust relationship between Indians and Federal Government), rev'd in part, 646 F.2d 399
(9th Cir. 1981); see also Begay v. United States, 865 F.2d 230, 231-32 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discuss-
ing and affirming Claims Court decision that Navajo and Hopi Indian Settlement Act does not
create full governmental obligations).
324. See Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417, 427-28 (1991) (finding
grant of reservation to Indians under General Allotment Act contained implied reservation of
water rights, but that Government is not obliged to guarantee amount of water); Eastern Band
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There appears to be some conflict over the extent to which the
Government's trust relationship requires it to manage tribal water
resources, but the reason is that management of water rights is best
analyzed as falling within the limited trust concept. There is no
scheme imposing comprehensive duties on the Secretary of the In-
terior to manage tribal water. In addition, the Government does not
manage tribal water resources on a day-to-day basis, owing in part
to the unique origin of tribal water rights. Tribal water rights in the
West have been defined by judicial decree. In Winters v. United
States,325 the Supreme Court held that creation of a reservation for
Indians implicitly reserved to them sufficient water for the purpose
for which the reservation was established. Because reservations in
the Southwest were established to encourage tribes to change from
their "nomadic and uncivilized" ways into a "pastoral and civilized"
people,3 26 this decision affirmed that the tribes are owners of valua-
ble water rights under the prior appropriations doctrine3 27 followed
in the West.
The Indians' opponents in tribal water cases have been private
parties and local water districts, in addition to the U.S. Government.
More important, the Secretary of the Interior has conflicting statu-
tory duties to provide water to non-Indian users.328 Under these
circumstances, the Supreme Court held in Nevada v. United States,3 29
that, whatever the scope of the duty owed to tribes, Congress has
required the Department of the Interior to "carry water on at least
two shoulders."3 30 Consequently, Congress could not have in-
tended that "the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary, who
would breach his duties to his single beneficiary" solely by repre-
senting conflicting interests without the beneficiary's consent,331 be
of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 75, 78 (1988) (stating that 25 U.S.C.
§ 2008(b) establishes general trust relationship only, not complete obligation mandating
monetary damages for educational deficiencies); Montana Bank v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 601,
614 (1985) (finding that 25 U.S.C. § 81, statute used by Fort Belknap Indian Community as
basis for federal fiduciary obligation, creates only limited trust).
325. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
326. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
327. CHARLES WILKINSON & RENNARD STRICKLAND, EDS., HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 575-78 (1982 ed.) (contrasting prior appropriation and riparian rights systems).
328. See Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 388-90 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-498 (1988)) (providing mechanism for Secretary of
Interior to use water for beneficial irrigation purposes, which includes non-Indian uses); Act
of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, § 26, 33 Stat. 225 (authorizing United States to build reclamation
projects under authority of Reclamation Act of 1902, and specifically authorizing use of In-
dian land for Pyramid Lake project at issue in Winters, provided that five acres of irrigable
reservation land are reserved for each member of reservation).
329. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
330. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983).
331. Id.
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applied against the Government. Nevada was not a claims case and
can be limited to cases in which Congress has given the Department
of the Interior conflicting mandates and in which a tribe essentially
argues the Government breached its duty of loyalty as a trustee.33 2
In addition, Nevada was an unusual case because the Government
itself sued on behalf of the tribe and admitted that it had not repre-
sented the tribe adequately when it entered into a water settlement
in 1954. The remedy sought in Nevada would have required modifi-
cation of a water judgment, with resultant destabilization of the le-
gitimate expectations of thousands of non-Indian water users.
Nevertheless, even in other settings, the law is far from settled with
respect to breach of trust regarding management of water.
In a two-paragraph unpublished opinion, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed a Claims Court dismissal of a claim brought by allottees of
the Salt River Reservation for breach of trust by failure to deliver
water to individual allotments as required by the Winters doctrine.3 33
The Claims Court opinion distinguished the case from Mitchell II on
several bases, but primarily on the ground that there was no trust
corpus analogous to the timber in Mitchell I. The court noted that
water for irrigation is not a resource that can be treated as a trust
corpus because it is not a source of wealth that must be managed so
as to conserve the asset while maximizing income that must then be
disbursed as profits.33 4
The Claims Court also held that the specific statutes relied on by
the Indians only created a limited or bare trust requiring the De-
partment of the Interior to allocate water fairly to the eligible allot-
tees. It did not impose a duty to manage water resources on the
Government.335 Provisions of the General Allotment Act dealing
with allotments of irrigable land and regulations governing irriga-
tion provide only for delivery to the allotments of whatever water
allottees are entitled to, but do not impose any duties to manage the
water resource for the allottees.336 At most, the statute and regula-
tions require that the Secretary not discriminate in allocating irriga-
332. See Roger Florio, Mater Rights: Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust After Nevada v. United
States, 13 AM. INDIAN L. R~v. 79, 93-98 (1987) (arguing that Nevada unnecessarily weakened
Indian trust claims by severing water adjudication from governmental trust responsibilities).
333. Grey v. United States, No. 91-5001, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11705 (unpublished
opinion) (Fed. Cir. May 24, 1991), afg 21 Cl. Ct. 285 (1990), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498
(U.S. Jan. 21, 1992).
334. Grey, 21 C. Ct. at 293.
335. Id.
336. Id. (finding no evidence that Congress intended Secretary of Interior to act as trustee
with respect to irrigating each allotment).
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tion water among allotted lands.3 3 7 There was no charge that he
had done so. In sum, the allottees' claim, which was essentially that
they had to pay more for water than users on non-Indian land,3 38
was not within the narrow scope of the applicable statutes. Again,
this result does not necessarily mean that Government actions with
regard to tribal water rights are never remediable, but only that the
claim must be within the existing statutory scheme or be based on
actual control by the United States.
In Nevada v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court left
open the question of whether a tribe may bring a claim against the
United States for breach of trust if the United States had in fact
breached a duty of care in representing the tribe's interests in a
water suit.33 9 A recent Claims Court case involving the Fort Mojave
and Colorado River Indian Tribes, Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United
States,340 raised this issue explicitly. The tribes argued that the Gov-
ernment breached its fiduciary duty of acting as the tribes' attorney
by omitting a portion of their land in determining the amount of
acreage entitled to water for irrigation. They sought damages to
compensate them for the water rights lost as a result of the Govern-
ment's miscalculation. In a thorough opinion, Judge Andewelt up-
held the court's jurisdiction, applying two alternative bases to do so.
First, he held that the executive orders creating the reservation and
the statute authorizing the Government to sue to protect Indian
337. Id. at 299. The court also held that the Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat.
388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-498), did not create a
claim because it provided nothing more than a foundation for United States ownership of
tribal water rights that had been appropriated and put to beneficial use under the Winters
doctrine. Id- at 295. The court concluded that water reclamation laws thus do not establish
any basis for allocating additional water to individual tribe members. Id.
The court in Grey went on to find that the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-512, § 10, 102 Stat. 2549, established
Claims Court jurisdiction only in causes of action arising from that statute's extinguishment of
claims existing in 1991. The Settlement Act itself did not provide a mechanism for the ad-
vancement of new claims. Grey, 21 Cl. Ct. at 296. For these reasons, the court decided that
the Government had no duty to deliver more water to the allottees than they were entitled to
under existing court decrees. In addition, the court found that no daily supervision and con-
trol existed that would permit a breach of trust finding based on the elaborate governmental
control theory of Navajo Tribe. Id. at 294.
338. Apparently, several statutes permitting the Secretary of the Interior to charge allot-
tees for a share of water delivery system construction costs were responsible for this differ-
ence in price, because the nonIndian users' water was subsidized in part by the water project.
Although the plaintiffs alleged that they had to pay higher prices for water than individuals on
nonreservation land, they presented no evidence on water pricing. Accordingly, the court
explicitly declined to make findings as to the effect these statutes might have on the reserva-
tions. Id. at 295 n.11.
339. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 135 n.14 (1983) (citing case brought on
grounds of governmental breach of duty to provide sufficient water for fishing). The cited
case, Northern Paiute Nation v. United States, 30 Indian Cl. Comm'n 210 (1973), was settled
rather than litigated on the merits. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135 n.14.
340. Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417 (1991).
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tribes' resource interests, 3 41 coupled with the Government's repre-
sentation of the tribe, was sufficient to invoke the elaborate control
theory creating full fiduciary responsibilities.3 42 Alternatively, the
court stated that the statute itself, while not requiring the Govern-
ment to take every case, imposed duties on the United States in the
cases taken.3 43 In other words, although the statute created a lim-
ited trust, the actions of the United States were within that trust.
At first blush, these two recent Claims Court decisions seem com-
pletely contradictory. In Grey,Judge Tidwell flatly stated that Winters
water rights did not represent a trust corpus, while in Fort Mojave
Indian Tribe v. United States, Judge Andewelt insisted that Winters
rights can be a trust corpus.3 44 The distinctions between the cases
lie both in the source of the trust and the duty breached. In Grey,
the statutory scheme was skimpy and the Government did not as-
sume control over delivery of water to allottees; in fact, allottees
themselves had control over their own water resources.3 45 More-
over, the allottees sought to impose an affirmative duty on the Gov-
ernment. In Fort Mojave, the tribal claimants alleged that the
Government acted to harm their water rights. In sum, tribes may
base a claim for breach of trust on mismanagement of tribal natural
resources, including water, and to trust funds if the Government ac-
tually controls the resources generating the funds. If there is no
actual control, tribes may still rely on a comprehensive statutory
scheme, provided one exists. Cases involving claims that do not
arise out of actual mismanagement in a skimpy statutory and regula-
tory context present more difficult issues.
6. Applying the appropriate standard
A determination that jurisdiction exists is, however, but one issue.
The most problematic issues involve the scope of trust duties. The
Federal Circuit has given no guidance on the standard to be applied
to measure the Government's actions, in part because there have
been very few cases in which the tribe's claim moved beyond thresh-
341. 25 U.S.C. § 175 (1988). The Act states that "[i]n all States and Territories where
there are reservations or allotted Indians the United States attorney shall represent them in all
suits at law and in equity." Id Despite this mandatory representation language, courts have
held that Congress intended to give the United States attorney the authority to represent
tribes, but did not require the United States to represent tribes in every action.
342. Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, 23 Cl. Ct. at 425-26.
343. Id. at 426.
344. See id. ("[Tihe title to plaintiffs' water rights constitutes the trust property, or the res,
which the government, as trustee, has a duty to preserve.").
345. The reader might recall that in Mitchell I and Mitchell II, the General Allotment Act
permitted substantial control by allottees, which was one reason the Act was held not to im-
pose full fiduciary obligations.
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old issues. Mitchell II merely held that the Court of Claims had
proper jurisdiction; it did not reach the separate question of what
the precise duties of the Government trustee would be. One issue
regarding standards is well settled by cases decided after Mitchell H.
In claims against the Government for money damages, at least, a
finding that the tribe invoked a limited trust signifies that the court
will think in terms of a narrow remedy. 346 Although the court may
apply principles of liberal construction to determine the meaning of
an ambiguous statute, the court will be less willing to decide that the
statute can fairly be mandated as creating a claim for compensation
in the Eastport sense.347 Whether the finding of a full fiduciary rela-
tionship carries with it the requirement that a stricter standard be
applied to measure the conduct of the Secretary of the Interior is far
less settled.
In measuring the applicable standards for breach of trust regard-
ing management of trust funds before Mitchell II and in the opinion
on remand from Mitchell I, the Court of Claims applied the common
law of trusts to define the Government's duties as trustee. In each
case, the court held that the prudent investor rule3 48 applied, re-
quiring the United States to maximize returns on the funds within
the parameters of suitable investments set for all U.S.-managed
trust funds.3 49 Unfortunately, subsequent Claims Court cases have
not been consistent in applying any particular standard to deter-
mine whether the Secretary's actions constitute a breach of trust.3 5 0
Overall, the Claims Court decisions reflect a willingness to apply a
less rigorous standard to the Government as trustee in place of the
346. For example, in Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, the Court of Claims stated that the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act reflects clear congressional intent to avoid creating a
trust relationship. Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 223, 233-34 (1983). Conse-
quently, the court decided that liberal construction of the Act is inappropriate in deciding
what duties the Government may owe and whether those duties are remediable by damages.
Id. at 233-34.
347. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (explaining implications of Mitchell I major-
ity decision in Eastport sense). Eastport held that, in order to obtain relief, civil claimants
against the Federal Government must bring claims under statutes, other than the Tucker Act,
that specifically waive sovereign immunity and provide the party a damages remedy. Eastport
S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
348. See supra note 192 (explaining prudent investor's rule).
349. These parameters are explained in the federal district court opinion of Manchester
Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1244-45 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The
Court of Claims has incorporated this portion of the Manchester Band of Pomo Indians opinion
into its own jurisprudence. See Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Indians v. United States, 512
F.2d 1390, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (adopting Manchester Band of Porno Indians analysis of suitable
investments for Indian trust funds).
350. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 660, 677-
78 (1986) (applying private trust law standards to determine liability for breach of fair and
honorable dealings claim), af'd, 877 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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private trust law standards applied by the Court of Claims and the
district court some fifteen years earlier.
Moreover, the Government continued to argue that a far more
forgiving standard should be applied to measure the Secretary's ac-
tions. This question becomes particularly important in cases in
which the statutory scheme gives the Secretary discretion to take
certain actions for the benefit of Indians but does not mandate these
actions. In the cases decided after Mitchell II, the Government has
continued to argue, often successfully, that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act standard, "so arbitrary and capricious as to be an abuse
of discretion," should be applied. In other words, if a reasonably
prudent trustee would make a certain type of investment, can the
Government be assessed lost income damages for failing to make
the same investment under a scheme authorizing, but not requiring,
the Government to make a similar investment? Will a damages rem-
edy always follow whenever the court determines that a trust was
created?
As stated above, the Federal Circuit has had no occasion to rule
on the appropriate standard. While a federal court has applied pri-
vate trust law standards to determine that the Secretary breached
this trust, the Federal Circuit has treated this same issue more cava-
lierly in an opinion that may indicate ajudicial hostility to the breach
of trust doctrine. Inficarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp. ,35l the
Tenth Circuit held it was a breach of trust not to use a system of
calculating royalties designed to ensure that the tribe would receive
the highest return on its mineral leases. 352 In defense, the Secretary
of the Interior argued that he followed applicable federal leasing
regulations in adopting a method of calculating royalties.353
Although such a defense would be adequate were this simply an ad-
ministrative law case, the full court adopted the opinion of Judge
Seymour, who dissented from the panel decision.354
Judge Seymour found that the majority of the panel erred in im-
plementing an "administrative law analysis without considering
what role, if any, the Secretary's fiduciary duty should play in a
court's examination of his administrative action. '3 55 He then deter-
351. 782 F.2d 885 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 970 (1986).
352. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855, 857 (10th Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (per curiam) (reversing court's limitation on tribe's recovery), rev' 728 F.2d 1555
(10th Cir. 1984) (panel), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 970 (1986).
353. SeeJicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1557-60 (10th Cir.
1984) (panel) (discussing Government's defenses to tribe's claims).
354. Id. at 1566-69 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (arguing that dual system of accounting
should have been used).
355. Id. at 1566 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
812
1992] INDIAN CLAIMS 813
mined that the situation required the Secretary's actions to be "con-
strained by principles of Indian trust obligations as well as by
standards of administrative law."3 56 Consequently, the court en
banc followed Judge Seymour's analysis and held that the Secretary
was required to adopt a dual system of accounting to maximize roy-
alty income.3 57 With Jicarilla Apache and some Claims Court cases
(admittedly applying the fair and honorable dealings clause, but in-
voking and relying on Mitchell 11358), in conjunction with the
Supreme Court's invocation of private trust law standards in Mitchell
II, the courts could be read to indicate that, when a full fiduciary
relationship is present, private trust law standards will and should
be applied to measure the Government's performance as trustee.
356. Id. at 1567 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
357. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 782 F.2d at 857 (adopting Judge Seymour's reasoning for
requiring dual accounting system).
358. Although fair and honorable dealings cases began as purely moral claims, they have
metamorphosed into legal, statutory claims. As a result, there has been a certain amount of
cross-pollinization between the fair and honorable dealings accounting cases, involving claims
of mismanagement and nonfeasance of trust resources, and breach of trust claims raising
basically the same issues. The Claims Court, for example, has cited and relied on Mitchell II as
requiring a comprehensive scheme or elaborate control. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 619-20, 669 (1987) (finding that timber scheme similar to Mitch-
ell 1I creates fiduciary relationship between Government and tribe); Gila River Pima-Maricopa
Tribe v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 660, 676-77 n.15 (1986) (finding extensive control of leases
by Government can create trust or fiduciary relationship).
In White Mountain Apache, the tribe claimed damages for overgrazing of its rangeland. See
White Mountain Apache, 11 Cl. Ct. at 649 (claiming that Government's allowance of overgrazing
resulted in severe deterioration and erosion of rangeland). The court noted that despite the
absence of any statutory or regulatory-based duty, the Government's "program of leasing
grazing land under permits to non-Indian livestock owners" constituted an exercise of elabo-
rate control over the rangeland sufficient to create a fiduciary duty. Id. at 620, 649-50. When
these factors are present, the court analyzes the claims as if they are breach of trust claims. In
White Mountain Apache, the court dismissed most of the tribe's water claims, however, because
no statutes, treaties, or regulations required the United States to develop water resources. Id.
at 628 (citing Gila River in support of holding that fiduciary duty does not exist in absence of
treaty, statute, or agreement). Nevertheless, the Court relied on Interior Department regula-
tions stating that any appropriations from tribal funds for reclamation projects had to be
approved by the Secretary of the Interior and provide a potential basis for the exercise of
"elaborate control." If the tribe could establish that the Government appropriated tribal
funds or water for Interior Department or Department of the Army needs, the tribe might
have a claim. Id. at 644. The tribe was unsuccessful, however. Id. at 646-47.
In this sense, the analysis derived from Mitchell 11 seems to be broader than the analysis
previously applied to fair and honorable dealings claims which required a statute. The Claims
Court seems to regard Mitchell H as a broader basis for recovery than the fair and honorable
dealings clause. In Gila River, the court noted that "plaintiffs' arguments reflect tailoring and
adjustments to take advantage of new developments in legal concepts that were not available
at the time the claims were filed in 1951, or tried in 1972." Gila River, 9 Cl. Ct. at 6. On the
other hand, the Government maintains that the fair and honorable dealings cases are in fact
applying a much broader (liability-creating) analysis in keeping with its original basis as moral
claims. If Mitchell II now sets the standards for creation of a trust entitling the tribe to dam-
ages under the fair and honorable dealings clause, it seems only fair to argue that the courts
are applying the same liability rules. Given the small number of cases, it seems that, at the
least, counsel should be cautious in invoking these cases as precedent.
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On the other hand,Jicarilla Apache raised a federal question issue3 59
brought in federal court and seeking only equitable relief. More-
over, because an Indian claimant may base a federal question on
federal common law, including the trust relationship, the need to tie
the claim to a federal statute is not as essential to the jurisdiction as
it is in Claims Court.360
In Pawnee v. United States,36 1 an allottee claimed that the same roy-
alty calculation method held wanting inJicarilla Apache was a breach
of trust entitling him to a money damages remedy under the Tucker
Act. The Claims Court held that the plaintiff had failed to state a
claim under the Tucker Act because the statutory scheme was not
sufficient to create a trust relationship requiring a damages rem-
edy.3 62 The court distinguished Jicarilla Apache on the ground that
the statutory scheme regarding allottees was "different," and the
Tenth Circuit's "conclusory" analysis was "no more persuasive than
the plaintiff's here." 36 3
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with this reasoning, but
not the ultimate result. The Federal Circuit held that the compre-
hensive scheme for regulating tribal oil and gas resources, together
with the elaborate control over leasing of oil and gas, created the
kind of trust relationship contemplated in Mitchell /1.364 Neverthe-
less, the Federal Circuit denied any remedy and remanded with an
order to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, 36 5 in an
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). In 1965, Congress enacted a statute to remove any doubts
that Indian tribes could sue in federal court in cases in which the United States did not repre-
sent them, either because the United States declined or because the tribe did not want the
United States to represent them. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
360. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Barlow, 834 F.2d 1393, 1399-1400 & n.7
(8th Cir. 1987) (modifying statutory trust terms to permit transfer of money from tribe's
"sawmill account" to "general account" if operation of sawmill was not found to be economi-
cally prudent). In an earlier article, I argued that it is appropriate for the federal courts to
apply liberal standards to the creation of a trust relationship that can serve as a basis for a
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and to questions regarding the scope of the Government's
duties. See Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship, supra note 92, at 680 (analyz-
ing availability of equitable relief after Mitchell I decision).
361. 14 Indian L. Rep. 4024 (Cl. Ct. 1986) (unpublished opinion), aff'd on other grounds,
830 F.2d 187 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
362. Pawnee v. United States, 14 Indian L. Rep. 4024, 4025 (Cl. Ct. 1986) (unpublished
opinion) (finding "no pervasive governmental involvement in the management of the re-
source"), aff'd on other grounds, 830 F.2d 187 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
363. Id. at 4026; see 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1988) (requiring Secretary's approval for oil and gas
leases on individual allottee's land). Earlier in the opinion, the court distinguished the stat-
utes relating to allotted land because they did not specifically refer "to the needs and best
interests of the Indian owners." Pawnee, 14 Indian L. Rep. at 4025. The applicable regula-
tions were the same as those inficarilla Apache, however.
364. See Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 190-91 (citingJicarilla Apache with approval for this holding).
365. Id. at 191-92 (holding that Pawnee failed to state claim for breach of fiduciary duty
because claim essentially required Secretary "to go contrary and beyond" applicable regula-
tions and terms of leases).
opinion that raises some serious questions regarding the Federal
Circuit's approach to trust questions. The court distinguished Ji-
carilla Apache on the basis that the plaintiffs in Jicarilla Apache chal-
lenged the regulations themselves, while the plaintiffs in Pawnee had
not.
3 66
Both the repudiated panel decision inJicarilla Apache and the Fed-
eral Circuit opinion in Pawnee take a crimped and crabbed look at
the statutes and regulations, applying the lens more of administra-
tive law than of Indian trust law in the interpretive process. In both
opinions, for example, the court relied on the fact that the statutory
scheme, while requiring management in the best interests of the les-
sors, did not require the Secretary to obtain the highest return for
the tribe.3 67 Imposing a requirement on the claimants to challenge
the regulations could implicitly indicate that the regulations can
only be challenged when they are not within the scope of delegated
power or promulgated in accordance with the procedures set forth
in the Administrative Procedure Act.368 The court stated in Pawnee
that "the scope and extent of the fiduciary relationship, with respect
to this particular matter, is established by the regulation and
leases."3 69 If this is true, it is doubtful whether the Federal Circuit
will be willing to apply a higher standard to the Government. Thus,
the first question, whether private trust law standards can or will be
applied by the Federal Circuit, is still unsettled.
A second difficult question regarding standards arises when the
gist of the complaint is not actual mismanagement but failure to act.
Recall the Cherokee Nation's complaint described in the introduc-
tion to this Article.370 The tribe has not accused the United States
of managing its resources badly, but of nonfeasance. If the United
States does nothing as trespassers take over the valuable riverbed
land belonging to the Cherokee Nation, can the tribe argue there is
a breach of trust? The Government has argued there is no jurisdic-
tion over the Cherokee Nation's nonfeasance claims because there is
no remediable trust relationship in the Mitchell H sense. Judge Tid-
well has dismissed all of the Cherokee Nation's claims except the
claim that the United States is obligated to remove trespassers from
the tribe's mineral land. Somewhat reluctantly, the court held that
Pawnee does establish that the Mineral Leasing Act creates a full fi-
366. Id.
367. Id. at 191.
368. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-701 (1988).
369. Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 192.
370. See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text (discussing Cherokee Nation's litigation
with Government over Oklahoma land rights).
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duciary relationship. Thus, the claim could not be dismissed out of
hand.3 7' Nevertheless, the issue ofjust what, if any, duty 25 U.S.C.
§ 175372 imposes upon the Government to act to remove trespassers
has yet to be addressed. 373 Whether the Federal Circuit will adopt
the parsimonious view of Judge Tidwell3 74 or the more expansive
view of Judge Andewelt 375 remains to be seen, but its opinion in
Pawnee does not bode well for tribal trust claims.
By now the limits of this new claim for money damages for breach
of trust must be clear. In addition to the procedural and technical
hurdles, two major principles keep this a weapon that is only useful,
but enormously so, in a few situations. First, because Congress cre-
ates the trust, it sets the limits of its own liability. It follows that
Congress can terminate a trust relationship without incurring any
liability.376 The court's role will be limited to determining whether
371. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 565, 577 (1990). Judge Tidwell stated:
The existence of a general fiduciary duty "does not mean ... that every Government
action disliked by the Indians is automatically a violation of that trust." Nevertheless,
comparing the language in plaintiff's complaint with the statutes and regulations
cited, the court finds that plaintiff ostensibly has met the requirements of Pawnee,
Thus, at trial, plaintiff must show with particularity which statutes and regulations
apply, and how defendant failed to follow the statutory requirements.
Id. (quoting Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 190 n.5) (emphasis in original). As of March 3, 1992, the
Cherokee claim remains alive, but only barely, after three amended complaints. The tribal
claimants have listed more potential trespassers, and the Court has implied that the tribe may
amend their complaint later as more information develops. Cherokee Nation v. United States,
No. 218-89L, 1992 WL 41510 (Cl. Ct. Mar. 5, 1992) (denying in part Government's motions
to strike third amended complaint and denying motion to dismiss with prejudice). Cf Choc-
taw Nation v. United States, No. 218-89L, 1992 WL 43324 (Cl. Ct. Mar. 9, 1992) (granting in
part defendant's motion to strike, but refusing to dismiss with prejudice in claim raising iden-
tical issues of fact and law brought by Choctaw Nation).
372. 25 U.S.C. § 175 (1988). The statute states that "[iun all States and Territories where
there are reservations or allotted Indians the United States attorney shall represent them in all
suits at law or in equity." Id.
373. In fact, the issue may never be addressed. The parties are involved in a standoff that
does not bode well for the tribe. The court has ordered the tribe to name the trespassers with
particularity. The tribe asserts it cannot because the Government has not done the survey.
374. See Cherokee Nation v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 117, 118-19 (1991) (holding that
striking of portions of plaintiff's pleading is appropriate when certain issues addressed in
amended complaint have previously been disposed of by court and when complaint fails to
supply information expressly required by court in prior ruling); Sankey v. United States, 22
Cl. Ct. 743, 746-48 (1991) (holding that statute of limitations bars breach of fiduciary duty
claim, and that Government did not have duty to exercise royalty in kind provision); Grey v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285, 300 (1990) (holding that no fiduciary relationship exists, and
that statutes do not give rise to comprehensive scheme that would otherwise form trust rela-
tionship), aff'd without opinion, 935 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Cherokee Nation v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 565, 582 (1990) (dismissing majority of plaintiff's claims, including claims
for failure to remove trespassers from tribal land).
375. See Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417, 432 (1991) (denying
majority of Government's motion for summary judgment because material issues of fact exist
regarding whether Government actions constitute breach of trust).
376. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335, 1339 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(finding no cognizable claim against Government for intentional termination), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 950 (1980).
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the executive branch properly executed the provisions of the termi-
nation statute. For example, terminating a rancheria without assur-
ing the tribe a proper sewage system, as promised in the termination
statute, is a breach of trust.377 Absent any breach of the statute,
however, just as property rules prevented tribes from recovering for
land lost through allotment, the trust rules prevent tribes from re-
covering for the termination era.
The second principle is that the claim encompasses only damages
to money and property held in trust by the Government. The
Claims Court and Federal Circuit have relied on the earlier fair and
honorable dealings claims cases, such as Fort Sill and Gila River, to
reiterate that no claim exists for damages to a tribe's cultural integ-
rity, right to exist, or psychological harm. In Begay v. United States,378
both these principles came into play. The Federal Circuit affirmed
the Claims Court's dismissal of the suit on grounds that the claim-
ants had no action for psychological harm and damage to their com-
munity caused by the forced relocation of Navajo elders from Hopi
land pursuant to the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974.37 0
No trust corpus was administered by the United States nor was there
any intent to create a trust.3 8 0 Moreover, Congress ordered the re-
location and there was no allegation that the executive department
had violated the statute.38 ' At most, the Navajo-Hopi Land Settle-
ment Act created a claim for statutory benefits and the claimants
had not alleged any denial of such benefits.38 2
377. See Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 45 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (determining California
Rancheria Act directing Secretary to construct whatever irrigation and sanitation systems
agreed to by tribe and United States created claim for damages to compensate for failure to
provide sewer system), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1228 (1983); Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp.
56, 57-60 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that termination of Indian rancheria was unlawful be-
cause United States failed to comply with California Rancheria Act requiring provision of
sanitation facilities prior to termination).
378. 865 F.2d 230 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
379. Begay v. United States, 865 F.2d 230, 231-32 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reaffirming Claims
Court's denial of damages for social, economic, cultural, and psychological harm founded on
theories of breach of statutory trust and breach of trust). See generally Navajo-Hopi Land Set-
tlement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 1712 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 640d-640d-
28 (1974)) (providing final settlement of conflicting land rights and interests of Hopi and
Navajo Tribes).
380. Begay, 865 F.2d at 231-32 (affirming Claims Court finding that essential elements
creating common law trust were lacking).
381. There is a problem with conceptualizing a trust corpus in the water cases. See Grey v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285, 300 (1990) (holding that no trust relationship existed), aff'd
without opinion, 935 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1991); supra notes 333-37 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing water cases).
382. Begay, 865 F.2d at 251.
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B. Property Claims in the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of
Claims
Four of the five classes of claims created by the Indian Claims
Commission Act have been invoked as bases for claims involving
property.3 83 Some tribes regarded these claims as an opportunity to
recoup the difference between the incredibly low prices paid when
land was taken in the 18th and 19th centuries and the value of the
land in the 20th century.38 4 In fact, a major goal of the legislation
was to remove clouds from land titles.38 5 There were many barriers
to successful completion of these claims. The reader might recall,
for instance, that the Commission adopted the adversary process
and never funded the planned Investigation Division. As a result,
tribes faced considerable problems, including (1) proof that the
tribe had actual control over a certain area before dispossession; (2)
proof that the dispossession did in fact occur; and (3) proof that the
Government was responsible.3 86 Anthropologists and historians
testified as expert witnesses for both the Government and the tribes,
often presenting competing versions of the truth. Of course one of
the problems with the adversary nature of the proceedings was that
the Justice Department attorneys threw themselves into the task of
contesting every inch of acreage and denying each tale of
injustice.38 7
Proving that the Government had in fact acquired the land un-
justly was only the beginning of the problems, for the tribes had to
383. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (detailing five classes of claims created by
Indian Claims Commission Act). The four clauses that have been invoked as bases for prop-
erty claims are clause one, which creates a claim for constitutional takings; clause three, the
so-called "treaty revision" clause, which permits the Commission to grant additional payment
if a treaty was based on "unconscionable consideration"; clause four which addresses other
takings of property; and clause five, the fair and honorable dealings clause. Id.
384. See DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL, supra note 24, at 227 (discussing function and effect
of Indian claims decisions); Rosenthal, supra note 96, at 65 (discussing Indian's perceptions of
role of Indian Claims Commission).
385. See Rosenthal, supra note 96, at 65-66 (discussing purpose of Indian Claims Commis-
sion Act).
386. See Pawnee Indian Tribe v. United States, I Indian Cl. Comm'n 245, 258-59 (1950)
(finding that whether tribe can establish aboriginal title is question of fact and tribe must
prove occupancy of land to exclusion of other tribes), rev'd in part on other grounds, 301 F.2d
667 (Ct. Cl. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1962); see also Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation,
Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, 41 A.L.R. FED. 425, 436-521 (1979)
(discussing proof necessary to establish aboriginal title and providing cases addressing issue);
supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's failure to establish In-
vestigation Division for gathering evidence relevant to claims, and adoption instead of adver-
sary model).
387. SHATruCK & NORGREN, supra note 24, at 148-49 (describing overzealousness of Jus-
tice Department attorneys); see also Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 615, 616
(1988) (criticizing each side's attorneys for "exhibit[ing] a propensity towards what can only
be characterized as 'one-upmanship'.. . and dilatory posturing").
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walk through a minefield of liability-limiting rules.3 8 8 In the Indian
Claims Commission Act, for example, Congress provided for "gra-
tuitous offsets."38s9 Thus, the Government had the opportunity to
present evidence of literally every blanket given to a tribe to offset
the judgment.390 In the offset phase of the Sioux Nation claim that
was only finally resolved in 1988, the Government claimed the right
to offset $65 million against the $44 million award.3 9 1
The rationales for permitting the offsets seem rather dubious.
The first was that tribes would have paid for the items anyway. This
seems doubtful because many of the benefits, such as religious edu-
cation by missionaries, were not welcomed by the tribes. Other de-
sirable benefits may not have been so regarded had the tribes been
informed they would have to pay for them later. The second ration-
ale was that, because the Government provided for adjudication of
moral claims, it was only fair to balance this inclusion by providing
for offsets. In light of the earlier discussion of the fate of the fair
and honorable dealings clause of the Indian Claims Commission
Act,3 92 this rationale seems laughable. Finally, although less often
cited, the desire to protect the Treasury seems to have been para-
mount. 393 Out of a sense of fairness, the Indian Claims Commission
did, however, develop an ameliorating rule. If a tribe had resisted
the Government and signed a treaty only after a war, then it would
not necessarily be liable for offsets because the treaty could not be
compared to a contract nor could the offsets be likened to part of
the compensation. On the other hand, if the treaty was a voluntary
treaty ceding land, the offsets could be counted as part of the con-
sideration. This distinction is known as the "treaty of peace (no off-
388. For an excellent economic analysis of these limiting rules, see generally Leonard A.
Carlson, What Was It Worth?, in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND
CLAIMS 87 (Imre Sutton ed. 1985).
389. See Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (omit-
ted from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30, 1978) (granting Com-
mission power to set off gratuitous expenditures made by Government against any award
made to claimant). See generally MONROE E. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 494-504
(1973) (criticizing offset provision and giving examples, such as case offsetting $12 million
from award of $17 million).
390. See Rosenthal, supra note 96, at 47-48 (discussing allowance of Government to de-
duct gratuitous expenditures from final award).
391. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 80, 80 (1985) (noting impor-
tance of offset phase of claim), vacated sub nom. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States,
806 F.2d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 913 (1987). This claim for adequate
compensation for land ceded in an 1868 treaty is discussed infra text accompanying notes 458-
75.
392. See supra notes 122-82 and accompanying text (discussing fair and honorable deal-
ings clause).
393. See Carlson, supra note 388, at 97 (discussing three justifications for allowance of
gratuitous offsets and noting that one such justification was that offsets reduced amount of
award, thereby "protect[ing] the federal treasury from unusually large claims").
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sets allowed)/treaty of cession (offsets allowed)" distinction. 394
Although the Commission also attempted to deny the Government
offsets upon evidence of dishonorable conduct by the United States
no matter how the treaty might be characterized,3 95 the Court of
Claims reversed, holding that the only appropriate question was
whether the treaty was one of peace or one of cession.3 95
Howard Friedman has argued that the Commission and Court of
Claims designed some of the rules to avoid assessing interest on
ancient claims. 397 The courts, for example, measure the fair market
value of land taken at the date of taking, i.e., in 19th-century and not
late 20th-century dollars. In addition, the Government is only liable
for interest on a claim if there is a statute, contract, or constitutional
claim because of the no-interest rule.398 Thus, the successful tribal
claimant in an inverse condemnation suit brought under the Fifth
Amendment takings clause is entitled to interest. If the tribal claim-
ant's land has not been taken in the constitutional sense, however,
the tribe only has a statutory claim, and nothing in the Indian
Claims Commission Act provides for an interest award in a noncon-
stitutional claim. 399 It is true that the no-interest rule applies
across-the-board to all litigants, including Indian tribes. Other liti-
gants are not in the same position as Indian tribes, however, be-
cause the Government barred only Indian tribes from suing the
Government for confiscation in the Court of Claims. As a result, the
unavailability of interest in the cases in which tribes have been able
to recover for a confiscation of aboriginal title since the courts were
opened to them, their damages awards have been completely inade-
quate to restore them to their original position.
Furthermore, application of the no-interest rule became a power-
ful incentive to the development of further liability-reducing rules.
394. See Sioux Tribe, 8 Cl. Ct. at 82 (discussing use of "treaty of peace" rule by Indian
Claims Commission and Court of Claims).
395. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 42 Indian Cl. Comm'n 214, 232 (1978) (stat-
ing conduct of United States "tainted the course of dealings between the United States and
the Sioux [so] that we cannot in good conscience offset any gratuitous expenditures.").
396. United States v. Sioux Tribe of Indians, 616 F.2d 485, 487 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (interpret-
ing 1868 treaty of cession under which gratuitous offsets must be allowed).
397. Friedman, supra note 191, at 26.
398. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing no-interest rule).
399. See Loyal Creek Band of Indians v. United States, I Indian Cl. Comm'n 195, 207,
215-17 (1950) (holding that upon accepting $600,000 award in 1903, Band was estopped
from denying finality of award), rev'dsub nim. Loyal Band of Creek Indians v. United States, 97
F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 813 (1951). On appeal, the Court of Claims re-
versed the Commission's decision and awarded the Band $600,000. While the court felt in-
clined to favor the view that interest should be paid on the award, it deferred to the Supreme
Court's view that the Government was exempt from paying interest. See Loyal Band of Creek
Indians v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 426, 431 (Ct. Cl.) (discussing why court declined to
include over 40 years of interest in award), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 813 (1951).
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Where a treaty exists, for example, whether fraudulent or coerced,
the claim can only be treated as a treaty revision claim and not one
based on the Constitution. If the claim can be characterized as a
breach of trust instead of a taking in the constitutional sense, inter-
est may also be avoided.40 0
The Commission alone cannot be blamed for developing these
liability reducing rules because early in the Commission's history,
the Supreme Court sent a clear and deliberate signal that the Gov-
ernment purse was to be protected. In the infamous 1955 case of
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,401 the Court drew a distinction
between aboriginal Indian title, land owned and occupied since time
immemorial by an Indian tribe, and "recognized" title, land granted
to an Indian tribe by Congress in a treaty or statute.40 2 In effect, the
Court held that if the tribes did not have a deed for their ancestral
land they did not own it, at least not in the constitutional sense.403
Thus, the Federal Government could take it away without incurring
any liability. In fact, in addition to ethnocentrism at best and racism
at worst, the other major impetus for this decision was fiscal. The
Government had attached an appendix to a predecessor case, listing
all of the Indian Claims Commission cases involving property and
asserting that the Government's liability would be over $9 billion,
with $8 billion of that amount constituting interest. 40 4 In addition,
the case itself arose in the context of Government-authorized cut-
ting of timber in the Tongass Forest in Alaska, where vast mineral
resources only recently had been discovered. Alaskan Natives held
most of Alaska in "aboriginal" title. The Tee-Hit-Ton decision ena-
bled the American people to acquire Alaska without any enforceable
duty to pay for it.405
After the decision in Tee-Hit-Ton, the Government urged the In-
dian Claims Commission to import this same distinction into all five
clauses of the Indian Claims Commission Act, by arguing that the
Indian Claims Commission Act had no jurisdiction over any claims
400. See generally Friedman, supra note 191 (discussing various liability reducing rules);
Carlson, supra note 388, at 96, 106 n.8 (arguing that, on average, tribe would receive same
award today if it either was paid market rate of interest or was allowed to hold its land longer).
401. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
402. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-91 (1955) (holding that
Indian occupancy may be terminated by Government without compensation where Congress
has not specifically recognized "occupancy" as ownership).
403. Id.
404. Brief for Petitioner at 55-57, United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48
(1951) (per curiam) (No. 281).
405. See Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign, supra note 174, at 1272 (stating that Tee-Hit-
Ton decision prompted native groups to lobby Congress for compensation leading to enact-
ment of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act).
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not based on recognized tide. The Commission rejected this argu-
ment, holding that the distinction mattered only for the purposes of
a clause 1, constitutional claim.40 6 Nevertheless, the liability-reduc-
ing rules discussed above prevented many claims from falling into
clause 1.
Only recently did the Supreme Court put its imprimatur on one of
the rules developed by the Commission to avoid payment of inter-
est, albeit in a case in which the Court adopted the stringent stan-
dard, yet found that the tribe met it. In Sioux Nation of Indians v.
United States,40 7 the Supreme Court applied what claims lawyers
know as the Fort Berthold408 test to distinguish between a taking for
which interest is owed and a mere breach of trust for which no inter-
est is owed. This test directs the court to assess whether Congress
was acting as a trustee by merely transmuting the tribe's land into
money or as a sovereign confiscating tribal land.40 9 The best way to
make this determination is, of course, to see whether the Govern-
ment "purported to give an adequate consideration" for the prop-
erty.410 Under the Fort Berthold test, a good faith, but incompetent,
effort to pay the tribe insulates the Government from Fifth Amend-
ment liability. Fortunately, in applying this test, the Supreme Court
decided that telling the Sioux to sign a treaty or starve was not the
act of a guardian but that of a sovereign.4 1'
Again, this test was influenced by fear of the liability that might
result if the same test was applied to Indian tribes as that applied
when a physical invasion of property results in a taking: a per se
rule, absent consent by the landowner. 412 Many more of the ancient
claims, including those that arose during the allotment era when the
406. See Otoe & Missouria Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265, 275 (Ct.
Cl. 1955) (discussing legislative purpose behind Indian Claims Commission Act), cert, denied,
350 U.S. 848 (1955).
407. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
408. Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 691 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (deter-
mining that Congress only acts in two capacities in dealing with Indian people).
409. See id. at 691 (setting guidelines for courts to determine Congress' capacity to act).
410. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (discussing whether taking of
Indian property occurred without just compensation).
411. See Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 448 U.S. 371, 423 (1980) (finding that,
in assuming obligation to provide rations to Indians, Congress did not intend such provision
as compensation for taking of land). The Government attached the "sell-or-starve" rider to
the treaty during the winter when the Government prevented the tribe from hunting, moved
most of the members into stockades, and threatened to withhold rations if they did not agree
to the treaty.
412. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (af-
firming traditional rule that Government's "permanent physical occupation of property" con-
stitutes taking); see also NellJessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment Takings of Indian
Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L. REv. 245, 260 (1982) (criticizing Court's
application of good faith effort test in Sioux Nation).
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Government broke up the last great tribal land masses from 1887 to
the early 1930s, would have been takings because many tribes did
not consent to allotment. 41 3 As recently as the 1950s, the Govern-
ment converted tribal land to cash for individual Indians as part of
its termination policy, sometimes with the consent of the affected
tribes, but oftentimes without consent.414
Sioux Nation was decided shortly before enactment of the Federal
Courts Improvement Act. Of the seven dispositions in property
cases that have reached the Federal Circuit since its inception, only
four opinions involving three claims addressed the merits of prop-
erty issues. 415 In general, these cases illustrate that the substantive
law applied to property cases is regarded as settled. They also illus-
trate that the Federal Circuit exercised appropriate supervision over
the Claims Court judges, many of whom were new to the bizarre
world of Indian claims in which a twenty-year-old case is regarded as
"new." It is not surprising in such circumstances that the Claims
Court judges occasionally erred in their application of substantive
property law.4 16 In their efforts to dispose of these old cases, the
Claims Court occasionally went beyond the permissible. In another
Sioux land claim, for example, the Claims Court ordered the eight
tribes of the Sioux Nation to consider a settlement offer.417
Although two tribes accepted, six tribes either explicitly or implicitly
rejected the offer. The trial judge entered judgment at $40 million,
the amount of the Government's settlement offer "neither as a sanc-
413. See S. LYMAN TYLER, A HIsToRY OF INDIAN POLICY 95-124 (1973) (relating history of
allotment policy of 1887-1930 during which Indian tribes lost 90 million acres of tribal land).
414. See generally DONALD L. Frxico, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION (1986) (relating his-
tory of termination period of 1945-60). According to Fixico, termination resulted in the loss
of 1,369,000 acres by 1960. Idt at 183.
415. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 765 F.2d 160 (un-
published opinion), 12 Indian L. Rep. 2049, 2050 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (disapproving basis for
determining farmland); Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 738
F.2d 452 (unpublished opinion), 11 Indian L. Rep. 2074, 2074 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming
lower court's compensatory award for extinguishment of aboriginal title; remanding for de-
termination of amount of land available for farming); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 726 F.2d 712, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that there was no Fifth Amendment taking
when Indians were not divested of preexisting property right); Wichita Indian Tribe v. United
States, 696 F.2d 1378, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (reversing finding that tribe had abandoned
aboriginal property and remanding to determine extent of aboriginal title and extent of Gov-
ernment liability).
416. The Claims Court misapplied settled law in one case. See Menominee Tribe, 726 F.2d at
714 (finding that judge erred because ruling was based on factors beyond court's jurisdiction).
In another case, the court's failure to support its conclusions resulted in two reversals. See
Gila River, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 2050 (vacating and increasing amount of farmable acreage
after finding that Claims Court again failed to support its conclusion); Gila River, 11 Indian L.
Rep. at 2075-76 (affirming damage award but remanding for redetermination of farmable
acreage because Claims Court did not explain basis for its conclusion).
417. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 8 CL, Ct. 80, 91-92 (1985) (discussing
settlement offer made to Indians and their reactions to it).
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tion nor as settlement offer per se, but simply as the court's consid-
ered judgment as to what would be fair and equitable
compensation. ' 418 While sympathetic to the lower court's frustra-
tions, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that
although the Court of Claims called for innovative handling of the
ancient claims, no innovation permitted "the imposition of a settle-
ment negotiated by counsel to which the parties did not agree. '4 19
Although few in number, both the procedural and substantive dis-
positions by the Federal Circuit contain insights into the claims pro-
cess and why it will not go away. The opinions addressed three
claims based on aboriginal title: one an ancient claim 420 and two
others based on modem claims.421 The opinions broke no new
grounds in substantive law.422 One of the opinions appeared to find
the Tee-Hit-Ton rule so unremarkable that the court asserted the
tribe had no preexisting property right without supporting cita-
tion.423 Two of the opinions, finally bringing the Gila River Pima-
418. Id at 92.
419. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 806 F.2d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 913 (1987). A fuller discussion of this case and its ultimate resolu-
tion can be found in the discussion of representation issues at infra notes 458-75 and accom-
panying text. In a breach of trust case, a similar device was also rejected by the Federal
Circuit. The Claims Court entered judgment at $10 million, although the Government had
offered to settle for $13 million as a sanction for failure to comply with court orders. See
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 575, 581-83 (1984) (citing plaintiff's
failure to comply with court orders regarding pre-trial exchange of testimony as inexcusable
conduct), vacated without opinion, 776 F.2d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
420. See Gila River, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 2049 (stating that claim for taking of aboriginal
title originally filed in Indian Claims Commission).
421. See Wichita Indian Tribe v. United States, 696 F.2d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (ad-
dressing claim brought pursuant to special jurisdictional act permitting late filing under In-
dian Claims Commission provisions); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 726 F.2d
712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (basing jurisdiction on Tucker Act).
422. In Wichita Indian Tribe, a 1978 special jurisdictional act permitted the claimants, pres-
ent descendant groups of the Wichita Confederacy, to make out-of-time filings before the
Indian Claims Commission. See Act of Mar. 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-247, 92 Stat. 158, 158
(authorizing tribe to file claims against Government for takings which occurred without suffi-
cient compensation and for other purposes with Indian Claims Commission); Wichita Indian
Tribe, 696 F.2d at 1379 (discussing jurisdictional act's allowance of out-of-time filings). The
Court of Claims dismissed the consolidated claims because the claimants failed to prove they
held exclusive aboriginal title to the area in question. Id. In reversing the dismissal, the Fed-
eral Circuit relied on previous Indian Claims Commission cases regarding proof and extin-
guishment of aboriginal title. See id. at 1381 (holding that moving village sites or otherwise
shifting patterns of occupancy is not sufficient to infer abandonment of aboriginal title) (citing
Omaha Tribe v. United States, 4 Indian Cl. Comm'n 627, 662, 667 (1957)); id. at 1385 (find-
ing that exclusive use was not undercut by permitting other Indian tribes to enter as traders
or guests) (citing Yakima Tribe v. United States, 12 Indian Cl. Comm'n 301, 378-79 (1963));
id. at 1385 (holding that proof of extinguishment of aboriginal title must be clear) (citing
Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 492 (1967)).
423. See Menominee Tribe, 726 F.2d at 716 (finding that no taking occurred and barring
tribe from compensation). In its unsuccessful effort to recover for its termination, the Me-
nominee Tribe also claimed damages on the ground that the sustained yield and other deed
restrictions were Fifth Amendment takings. While the Claims Court agreed with the tribe, the
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the regulations were legitimate regulations under the
Maricopa's claim for taking of 3,751,000 acres in Arizona to an end
after thirty-four years of litigation, were unpublished but illustrate
the "Jarndyce v. Jarndyce"424 quality of all Indian Claims Commission
litigation. The case moved through the Indian Claims Commission
in the stately progression common to the claims cases. Filed in
1951, the case was divided into the customary three phases. The
trial in the liability phase was held in 1962. In 1970, the Indian
Claims Commission issued its determination of the extent of the
tribe's aboriginal holdings that had been taken. In 1972, the Indian
Claims Commission held that the title had been extinguished in
1883. The trial on damages did not start until 1976. The case was
transferred to the Court of Claims in 1978, and transferred again to
the Claims Court in 1982. In 1985, on its third trip to the Federal
Circuit,4 25 the tribe was finally awarded a judgment in the final valu-
ation phase of the proceeding. The tribe received $6.3 million as
the fair market value of the 3.8 million acres in 1883.
Of course, no interest was due because the land had never been
recognized by a treaty or statute. The case thus illustrates a tremen-
dous irony in the application of the Tee-Hit-Ton rule, whereby the
agricultural Gila River Pimas, praised as being more civilized than
other "nomadic" Indians, tried to accommodate the white settlers
and the U.S. Government instead of fighting them. There were no
Indian wars with these people, and thus no treaty recognizing In-
dian title.
Government's "plenary authority to regulate Indian-owned forests." Id. Although the court
did not cite a non-Indian regulatory takings case, the restrictions could be so justified. The
more important basis of its decision was that the tribe had no property right:
The Tribe never had unfettered ownership of the land; nor was that kind of owner-
ship given to them in the termination Act; accordingly, no property right was taken
from the Indians when Congress required continued management on the sustained
yield basis.
Id. As noted in the text, the Court did not cite Tee-Hit-Ton or any other case in support of this
proposition.
424. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853).
425. See Gila River, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 2050 (setting aside court's determination of farm-
able acres in absence of sufficient explanation); Gila River, 11 Indian L. Rep. at 2075-76 (af-
firming damages award but remanding for redetermination of farmable acreage). The only
issue before the Federal Circuit was whether the trial judge applied the correct valuation
formula. The court reversed the trial judge and remanded, instructing him to explain his
reasons for reducing the amount of the most valuable acreage by 100,000 acres. Gila River, 11
Indian L. Rep. at 2076. The Federal Circuit chastised the trial judge for ignoring its original
order and adjusted the amount of farmland upwards by 75,000 acres, resulting in a $731,250
increase. See Gila River, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 2050 (noting that increase in award reflected
additional 75,000 acres treated as farmland).
In an interim unpublished decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court's dismis-
sal of the case for failure to prosecute. Gila River, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 2033. The court stated
that although the failure to meet a pre-trial deadline was negligent, it did not appear to be an
"intentional flouting" of the lower court's order. Id. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit re-
versed, while urging the parties to bring the case to an expeditious conclusion. Id.
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Although much of the substantive law regarding Indian property
claims has been decided, these cases remain important because they
illustrate that rules of formal inequality are still applied in Indian
law cases by judges who do not question either the racist/ethnocen-
tric basis for these rules, or what these rules continue to say about
the lack of regard for Indian issues by the judicial system today. 426
That ajudge in the 1990s can cite cases decided in 1886 referring to
Indian tribes and people in degrading terms427 without a thought is
perhaps no more surprising than having the same judge cite the dis-
senting opinion in Mitchell 11 as authority for a restrictive interpreta-
tion of that same case. 428
Perhaps because the property cases have taken so long to go
through the claims system, they also illustrate other pitfalls. Over a
forty-year period, tribal governments have changed dramatically; at-
torneys have died or been discharged, and new attorneys have been
added. Lawyering styles change from attorney to attorney. As new
theories are developed, the attorneys quite naturally try to incorpo-
rate them into the claim. As new governing bodies take over, tribes
want to rethink legal strategies. For these reasons, the property
cases help to illuminate indirectly and directly problems concerning
representation both by attorneys and by named plaintiffs.
1. United States v. Dann
The Western Shoshone claim, discussed in the introduction to
this Article,429 was originally filed in 1951 by one of the twenty-two
autonomous Bands loosely confederated as the Western Shoshone,
the Temoak Band. Once the claim was filed, the Claims Commis-
sion designated an entity called the Western Shoshone Identifiable
Group as the representative of all the Shoshone Indians.4 s0 This
426. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT (1991) (illustrating racist and colonialist assumptions underlying much of modem
Indian law); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991)
("This disparate treatment of both property and political rights is not the result of neutral
rules being applied in a manner that has disparate impact. Rather, it is the result offormally
unequal rules.") (emphasis in original).
427. See Cherokee Nation v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 565, 573 n.3 (1990) (citing United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) (stating that Indian tribes are "wards of the na-
tion" and not trust beneficiaries)).
428. Id. (citing and relying on Justice Powell's dissent in Mitchell 11 to argue that relation-
ship is one of guardian and ward and not of trust).
429. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing Western Shoshone case which
held that U.S. Government confiscated Western Shoshone Indian land).
430. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, § 10, 60 Stat. 1049, 1052 (omitted
from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30, 1978) (providing guide-
lines for presentation of claims).
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group elected a claims committee that then represented the group
in its dealings with the tribal counsel.43 1
Although the claim asserted a taking of aboriginal title, there was
no single act of taking-no Indian war followed by a treaty, no stat-
ute taking the land away. The Claims Commission concluded that
most of the land had been lost "by gradual encroachment by whites,
settlers and others, and the acquisition, disposition or taking of their
lands by the United States. '43 2 Because no date of taking was pin-
pointed, an attorney for the plaintiff group stipulated that all the
land had been taken, and that the formal date of taking occurred in
the early 19th century.433 There were only a few problems. To be-
gin with, fairly large amounts of this land, at least three million
acres, 43 4 including the Dann Band's 5000 acres, is still used by In-
dian people who believe it to be theirs. The Dann sisters never
joined in the claim and did not regard themselves as members of an
entity called the Western Shoshone Nation, much less the Western
Shoshone Identifiable Group. An organization of Western Sho-
shone Indians, including the Danns, attempted, but to no avail, to
intervene in the claim in 1974435 to remove presently occupied land
from the claims case. The Court of Claims dismissed this effort as
an intertribal dispute over litigation strategy which came too late in
the claims process to permit intervention.43 6 The Temoak Band, an
original plaintiff, even fired its attorney in 1976 and joined the ef-
forts to stop the case. Apparently even the original plaintiffs as-
sumed that land still occupied by the Shoshone people was not part
of the claim. The chairman of the tribe explained the tribe's con-
cerns in a 1977 letter to the Secretary of the Interior:
There are many strange things about the way these lawyers have
operated. They no longer report to us but to a "claims commit-
431. See Orlando, supra note 39, at 265-67 (discussing evolution of Western Shoshone
claim).
432. Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, I 1 Indian Cl. Comm'n 387,413-14,416
(1962) (discussing findings of fact made by Indian Claims Commission).
433. Western Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 29 Indian Cl. Comm'n 5, 7
(1972) (citing decision and description of stipulation).
434. See Imre Sutton, Incident or Event? Land Restoration in the Claims Process, in IRREDEEMA-
BLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 211, 221 (Imre Sutton ed. 1985) (esti-
mating that tribe occupies 250,000 acres). Estimates of the acreage claimed vary. See United
States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that estimates of acreage claimed
ranges from three to twelve million acres).
435. See Western Shoshone Legal Defense & Educ. Ass'n v. United States, 531 F.2d 495,
497, 503 n.16 (Ct. Cl.) (finding request was made too late in proceeding for intervention and
only reflected internal conflict within tribe), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976). One reason
given by the Claims Court for denial of intervention was that because the judgment had not
yet been paid, the Western Shoshones could ask Congress to delay the payment while they
litigated their claims to title of land currently occupied. Id. at 503 n.16.
436. Id. at 503-04.
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tee" which was elected by just a few Indians and has no rules or
any way for the people to control them. These lawyers not only
have refused to protect the title to the lands we still have but have
fought our people who have tried to do it themselves through the
Western Shoshone Legal Defense and Education Association. We
have now fired these claims lawyers and are looking for a
replacement.43 7
The objectors asked for a stay of the Indian Claims Commission
judgment pending an administrative appeal to the Secretary of the
Interior. The Commission denied the stay and issued its final deci-
sion.43 8 The Court of Claims affirmed the Claims Commission,43 9
and the judgment funds were deposited in an interest-bearing fund
in the Treasury for the plaintiff tribe.
The Danns argued that Congress never extinguished their aborig-
inal title to the land by any sovereign act.4 40 Until title was extin-
guished, their right to the land was as "good as the fee simple
absolute of the Whites," under precedents stretching back tojohnson
v. McIntosh and not even questioned in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States.441 The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that even if the Indian
Claims Commission judgment had preclusive effect, the Danns were
not precluded because the judgment, still not paid out to the tribal
claimants, lacked finality.442 In addition, the Ninth Circuit stated
that the issue of title was never raised, litigated, and adjudicated as
required by principles of collateral estoppel. 443 Instead, the issue
litigated was the extent of the Western Shoshone's holdings before
"the arrival of the white man."'4 44 In sum, the court concluded that
437. Appendix for Respondent at R2-R3, United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985) (No.
83-1476).
438. See Western Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 40 Indian Cl. Comm'n
305, 308-09 (1977) (stating it was too late in litigation to stay proceedings so that plaintiff
could introduce new theory on which to base claim), ajf'd sub nom. Temoak Band of W. Sho-
shone Indians v. United States, 593 F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
439. See Temoak Band of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 593 F.2d 994, 997-99,
1002 (Ct. Cl.) (ruling that Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying request to stay
proceedings and affirming Commission's monetary award), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
440. United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1978).
441. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-90 (1955) (concluding
that Government can extinguish title without compensation where Indian occupancy has not
been "specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress"); see also John-
son v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 240, 253-54 (1823) (explaining that while Indian Nations
held aboriginal title to lands they inhabited, upon discovery of Indian lands, discovering na-
tion gained fee title to lands, subject to Indians' right of occupancy and use).
442. Dann, 572 F.2d at 225-26.
443. Id. at 226.
444. Id.
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"[t]he extinguishment question was not necessarily in issue, it was
not actually litigated, and it has not been decided." 445
On certiorari, the Danns based most of their argument on princi-
ples of res judicata. In addition to supporting the Ninth Circuit's
position, the Danns also contended that the case involved basic
principles of due process in that the Danns were never adequately
represented by the Western Shoshone Identifiable Group. 446 They
also argued that to permit the Indian Claims Commission's judg-
ment to be used against them would result in permitting judicial
extinguishment of aboriginal title. In other words, the judgment
would effect a taking of the land when only Congress has the author-
ity to confiscate land.447
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion
most notable for what it did not say and for treating the case as
simply one of statutory construction. 448 The Indian Claims Com-
mission Act provides that payment of the claims will fully discharge
all obligations of the United States, 449 so the Court viewed its task as
simply to determine whether crediting the judgment fund to a tribal
account in the Treasury qualified as payment.450 Without discussing
any of the more difficult issues regarding why the Dann sisters,
whose Band had continuously occupied this land, should be bound
to a decision entered on behalf of a group that seemed to have been
formed just for the purpose of bringing this litigation, the Court
applied general principles of trust law to determine whether pay-
ment had been made. Payment to a trustee is payment to the benefi-
445. Id. at 226-27 (footnote omitted). The only issue decided, according to the court, was
the extent to which the Western Shoshone claimed title before contact. The Commission did
not decide that Congress had extinguished that title. The stipulation only established a date
of taking for purposes of valuation. Id at 226.
446. See Brief for Respondent at 29-33, United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985) (No.
83-1476) (arguing that due process requires verification that representative, in fact, repre-
sents interests of entity, and that such verification was lacking in instant case); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 39-44 (1940) (holding that due process was violated by giving preclusive
effect to judgments rendered in class action suits in which class members had not been given
notice or opportunity to opt out).
447. Brief for Respondent at 25-29, United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985) (No. 83-
1476). In addition, the Danns argued that the Indian Claims Commission payment provision
should be interpreted to avoid these difficult constitutional questions by holding that the bar
of § 22(a) was intended only to discharge Congress from any liability for money damages for
what actually occurred during the years covered by the land claim. Id.
448. See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 44-45 (1985) (holding that "payment" oc-
curred under § 22(a) of Indian Claims Commission Act when Government placed funds into
tribe's trust account).
449. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, § 22, 60 Stat. 1049, 1055 (omitted
from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30, 1978). Section 22 states
that "[t]he payment of any claim, after its determination in accordance with this Act, shall be a
full discharge of the United States of all claims and demands touching any of the matters
involved in the controversy." Id.
450. Dann, 470 U.S. at 44.
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ciary; so when the Government as defendant handed the money
over to itself as trustee, payment occurred.45'
It is notable that most of the Court's opinion focused on Con-
gress' intent to settle all the ancient claims in enacting the Indian
Claims Commission Act.45 2 Whether the method chosen might vio-
late fundamental principles of fairness was simply not of interest to
the Court.453 Of greatest concern to the Court was to dispatch
these claims cases once and for all.
Finality and the doctrine of repose are of the greatest importance
when land claims are involved, whether or not those claims involve
Indian people. Concerns that there may be some three million acres
of unextinguished aboriginal title in the Southwest may have at least
unconsciously influenced the courts to avoid upsetting settled ex-
pectations of non-Indians454 and long-range plans of the Depart-
ment of the Interior for public lands. One can also understand why
fair-minded people would fear that all the ancient claims might be
reopened. Nevertheless, the Court should have faced squarely the
difficult due process issues of attorney and class representation
raised in the Dann case, instead of issuing a terse opinion that said,
in effect, "no more." 45 5
2. The Sioux land claims
The Dann sisters argued that they had never authorized the
named plaintiffs or the attorney to represent their present posses-
sory interest in land. In contrast, the Sioux Nation protested the
denial of the tribe's right to discharge its attorneys and to stop the
courts from finally determining the tribe's land claims, in order to
451. See idl at 47-50 (discussing meaning of word "payment" as used by Congress in
§ 22(a) of Indian Claims Commission Act). Congress amended the standing appropriation
covering the Indian Claims Commission judgments to provide for automatic deposit in trust
funds to the credit of the tribe's pending determination of how the money should be distrib-
uted. 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) (ed. 1976) (recodified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1988)).
References to Indian Claims Commission judgments were omitted because the Commission
was no longer in existence. See H.R. REP. No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 62, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1895, 1956 (detailing reasons for changes in statutory language). The amend-
ment had the salutary purpose of ensuring investment of these funds for the benefit of the
tribe. Unfortunately, the same amendment created the vehicle for holding that the payment
already had been made.
452. See Dann, 470 U.S. at 45-47 (discussing purposes of Indian Claims Commission Act).
453. See ROBERT WOODWARD & ScoTr ARmsTRoNG, THE BRETHREN 57-58, 359 (1979)
(stating that Burger Court denigrated Indian claims cases by calling them "teepee" and "pee-
wee" cases).
454. Unextinguished aboriginal title is good against third parties, if not against the Gov-
ernment. Thus, a tribe may sue for trespass or sue to eject non-Indian possessors. See United
States v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 699 (9th Cir. 1976) (declaring railroad
right of way invalid after ninety years).
455. See Sutton, supra note 434, at 223 (discussing Dann case).
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seek a solution involving the return of land.4 5 6 The Black Hills case
is the more famous of the Sioux land claims because of the amount
of the judgment and the cultural, religious, and economic impor-
tance of the Black Hills to the Sioux Nation. A less well-known 1988
decision of the Federal Circuit upholding the Claims Court's award
of $40 million has brought another Sioux tribal claim to an end.457
In each of the Sioux land claims, the courts rebuffed efforts by con-
stituent tribes within the Sioux Nation to dismiss their claims attor-
neys. In each case, as in Dann, the tribes still seek return of the land
and have refused to accept any judgment money.
In 1978, the Indian Claims Commission awarded the Sioux Na-
tion more than $43 million in damages stemming from a claim that
the price paid to the tribe for an 1868 cession of land was uncon-
scionable. 458 The Commission further held that the United States
could not offset any property or money "gratuitously" given the
tribe after the cession.459 The Government successfully appealed
this aspect of the decision to the Court of Claims, which in turn held
that the Commission should have allowed the Government to pres-
ent evidence about offsets. 460 While this appeal was proceeding,
some of the eight Sioux Tribes comprising the petitioner Sioux Na-
tion decided to change their litigation strategy to seek return of the
land rather than money.461 The tribes refused to renew the contract
of the attorney who had represented them for some thirty years.
456. S.James Anaya has argued that the Sioux Nation case is the same as the Dann case. See
S. James Anaya, Native Land Claims in the United States: The Unatoned-for Spirit of Place (Cam-
bridge Lectures, 1991) (Frank E. McCardle, ed., forthcoming 1992) (analyzing Sioux Nation
and Dann cases in discussion of Government's response to native land claims). I disagree for
several reasons. First, there was no confiscation of the land of the Western Shoshones to
constitute a sovereign act as there was in the Sioux Nation case. To interpret a merger and bar
provision in a statute providing for redress for ancient claims as permitting extinguishment of
title by a judicial decree violates basic principles of due process. Second, instead of arguing
that the tribal claimant did not represent them, the Sioux Tribes argued that their attorneys
misled them. Whatever happened between the Sioux Tribe and their attorneys, the tribes
within the Sioux Nation were the appropriate entities to bring the case on behalf of their
people. These tribes were not created for the purpose of litigation but actually existed as
political entities. In other words, while the structure of the Indian Claims Commission system
unfairly defeated the Dann sisters' present possessory interest in their land, the Sioux Nation
case involved decisions of strategy by the tribes, as well as the attorneys for the tribes, that
arguably turned out poorly for them.
457. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 862 F.2d 275 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
458. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 42 Indian Cl. Comm'n 257, 257 (1978)
(awarding Sioux Tribe $49,949,700 for total value of Sioux interests extinguished under 1868
Treaty), rev'd in part and remanded, 616 F.2d 485 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953 (1980).
459. Id.
460. See United States v. Sioux Tribe of Indians, 616 F.2d 485, 492 (Ct. Cl.) (holding that
Commission erred in not considering reducing award by any "payments on the claim" or
"gratuitous offsets"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953 (1980).
461. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 80, 84 (1985) (noting that four
tribes rejected settlement offer because it did not entail return of land and that two tribes
rejected offer without explanation).
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Although the attorney attempted to withdraw as counsel for the
Oglala Sioux Tribe in 1980, and again in 1985 when he also sought
to withdraw as counsel from the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the
court refused to permit the withdrawal until the tribe made an ap-
propriate motion to substitute another attorney for the case. The
tribe refused.
Meanwhile, the Indian Claims Commission was terminated and its
remaining docket was transferred to the Claims Court. That court
became impatient with efforts to get the tribes to agree to settle the
issue. Because the offset procedure gives the Government and the
tribe the respective opportunities to prove and to controvert the
worth of literally every item given the tribe since the time of the
cession, the trial judge was understandably anxious to avoid trial on
these issues. The Government twice offered to settle the offset issue
at $4.2 million during the period from 1979 until 1985.462 The offer
was tentatively agreed upon by the attorneys but was rejected by a
majority of the tribes. 463 Finally, the trial judge imposed a settle-
ment on the tribes. 464 The Federal Circuit promptly vacated the or-
der as not consented to, in an opinion noting that the impasse might
be broken by the parties' stipulating "the total dollar amount of var-
ious categories of offsets to which the Government is entitled." 465
When the attorneys did finally stipulate to a total amount of $3.7
million, by naming five categories of offsets with a dollar amount for
each, the Claims Court entered judgment.466 The Oglala and Rose-
bud Sioux Tribes filed a motion for relief ofjudgment, arguing that
the stipulation was an unconsented settlement of the case and fur-
462. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 806 F.2d 1046, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 913 (1987).
463. Sioux Tribe, 8 Cl. Ct. at 84.
464. Id. at 92. In reaching its decision to impose a settlement on the parties, the court
stated:
The simple fact that four of the reservation tribes are refusing to accept any settle-
ment or award of this Court, which does not include the return of their land, is indic-
ative of the [tribes'] refusal to comprehend, after 35 years of litigation, that this
Court can only award moneyjudgments. ... As a result, this Court can envision the
continuation of this litigation ad infinitum .... Thus, the case grinds its way slowly
forward, regardless of the wishes of the plaintiff or of its attorneys, putting an ever
increasing burden on the resources of this Court. It may well be that the past leaders
of the current reservation tribes initiated this suit, some 35 years ago, for reasons
that are no longer consistent with the wishes of the current tribal governing bodies.
Id. at 85-86.
465. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 806 F.2d at 1053.
466. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 94, 99 (1987), aft'd, 862 F.2d 275
(Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075 (1989).
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ther, that they had not authorized the attorney to act for them in any
capacity. 467 The Claims Court refused to grant the remedy.468
The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that the stipulation to the
amount was not a settlement of the case, but merely a factual stipu-
lation to the dollar amounts to be used once the judge determined
whether the law permitted the particular category of offset to be de-
ducted.469 Furthermore, the court held the attempted discharge of
counsel ineffective, stating that the Claims Court rightfully refused
to allow the tribes to terminate counsel who had been working on
the case for thirty years and were close to completing it, unless the
change would be made without undue delay to the litigation.470
In dissent, Judge Newman disagreed with the court's handling of
the termination of counsel issue. Judge Newman found it inconceiv-
able that "with over half the clientele in loud revolt, nominal coun-
sel has the authority to bind these tribes, against their intentions
and instructions. ' 471 Judge Newman further noted that both the
Government and the Claims Court were aware throughout the liti-
gation that most of the tribes were unhappy with the negotiations
and the proposed settlement.4 72
Arguing that it is the courts who are ultimately responsible for the
supervision of counsel, Judge Newman then stated that there was an
obligation to respect "the authority of the tribes to ascertain their
own best interests, and not to impose on the tribes the views of their
467. Id at 100.
468. Id. at 105-06. In refusing to grant the remedy, Judge York stated:
Neither movant party has ever asked this Court to substitute new counsel, or sought
to enter a separate appearance, or otherwise attempted to assert through legal pro-
cess a position independent of the Sioux Tribe and of the six other Sioux Tribes in
these proceedings. It is too late in the game to do this now. Having failed over a 37-
year period to raise any substantive objection to what was happening, the Oglala
Sioux Tribe and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe now are precluded and estopped from
initiating their belated attack upon the judgment of this Court, an attack which the
Sioux Tribe and the six other Sioux tribal representatives do not join.
Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted).
469. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 862 F.2d 275, 279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1075 (1989).
470. Id. at 281.
471. Id. at 282 (Newman, J., dissenting).
472. Id. In a footnote, Judge Newman added:
As discussed by the Claims Court, of the eight plaintiff Sioux Tribes, appellants and
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the Lower Brule
Sioux Tribe, and the Fort Peck Sioux Tribe, desired to seek a return of ancestral land
rather than a money award; the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe and the Santee Sioux Tribe
were the only plaintiffs willing to accept the money settlement.
Id. at 282 n. I (Newman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (citing Sioux Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 8 Ct. Cl. 80, 86-90 (1985)).
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lawyer. The prolonged pendency of this case does not justify the
irregular procedure whereby it has been brought to an end. '473
Although the Claims Court has not adopted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, these rules have been adopted in over one-
half of the states and detail basic norms regarding discharge of at-
torneys. While a client may be acting foolishly to do so, these rules
permit discharge, even late in a proceeding. 474 The only exceptions
noted in Rule 1.16 involve appointed counsel, in which case "appli-
cable law" may limit a client's ability to discharge his or her
attorney.475
Admittedly, attempts to discharge counsel after thirty years of
proceedings raise difficult issues, but there exists no reason why the
Claims Court could not permit the tribe to dismiss its counsel. If
the tribal counsel's contract with the tribe did not contain a provi-
sion for payment for services actually rendered, it would be within
the power of the court to order restitution.
The 1988 decision in the Sioux 1868 treaty claim is the last of the
ancient Indian property claims, but the decision has not in any real
way resolved the underlying dispute just as the decisions in the Sioux
Nation Black Hills and Dann cases have not resolved those disputes.
At this time the tribes involved will accept no resolution that does
not include the return of some of the land. Attempts to use the
federal courts to assert possessory rights to the lands involved in
these disputes have been unsuccessful, 476 yet the dismissal of such
lawsuits on various procedural grounds relating to finality has not
473. Id. at 283 (Newman, J., dissenting).
474. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1991) (stating when attorney
may decline or terminate representation). Rule 1.16 states in part: "(a) Except as stated in
paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced,
shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: . . . (3) the lawyer is discharged." Id.
The comments to the Model Rules make clear that discharge can come at any point in the
proceedings: "A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause,
subject to liability for, payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the with-
drawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the
circumstances." Id. cmt. 4.
475. Nevertheless, the Model Rules do not appear to provide for an attorney to continue
to represent such a client over the client's objections. Comment 5 notes only that discharge
of an appointed attorney, if unjustified, may result in the client having to represent himself or
herself. Id. cmt. 5. Comment 6 addresses situations in which the client is mentally incompe-
tent or for other reasons "the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests." Id.
cmt. 6.
476. See Western Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini, 951 F. 2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1991)
(dismissing suit seeking declaration that state wildlife regulations interfered with tribal prop-
erty rights on grounds that Indian Claims Commission decision barred relitigation of all title
issues whether against Federal Government, third parties, or states); Oglala Sioux Tribe v.
United States, 650 F.2d 140, 143-44 (8th Cir. 1981) (dismissing suit asserting possessory
rights on ground Indian Claims Commission Act provided exclusive remedy); Oglala Sioux
Tribe v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1409 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying resjudicata to
dismiss quiet title action).
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provided a resolution either. Only a true agreement with these
tribes hammered out between the Federal Government and the
tribes authorized representatives including the return of some land
will truly end these disputes.477
C. Enforcement of Treaties: The Promise of Tsosie v. United States 478
Many treaties made with Indian tribes remain in force and repre-
sent important repositories of tribal rights.479 These tribal rights
are usually represented in claims law by the cases in which tribes
rely on treaties recognizing tribal title as a basis for Fifth Amend-
ment takings claims.480 In addition, section 1491 of the Tucker Act
specifically grants jurisdiction for claims based on treaties.48' In a
recent case, the Federal Circuit upheld the Claims Court's determi-
nation that an 1868 treaty could serve as a basis for a claim brought
under the Tucker Act. Nine treaties entered into between 1867 and
1868 contain clauses indemnifying tribes from harm caused by "bad
men among whites": 482
If bad men among the whites, or among other people subject to
the authority of the United States, shall commit any wrong upon
the person or property of the Indians, the United States will, upon
proof made to the agent and forwarded to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs at Washington city, proceed at once to cause the
477. At least one bill has been introduced to convey federally held land within the Black
Hills back to the tribe, but to date such efforts have been unsuccessful. See S. 1453, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
478. 11 Cl. Ct. 62 (1986), aft'd, 825 F.2d 393 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
479, Congress can abrogate treaties with Indian tribes, although abrogation may create
liability for a taking of property. See The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621
(1871) (rationalizing that Indian treaties shall be accorded no higher sanctity than interna-
tional treaties); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (inter-
preting statute as not abrogating earlier treaty on theory that Congress would have stated its
intention to abrogate more clearly because abrogation would subject it to liability). Until
abrogation, however, treaties exist and create rights. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,
738-40 (1986) (requiring clear evidence that Congress intended to abrogate Indian treaty);
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
675 (1979) (discussing treaty protecting off-reservation fishing rights with Indian tribe
contract).
480. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980) (stating that
abrogation of treaty recognizing title constituted Fifth Amendment taking).
481. Hebah v. United States, 428 F.2d 1334, 1338-40 (Cl. Ct. 1970) (explaining that,
while Indian tribe can base treaty claim on 28 U.S.C § 1505, individual can base suit on 28
U.S.C. § 1491, commonly referred to as "Tucker Act").
482. Treaty with the Kiowas and Comanches, Oct. 21, 1867, art. I, 15 Star. 581, 581;
Treaty with the Kiowa Indians, Oct. 21, 1867, art. IV, 15 Stat. 589, 590; Treaty with the
Cheyenne Indians, Oct. 28, 1867, art. I, 15 Star. 593, 593; Treaty with the Sioux Indians, Apr.
29, 1868, art. I, 15 Stat. 635, 635; Treaty with the Crow Indians, May 7, 1868, art. I, 15 Star.
649, 649; Treaty with the Cheyenne Indians, May 10, 1868, art. I, 15 Stat. 655, 655; Treaty
with the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, art. I, 15 Stat. 667, 667; Treaty with the Ute Indians,
Mar. 2, 1868, art. VI, 15 Star. 619, 620; Treaty with the Eastern Band of Shoshonees and
Bannacks, July 3, 1868, art. I, 15 Stat. 673, 673.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:753
offender to be arrested and punished according to the laws of the
United States, and also to reimburse the injured persons for the loss
sustained.483
This clause was probably intended more for the protection of the
offenders than to benefit the Indian tribes, but the promise to reim-
burse is clear and plain. Venita Tsosie, a Navajo woman, alleged
that a Public Health Service lab technician, pretending to be a doc-
tor, conducted a spurious physical examination on her which left her
physically and psychologically injured. She filed an administrative
claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),48 4 alleging both
assault and battery by the technician and negligent hiring and super-
vision by the Public Health Service. The Department of Health and
Human Services denied her claim against the hospital on the
grounds that she failed to allege sufficient facts. As to her assault
and battery claim, the Department denied it on the ground that the
FTCA does not apply to intentional torts.48 5
Ms. Tsosie then filed a claim with the Department of the Interior,
invoking the "bad men" clause. The Assistant Secretary denied the
claim on the grounds that the clause was no longer operative. The
Government's essential argument was that the purpose of the
clause, to maintain peace, had been achieved, and thus the clause
was no longer necessary because there was no present threat of war-
fare between the United States and the Navajo Nation.48 6 Such an
argument, if adopted, could eviscerate all Indian treaties since the
purpose of these treaties was to ensure peace between the tribes and
the United States. Although the Claims Court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument, it did so reluctantly, believing it was bound by
precedent of the Court of Claims.48 7 Nevertheless, Judge Yock was
so impressed by the Government's "innovative and able" arguments
that he devoted several pages of the opinion to analyzing why he
483. Treaty with the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, art. I, 15 Stat. 667, 667 (emphasis
added).
484. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988) (covering tortious conduct committed by federal em-
ployees acting within scope of employment).
485. Tsosie v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 62, 64 (1986), aff'd, 825 F.2d 393 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
486. Id.
487. Id. at 70-71. The Court of Claims took jurisdiction over two claims based on the
"bad men" clause, although in neither was the claimant ultimately successful. Hebah v.
United States, 428 F.2d 1334, 1340 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (denying Government's motion to dismiss
wrongful death action based on "bad men" clause); Hebah v. United States, 456 F.2d 696,
710 (affirming trial commissioner's findings against plaintiff on merits), cerl. denied, 409 U.S.
870 (1972); Begay v. United States, 650 F.2d 288 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (affirming report unfavorable
to plaintiffs by Department of the Interior), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).
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believed the precedent could be distinguished and why the Govern-
ment's arguments should carry the day.4 88
Judge Yock had shown his impatience with Indian claims before,
by ordering a tribe's attorney to settle a claim even though the tribe
had attempted to fire the attorney. 489 His opinion in Tsosie similarly
indicates an impatience with Indian claims. He noted, for example,
that the opening of the courts to Indian claims by the Indian Claims
Commission Act and the availability of the Federal Tort Claims Act
"supplanted the need for Indians to retain their bad men reimburse-
ment provisions." 490 In doing so, Judge Yock apparently did not
notice the irony of holding out the promise of a FTCA recovery for
an intentional tort, even though he had just noted that it only cov-
ered negligence actions. The court certified the question regarding
the treaty for immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit.491 The Fed-
eral Circuit voted not to hear the case in banc as requested by the
Government, and the panel affirmed the Claims Court.492
In the last Indian law opinion he wrote before his death in 1990,
Senior Circuit Judge Philip Nichols firmly rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that the clause was no longer operative. Labeling
a treaty clause obsolete because the tribe had maintained peaceful
relations with the United States could permit the Government to
argue that the tribe should now give up its land because keeping the
peace was one of the purposes for creating the Navajo Reservation.
The court rejected such an "ungracious" interpretation of the
treaty, which was intended as a whole to "have a permanent impact
on Navajo life." 493 The Government also argued that the tribe's
failure to rely on the "bad men" clause for nearly one hundred years
after signing the treaty indicated that the treaty promise had lapsed.
Judge Nichols noted, however, that the Government denied the
488. Tsosie, 11 Cl. Ct. at 65 (characterizing defendant's five arguments why plaintiff's "bad
men" claim should not be reviewed by Court as "innovative and able"). The Government's
five arguments were (1) the treaty's bad men reimbursement provision had to be implemented
by further congressional action before it could be implemented; (2) the reimbursement provi-
sion was obsolete because the parties to the treaty intended the provision to expire; (3) spe-
cific language of article IV of the treaty precluded judicial review of the Department of the
Interior's final decision; (4) the plaintiff's claim was based on tort law and the statute oflimita-
tions for such claims had expired; and (5) in the alternative, the equitable doctrine of laches
should preclude judicial review in the Claims Court. Id.
489. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (explaining that Oglala Sioux Tribe
refused to renew their attorney's contract but Court of Claims would not let attorneys with-
draw from case).
490. Tsosie, 11 Cl. Ct. at 70.
491. Id. at 76 (certifying question to Federal Circuit for appeal based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(d)(2), as amended by § 125(b) of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982).
492. See Tsosie v. United States, 825 F.2d 393, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that court
did not feel necessity of hearing case in banc).
493. Id. at 399.
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Court of Claims jurisdiction to take any claims based on treaties
with Indian tribes until 1949 when the offending language was re-
moved from the Tucker Act.494 The court remanded for an admin-
istrative determination on the merits of the claim.
The Tsosie case holds out some limited promise for the tribes with
treaties containing "bad men" clauses.495 Judge Nichols pointed
out that the clauses applied not just to employees or agents of the
U.S. Government, but to anyone under United States authority who
harms Indians protected by the clause, including Indians who are
not members of the tribe.496 Professor Robert Laurence urged tri-
bal advocates to make greater use of the "bad men" clause as a
weapon to remedy some of the on-reservation torts that have
proved so difficult to remedy:
When corporations pollute tribal water sources or leave behind
toxic waste dumps or fail to return mined land to a useable state,
when lenders doing business on the reservation treat Indian bor-
rowers unfairly, when lemons are sold or prices gouge buyers or
consumers [are] cheated or harassed, when contracts are entered
into and then ignored, when Indians are lied to or treated unfairly
by non-members coming on the reservation: these are all, it
seems to me, occasions of "bad men among the whites."'497
Given the reluctance of the Claims Court to open the doors of the
court to Ms. Tsosie's claim and the Government's efforts to limit
liability, only time will tell whether the "bad men" clause can be
given the expansive reading urged by Professor Laurence.
IV. STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
As discussed above, tribal disputes with the Federal Government
can also be adjudicated in Article III federal courts, as long as the
plaintiff tribe or group seeks equitable or injunctive relief.498 Nev-
494. See id at 401 (referring to Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 189, § 88, 63 Stat. 102). The Act
deleted a phrase that prevented cases based on treaties "with the Indians" from being heard
in federal courts. Id The court also held that, if the lack ofjurisdiction rendered the treaty
clause non-self-executing during the interim period, the 1949 statute cured the defect. Id. at
403.
495. See Benally v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 8 (1987) (dismissing "bad men" claim by
Navajo molested by BIA employee because plaintiff's earlier filing in district court constituted
election of remedies).
496. See Tsosie, 825 F.2d at 400 n.2 (explaining that "bad men" clause refers to all whites
and nonwhites).
497. Robert Laurence, "Bad Men Among the Whites", 23 Am. Indian L. Newsl. (Am. Indian
Law Ctr., Albuquerque, N.M.), Aug. 1990, at 9 (summarizing "bad men" clause and impact of
Tsosie case).
498. See supra notes 183-95 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdiction in Article III
federal courts). A recent Supreme Court decision holds out the possibility that Indian tribal
advocates may be able to obtain federal district court jurisdiction by invoking the Administra-
tive Procedure Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity, at least in a case in which the relief
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ertheless, many claims against the Government seek and require a
money damages remedy, including the kinds of cases discussed
above: takings claims, claims primarily seeking payment of money
for mismanagement of trust funds, and claims for compensation for
breach of treaty. Even though equitable relief may be available to
force the Government to manage tribal property properly, a tribe
needs a damages remedy to recover for the loss it has incurred up to
the time of judgment. The existence of a money damages remedy
serves as a powerful deterrent to mismanagement, as Justice White
noted in his dissent in Mitchell I.4 99 In fact, in an appropriate case, a
tribe may want to bring both actions simultaneously to keep pres-
sure on the Government and to ensure a complete remedy once lia-
bility is determined.
To make these strategic decisions, it is necessary to consider not
only the substantive law applied in each court, but also the structure
of that court and the process employed within it. In other words, if
the old system appeared biased in favor of the Government in all
cases or even only in Indian cases, does the new system remove the
appearance or reality of bias, either because of the way it has been
constituted or because of the procedures adopted? If not, should
tribes try to avoid these courts even more than they do now? Or, is
the alternative similarly flawed? If the formal rules applied in the
system of Indian law are skewed against Indian interests such that
the choice of forum has nothing to do with the outcome, the choice
of forum would be less important to a tribe. Or, 'as happens in civil
rights law generally in times like these, tribes would have to become
attuned to nuances in substantive law that can be located in differ-
ences in structure or process, carefully selecting the appropriate fo-
rum, flawed as it is, for strategic purposes. 500
requested can be fairly characterized as equitable, even though the result may be a release of
funds looking very much like a money damages remedy. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879, 905-12 (1988) (holding district court has jurisdiction over suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief resulting in release of money due state under Medicaid program). Only time
will tell whether Bowen has in fact broadened district court jurisdiction. Compare Michael F.
Noone, Jr. & Urban A. Lester, Defining Tucker Act Jurisdiction after Bowen v. Massachusetts, 40
CATH. U. L. REy. 571, 603 (1991) (arguing that Bowen should be limited to its facts because of
congressional intent that Medicaid noncompliance cases be heard in regional court of ap-
peals) with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Claims Courts at the Crossroads, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 517, 531-
32 (1991) (approving of case as expanding federal court jurisdiction in cases involving chal-
lenges to administration of federal grant programs). Even if there is more room for concur-
rent jurisdiction in some cases, tribal claims for takings of property, claims for
mismanagement of trust money, and claims for compensation under a treaty would remain
classic actions for damages.
499. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 550 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
500. A tribe, for example, may choose to bring a mismanagement claim in federal district
court because the APA clearly waives the doctrine of sovereign immunity for such actions. In
addition, district courts may be more willing to apply principles of liberal construction of
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This section of the Article will turn to the landscape created by
the Federal Courts Improvement Act for the resolution of claims,
focusing on questions of structure and process. Where relevant, I
will note the differences between the old and the new system. The
purpose of this inquiry is not to focus on differences between the
old and new so much as to try to locate points that may affect the
decision whether to litigate, and if so, in which court.
A. Adoption of the Federal Rules by the Claims Court
The Claims Court has adopted rules based on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 50' Before adopting these rules, the Govern-
ment strongly resisted compliance with discovery orders in trust ac-
counting cases in both the Indian Claims Commission and the Court
of Claims. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, permit
the federal district courts to impose sanctions for refusal to comply
with discovery. In Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States,502
the federal district court imposed sanctions by finding the Board's
allegations to be true after the Government refused to answer inter-
rogatories for over two years. 503 By adopting Rule 37 along with
the other federal rules regarding discovery, the Claims Court
opened the door for sanctions against the Government. 50 4
During the 1985 Federal Circuit Judicial Conference, a question
from the audience exhibited a certain amount of disbelief that the
Federal Circuit would get tough with the Government, at least in the
case of Rule 11 sanctions.50 5 Judge Kozinski's frank answer ad-
ambiguous statutes to create enforceable trust duties. The Claims Court still regards the
question of whether a claim is founded upon a statute to be jurisdictional. Thus, the court
may be less willing to apply principles of liberal construction to determine whether an offered
statute creates a trust relationship that can be enforced in money damages, Compare Jicarilla
Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855, 857 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per
curiam) (applying principles of liberal construction to find oil and gas statutes created trust
relationship) with Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187, 189-91 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding
similar statutory duties created relationship but construing statutory duties narrowly).
501. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 139(b)(1), 96 Stat.
25, 42 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2503 (1992)).
502. 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973); see supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text
(discussing Manchester Band of Pomo Indians).
503. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (giving history of unsuccessful efforts to force compliance with discovery orders).
504. CL. CT. R. 37 (providing sanctions for failure to make or cooperate in discovery); see
Sward & Page, supra note 2, at 406 (discussing court's adoption of federal discovery rules).
505. Alex Kozinski, Remarks at The Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (May 17, 1985), in 108 F.R.D. 465, 492-93
(1985) (addressing question regarding Rule 11 sanctions). Then Chief Judge Kozinski read
aloud the following question from the audience: "Does the court feel free in appropriate
cases to enter Rule I 1 sanctions against theJustice Department and/or (Justice] Department
attorneys? What about attorneys' fees?" Id.
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dressed concerns about the role of the government attorney com-
pared to a private attorney:
I suspect that there are some quasi-legal questions lurking in
here. If there are, I don't mean here to preclude sanctions on the
government if ever a case should arise. ... IT]here is no reason
why the Justice Department or any other litigant ought to be in a
different position from the run-of-the-mill attorney or litigant.
The difficulty in dealing withJustice Department attorneys, as is
sometimes the case with attorneys for private parties, is the ques-
tion of who is in charge? ... [T]he new person at the Department
of Justice, is it the Assistant Attorney General? Who really is in
charge? 506
In 1989, the Claims Court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the Gov-
ernment for misrepresenting that the BIA had begun an accounting
of the tribe's trust funds, when in fact the BIA had done nothing to
secure an accounting of the funds. 50 7 Recognizing that the Justice
Department attorney "at most is a cog in the entire procedure," the
court declined to fine the attorney, but instead assessed costs and
attorneys fees against the Government. 508
The Claims Court has sanctioned a tribe by dismissing a multi-
million dollar tribal claim with prejudice. The dismissal was over-
turned on appeal, however. Newly retained counsel for the tribe
objected that the Government's outstanding settlement offer of $13
million was too low, but objected to turning over expert reports to
the Government, because doing so would prejudice the tribe's case
in two related lawsuits.509 The court noted that imposition of a
sanction on the client because of attorney misconduct should be a
rare occurrence, but concluded that such dismissal was appropriate
because the tribal counsel had been apprised of the court's orders
and thus shared the blame.510 The court concluded that its author-
ity to dismiss with prejudice necessarily subsumed a lesser authority
to enter judgment in an amount lower than the Government's last
settlement offer. Although noting the novelty of this action, the
506. Id.
507. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. United States, 16
Cl. Ct. 158 (1989).
508. Id. at 166.
509. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 575, 585-86 (1984)
(invoking CL. CT. R. 16(0, 37(b)(2)(C), and 41(b) to fix amount ofjudgment as sanction for
failure to comply with pre-trial orders), vacated and remanded, 776 F.2d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(unpublished opinion).
510. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 6 Cl. Ct. at 580.
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court set $10 million as an appropriate recovery. 5 11 In an unpub-
lished opinion, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the
Claims Court's judgment.
The Federal Circuit's adoption of the Federal Rules is not surpris-
ing given its status as a court of appeals on the same level with the
regional courts of appeals in the federal system. Attorneys working
in the area of civil rights have raised concerns about the relatively
recent liberalization of Rule 11, permitting sanctions for frivolous
appeals, in cases appealed to the regional courts.5 12 Although to
date no Rule 11 sanctions have been imposed against tribes in In-
dian claims, the Federal Circuit has not hesitated to impose sanc-
tions in other claims in which private parties seek remedies from the
Government. 513 Commenting on the frequent use of Rule 11 sanc-
tions in public employment cases, for example, Professor Robert
Vaughn of the Washington College of Law of The American Univer-
sity cautioned the court that use of the device for legitimate pur-
poses to keep the court's docket manageable can unduly discourage
petitioners with claims "on the periphery of existing precedent or
provisions." 514 Indian law has developed so rapidly in the 1970s
and 1980s that caution should be used in imposing sanctions on
cases raising novel legal issues or challenging bad law.
A federal judge noted the problem faced by attorneys trying to
advocate changes in the law with a particularly apt example: "Bad
court decisions must be challenged if they are to be overruled, but
the early challenges are certainly hopeless. The first attorney to
challenge Plessy v. Ferguson was certainly bringing a frivolous action,
but his efforts and the efforts of others eventually led to Brown v.
Board of Education."515 Similarly, tribal advocates urging the funda-
511. Id at 585 (noting that neither old Court of Claims nor Federal Circuit had approved
of such sanction to date).
512. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rul 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1930 (1989) (stating that disagreement exists among federal
courts of appeals on almost all interpretation and policy questions arising under Rule 11);
Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rul 1 1-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Strug-
gle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1352-53 (1986) (concluding Rule II
has potential to stifle creativity especially when employed in punitive manner); Carl Tobias,
Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 526 (1988-89) (arguing that enforce-
ment of Rule II should be severely circumscribed).
513. See RobertJ. Martineau & Patricia A. Davidson, Frivolous Appeals in the Federal Courts:
The Ways of the Circuits, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 603, 640-43 (1985) (analyzing Federal Circuit's
standard for imposing Rule II sanctions and describing it as "strict").
514. Robert G. Vaughn, Remarks at The Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Apr. 23, 1986), in 112 F.R.D. 439, 464 (1986)
(addressing risks involved in applying frivolous appeal sanctions).
515. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). The
Claims Court has also adopted Rule 11. See generally Judge Christine Cook Nettesheim, Re-
marks at The Second Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for
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mental wrongness of rules like the Tee-Hit-Ton rule ought to have
room to make such arguments without fearing the sanction of Rule
11.
B. The Nonpublication Controversy
The Federal Circuit has taken to the nonpublication rule51 6 with a
vengeance, publishing only one-third of its opinions in the early
years. This change has not resulted in much of a difference as far as
Indian claims are concerned, however, and may actually result in
more of them getting published expeditiously. Because the old
Court of Claims published every opinion, Indian claims attorneys
grew accustomed to being able to read and cite every case. On the
other hand, because of the length and volume of the old Court of
Claims opinions, the official reporters were often two years behind.
As a result, counsel became dependent on the West Publishing
Company. As a profit-making enterprise, West selectively published
opinions, and was loathe to publish Indian claims cases, especially
appeals from the Indian Claims Commission Act.517 According to
Judge Nichols, the Court of Claims began making more dispositions
by de facto unpublished opinions, called "Orders." 518 Although
these orders were eventually published in bound volumes, they were
not distributed along with other slip opinions and were conse-
quently rather hard to locate. The Government, being defendant in
all the Tucker Act cases, had easy access to these orders and the
court itself often cited them, creating at the very least an appearance
of unfairness. 51 9 At present, West publishes all the opinions of the
Claims Court and the nonpublication practice of the Federal Circuit
has not been used as frequently in Indian claims as it has in other
areas under its jurisdiction.
C. Appeals
Adoption of the Federal Rules by the Claims Court and the Fed-
eral Circuit had several additional effects on claims cases. The Court
the Federal Circuit (Apr. 26, 1984), in 104 F.R.D. 207, 245 (1984) (discussing changes in
court's rules to conform to Federal Rule 11).
516. FED. CIR. R. 47.8(a) (giving court ability to announce disposition of appeals in un-
published opinion or order).
517. Philip Nichols,Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REV.
909, 913 (1986) (stating that West had "special antipathy" toward publishing opinions cover-
ing what they regarded as unpopular subject matter such as Indian claims under Indian
Claims Commission Act).
518. Id. at 917 (stating that "Orders" were unpublished, but citable).
519. Id. Other concerns raised about nonpublication are that the courts will excuse a
sloppy opinion by not publishing it or hide classes of cases that may reflect badly on the court.
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of Claims did not have true appellate jurisdiction, except over In-
dian Claims Commission cases. But the creation of a trial division
after Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,520 created the opportunity for frequent
three-judge panel reviews of trial judge interlocutory decisions be-
cause the trial judges did not have authority to enter final judg-
ments. 521 As a result, mistakes made by the trial judges could be
quickly remedied. Counsel became accustomed to review by four
judges before getting a final decision. In addition, the Court of
Claims judges gained a fair amount of expertise in Indian claims
because of the frequency with which they dealt with them. Much of
this expertise, at least initially, was transferred to the Federal Circuit
when seven Court of Claims judges became Federal Circuit judges.
At present, however, no active judges remain from the Court of
Claims.5 22
Under this new system, the standard of review of factual questions
will necessarily be much more deferential to the court of first in-
stance. The Claims Court has now adopted Rule 52(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules applying a clearly erroneous standard to appeals. 525 The
old Court of Claims panels, on the other hand, could correct trial
judge's factual findings, applying only a standard requiring "due re-
gard" for the trial court's facts.524 This change could result in a
restriction on tribal claimants' abilities to obtain review of facts. 5 2 5
Indian claims are often extremely difficult factually because of their
scope and duration. A judge today, for example, has to decide how
many of the three million acres taken in the late 19th century should
be classified as farmland as of that date for purposes of determining
the amount that would have been paid for such prime acreage. Such
a determination is difficult at best for a judge experienced in han-
dling Indian claims. Fortunately, the Federal Circuit appears sensi-
tive to this concern. Recently, the court reversed a Claims Court
judge's determination regarding the amount of acreage to be classi-
520. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
521. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962) (holding that Court of Claims
and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are Article III courts, entitling their judges to
constitutional protection in tenure and compensation and, thus, vesting them with power to
sit in judgment in district courts and courts of appeals).
522. Several original Court of Claims judges retain senior status and have been sitting
frequently because the circuit court is operating with less than a full complement ofjudges.
523. CL. CT. R. 52(a). Rule 52(a) states that "[flindings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."
524. See Sward & Page, supra note 2, at 406 n.139 (discussing standard of former Court of
Claims for reviewing trial judge's decisions).
525. David V. Anthony, Remarks at The First Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (May 20, 1983), in 100 F.R.D. 499, 542-43
(1987) (discussing limited availability of appeals in Federal Circuit).
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fled as farmland under the clearly erroneous standard and finally set
the amount itself, thus raising the final award by $731,250.526
There are other sides of these arguments, of course. Frequent
interlocutory reviews by both sides was one of the systemic
problems most criticized in the Indian Claims Commission and
Court of Claims and was one of the reasons the cases lasted intermi-
nably. 527 In refusing an interlocutory appeal by a tribe in a case in
which the Claims Court had ruled in favor of the tribe in denying
the Government's motion to dismiss, the Federal Circuit served no-
tice that the days of easy appeals were over, even in cases trans-
ferred from the Court of Claims under the FCIA.5 28 In other words,
the court has treated transfer cases as appeals from the newly cre-
ated Claims Court, even if the appealed order had been made by a
Court of Claims trial judge.529 Despite the loss of the chance for
easy review of factual determinations, permitting fewer appeals
must surely be a net gain in terms of efficiency and savings for tribal
plaintiffs as well as for the Government.530
The Federal Circuit can mitigate concerns about inexperience by
taking its duty to exercise appellate jurisdiction seriously and polic-
ing errors of law and at least clearly erroneous errors of fact. To
date, there is no evidence that these differences have made any neg-
ative impact on the substantive law developed under the new sys-
tem. The Federal Circuit has made corrections when Claims Court
judges, inexperienced in Indian matters, have allowed their frustra-
tions with the process to get the better of their judgment.53'
526. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 765 F.2d 160 (unpub-
lished opinion), 12 Indian L. Rep. 2049, 2050 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
527. See Adams, supra note 2, at 63 (criticizing fact that litigants could stop case to get
review of any dispositive motion); Newton, Note, Trust Funds, supra note 187, at 538-39 (criti-
cizing cumberance and slow procedures in Indian Claims Commission).
528. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 403(a), 96 Stat. 25,
57-58 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2503 (1992)) (providing for transfer of pending claims).
529. See Aleut Tribe v. United States, 702 F.2d 1015, 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting
interlocutory appeals are more limited under FCIA).
530. See, e.g., Lurie, supra note 102, at 368-69 (noting that original tribal leaders responsi-
ble for bringing claims and many attorneys litigating claims had died during long pendency of
cases).
531. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 806 F.2d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(reviewing forced settlement by Claims Court judge), cert denied, 482 U.S. 913 (1987); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 776 F.2d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (unpublished opin-
ion), vacating and remanding 6 Cl. Ct. 575 (1984); Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
v. United States, 765 F.2d 160 (unpublished opinion), 12 Indian L. Rep. 2049, 2050 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (reversing factual determination as clearly erroneous).
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D. The Judges
.1. Bias
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Article Ill judges will have
much less influence over Indian claims, while the old system pro-
vided for frequent oversight by Article III judges. This concern is
only legitimate, of course, if there is reason to believe that Article III
judges are more impartial than Article I judges.53 2 The Indian
Claims Commission and the Court of Claims were perceived to be
pro-Government at worst, or behind the times or "strict construc-
tionist" at best.5 33 This perception has not changed in some classes
of cases, such as public employment cases, and it has not changed in
Indian claims either. The Claims Court judges' status and the enor-
mous influence the Department of Justice wields in their appoint-
ment and reappointment may explain this perception that the court
is biased toward the Government. To begin with, the Department
recommends persons to be appointed as Claims Court judges. 53 4
The requirement of a recommendation for reappointment is an es-
pecially sore point with the judges because they only have fifteen-
year contracts. 535 Thejudges inevitably must consider their options
after their term expires. As Chief Judge Smith candidly stated, "A
judge may be unduly dependent on the Justice Department which is
the appointment authority as well as the representative of the De-
fendant or looks to the Plaintiff Bar for employment; and that's just
a situation that shouldn't prevail. ' 536 Because Indian law claims
firms are small in number, one suspects that the Government would
appear to be a more likely employer for such a judge. Moreover, a
judge who seeks reappointment must win the approval of the De-
partment ofJustice. That such a judge might at least unconsciously
532. See Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAw & CoNrEMp. PROBS. 5, 60-61
(1991) (discussing tendency of Article IIIjudges to encourage settlements to avoid lawmaking
in complex cases).
533. See Lurie, supra note 102, at 364 (noting that first Indian Claims Commissioners,
though able and sincere men, "made simplistic, inadvertently biased interpretations owing to
their lack of awareness of the historical and cultural complexities underlying Indian griev-
ances" and that Commissioner Watkins, appointed later because of his experience in Indian
Affairs as advocate of program to terminate Indian tribes "had a lot of preconceptions, if no
more cultural and historical understanding."). Despite this perception, toward the end of its
existence the Court of Claims issued some very innovative decisions in the breach of trust
area. Admittedly these opinions were greatly influenced by a parallel development occurring
in the federal district courts. Nevertheless, they were potentially far-reaching. Arguably, the
more recent Claims Court opinions have been much more like the old Court of Claims.
534. See Miller, supra note 4, at 58-59 (noting that President has authority to solicit written
opinions from "Department heads" concerning qualifications ofjudicial appointees).
535. Loren A. Smith, Remarks at The Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (May 24, 1989), in 128 F.R.D. 409,460 (1989)
(discussing lack of tenure system).
536. Id. (stating that lack of tenure forces judges into marketplace at end of term).
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react to such pressure is not out of the question. The marginaliza-
tion of Indian claims within the Claims Court's workload, the small
number of attorneys working in Indian claims, and the remoteness
of the court from the reservations may make the tendency to favor
the Government almost irresistible. An Article III review court with
little expertise or experience in Indian claims may not adequately
correct this bias, especially given the specialist subject matter of the
Federal Circuit. Since the Federal Circuit's creation, conservative
presidents have been able to mold the court considerably. In short,
it is unlikely that the Federal Circuit brings any special sensitivity to
issues involving Indian claims.
2. Background
Despite the lack of tenure and its status as a stepchild, the Claims
Court has attracted able judges. Unfortunately, most of the judges
had no experience in Indian law before coming to the bench.537 In
light of the focus of the court's work, it is doubtful that an attorney
with special expertise in Indian claims law will ever be appointed.
Moreover, the Department of Justice, by virtue of being the Gov-
ernment's attorney, has a great deal of subtle control over the
judges. One criticism of specialized courts is that it is easier to pre-
dict how judges will rule on specific issues than it is to make more
general predictions about their behavior. This factor may impact on
Indian claims in a more subtle manner than most might think.
Given the small number of cases involving Indian claims that come
before the court each year, it is unlikely that the Department ofJus-
tice would use any kind of litmus test regarding Indian issues. It is
more likely that it would try to ascertain ajudge's stance on particu-
lar issues that are a much greater part of the court's jurisdiction.
Appointees to the Claims Court, for example, have included judges
with backgrounds in government contracts and public employment
law, subject matters that are frequently litigated.538 Other appoin-
tees tend to be attorneys from the Department of Justice 53 9 or men
537. Judge Marian Blank Horn, appointed by President Reagan in 1986, served in various
Department of Interior positions before being appointed to the bench. She did not serve in
the Office of the Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs, however, where most of the work on
Indian issues takes place. She was Acting Solicitor for the entire department immediately
before joining the court, however, so she should have had some familiarity with Indian issues.
538. E.g., Judges Eric Bruggink (Merit Systems Protection Board); John Wiese (govern-
ment contracts); and Robert Yock (government contracts).
539. E.g., Judges Roger B. Andewelt (antitrust division) and Bohdan Futey (Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission at Department).
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and women who have labored in the political vineyards of the in-
cumbent Republican administrations.5 40
The Federal Circuit judges have similar professional back-
grounds.5 41 Only two of the Federal Circuit judges and three of the
sixteen Claims Court judges are women, and there is only one Afri-
can-American judge on either court, Judge Reginald B. Gibson on
the Claims Court. This pattern of racial and gender underinclusion
on the claims courts, however, is on a par with the pattern of Presi-
dent Bush's appointees to the federal courts, 85% of whom are
white males.5 42  Assuming that members of traditionally
subordinated groups might be more sensitive to cases involving sim-
ilar groups, an Indian tribe might conclude that insofar as race and
gender may make a particular forum more hospitable, these factors
play no role in choosing between the district court and the Claims
Court in a case presenting that choice.
Nevertheless, more subtle factors affect both the quality ofjudges
and the quality of the judging, as noted in the introduction to this
Article. Recall that the Court of Claims jurisdiction, including In-
dian claims, was made part of the new court system to counter the
arguments that the Federal Circuit would be overly specialized.
Chief Judge Loren Smith has protested frequently that the Claims
Court is not a specialized court because of the diversity of its subject
matters. Others have also labeled the Federal Circuit as generalist.
As Ellen Sward and Rodney Page have stated, however, "[T]he Fed-
eral Circuit is 'generalist' only if one means by 'generalist' that it
specializes in several areas. 543 This point is very important in the
context of Indian claims because Indian law is regarded as an ob-
scure branch of the law containing special technical rules setting it
apart from all other areas of law. This substantive law marginaliza-
tion combined with the obscurity of the courts removes Indian
540. E.g., Judges Robert Hodges (staff of Sen. Strom Thurmond); Moody Tidwell (De-
partment of Interior underJames Watt); Diane Weinstein (counsel to Vice President Quayle).
ChiefJudge Loren Smith had worked on the Reagan campaign and has been referred to as a
"former administration utility player." Terry Carter, After Bork, A Rri Widens, NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL, Mar. 28, 1988, at 44. ChiefJudge Smith is highly regarded as being both exception-
ally able and open-minded by bench and bar alike.
541. The newer judges' expertise reflects the Federal Circuit's workload. E.g., Glenn
Archer (Department ofJustice Tax Division); Alan D. Lourie (private patent law experience);
Pauline Newman (same). Appointments with political backgrounds include Judge Paul R.
Michel (Department of Justice Public Integrity Section, then prosecutor on staff of Arlen
Specter in Philadelphia); S. Jay Plager (Office of Management and Budget).
542. Terence Moran, Bush Judge Appointments: White, Male and Cautious, THE CoN-
NECrICuT LAw TRIBUNE, Feb. 4, 1991, at 2 ("The archtypal Bush judicial nominee is a white
man in his mid-40s, active in Republican politics, removed from academic debate, with a net
worth of upwards of $1 million and some experience in government.").
543. Sward & Page, supra note 2, at 397.
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claims even further from the critical scrutiny of the academic and
progressive legal communities and from the glare of public opinion
as well. Moreover, although the federal judiciary is increasingly
conservative, the cross-fertilization of ideas that inevitably occurs in
a court of general jurisdiction creates an atmosphere more condu-
cive to bringing Indian law into the mainstream. It is no accident
that the early cases holding the United States accountable for breach
of trust were decided by federal district courtjudges. Although not
familiar with Indian law, or even particularly over-sensitized to In-
dian issues, these judges were familiar with the basic principles of
fiduciary law and did not hesitate to apply them to the
Government.5 44
E. The Attorneys
1. The Department ofJustice
Both the old and new claims courts are courts of nationwide juris-
diction, located in Washington, D.C., and obviously remote from
most Indian communities. Although the Claims Court has experi-
mented with holding trials outside of Washington and also using
teleconferencing, most Indian claims are still litigated in Washing-
ton, D.C. 5 45
The location of the courts is good for the Government, which is
always the defendant in Indian claims cases. The security of a regu-
lar paycheck, not driven by the numbers and kinds of cases brought,
frees Government attorneys to spend their time not on generating
clients, but on working the Government's program. Moreover, the
Department ofJustice is in charge of the program and does not have
to worry about rogue attorneys mucking up the process by filing or
appealing the wrong kinds of cases. A central authority can call the
shots, make a decision not to challenge a "bad" decision, or en-
courage the court to publish a particular opinion favorable to the
Government. In the case of Indian claims, the Department of Jus-
tice argues consistently for the strictest possible interpretations of
Tucker Act jurisdiction.
544. See Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243
(N.D. Cal. 1973) (discussing Government's trust obligations to Indians); Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.D.C. 1973) (contending that regulation is arbitrary
and capricious).
545. Somejudges, however, do not like telephone conferencing, and even one who does,
Judge Kenneth Harkins, has stated that, ifhe were the attorney in a case, he would prefer "the
eye-to-eye contact." Claims Court Reports Drop in Tax Cases, Increase in New Contract Cases, Daily
Report for Executives (BNA), Oct. 31, 1983, at G-1.
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2. The tribal advocate
As noted, tribes have traditionally relied on a rather small group
of Indian claims attorneys. The Indian Tucker Act provides for con-
tingency fees for these attorneys. Obviously the purpose of this
provision, which was also present in the Indian Claims Commission
Act, was a progressive one: to enable tribes to retain good
attorneys.
In recent years it has become fashionable to criticize all the claims
lawyers as Washington hacks more interested in earning their ten
percent contingency fee rather than helping Indian people.5 45 In a
powerful dissenting opinion issued when he sat on the Court of
Claims, Judge Philip Nichols forthrightly discussed the potential for
conflicts of interest inherent in the contingent fee system for Indian
claims, noting that "the attorney's interest, but not the tribe's is to
effect a judicial sale, as it were, of tribal land at values of some his-
toric past date, not of the present, to be set by the Commission,
whether or not the Indians may in reality ever have had their title
extinguished except by the ICC proceeding itself. ' 547 Unfortu-
nately, those participating in this debate tend toward extremes.
Although an attorney may work for years on a big claim and receive
only expenses, ten percent of a multimillion dollar judgment can be
a powerful incentive if the attorney thinks the case is a good one.5 48
The truth, I believe, is that some lawyers served their Indian clients
poorly, but many served them well while working within the con-
546. Vine Deloria has been the leading exponent of this point of view. See generally DELO-
RIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL, supra note 24, at 226 ("The high moral purpose of settling the Indian
claims boiled down in the end to a lucrative bonanza for a select group of attorneys possess-
ing the special skills to practice Indian law .... ).
547. See Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. United States, 647 F.2d 1087, 1090 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(Nichols, J., dissenting) (claiming that Indian Claims Commission Act generates conflict of
interest and predicting that these conflicts will grow larger in future).
548. See generally Klamath & Modox Tribes v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 378 (1983) (awarding
$1,485,000 pursuant to contract with tribe, representing 9% of final judgment after 30 years'
litigation); American Indians Residing on the Maricopa-Ak Chin Reservation v. United States,
1 Cl. Ct. 599 (1982) (awarding $14,173, representing 10%6 of final judgment and 2266.5
hours of work for tribal client). After reading the book by his son, one could conclude that
Arthur Lazarus, the attorney for the Sioux Nation, was nearly perfect, while the Sioux Na-
tion's original attorney, hired in 1911 by elders of the tribe was completely incompetent.
LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 228-31 (describing motion to reopen claim on grounds that attor-
ney had been incompetent). Ralph Case, the original attorney, became an alcoholic and made
some terrible mistakes later in the claim. But surely he was not the only claims attorney ever
to lapse. Moreover, some of his earlier mistakes, as described by Mr. Lazarus, seem predi-
cated on a not-completely irrational belief that having created the Indian Claims Commission,
the Government would not fight the tribe at every step in court and also that the tribe would
be entitled to full compensation for the lost land, including the value of the minerals. Id. at
148. Case believed that the tribe was entitled to the value of gold taken. Id. He based the
ICC case on the fair and honorable dealings clause as the broadest basis for recovery, while
dropping his claim for a Fifth Amendment taking. Id. at 191.
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fines of the claims structure. In other words, it is the structure and
not the attorneys working within it that has for the most part caused
the problems. This structure has contributed to the marginalization
of Indian claims. This marginalization serves the Government but
not the Indian tribes. Moreover, it keeps rules, like that of Tee-Hit-
Ton, hidden from the majority of people as an obscure rule of Indian
property law that surely has no relevance in the modem world.
Until 1965, an Indian lawyer was either a claims lawyer or a Gov-
ernment lawyer because tribes were not able to sue on their own
behalf in federal court. Just as judges can be captured by the pro-
gram, so can attorneys. Nowhere is this problem more serious than
in the remedial issues regarding land versus money. Given a choice
between devising a remedy that might permit a tribe to keep its
land, but which would have to be pursued locally and without the
assurance of a contingent fee, an attorney could conclude in good
faith that the tribe has no choice but to admit its land was taken and
try to get the best judgment possible. Faced with a trial that may
take decades, an attorney might be tempted to stipulate to a date of
taking and an amount taken to avoid the trial, especially if the result-
ingjudgment would be in the millions of dollars. An attorney thinks
first of the familiar remedy, the one that will work; it is only human
nature.
CONCLUSION
The single greatest influence on the development of modem In-
dian law was the opening of the federal courts to Indian tribes in
1965. At the same time, the Office of Economic Opportunity began
to fund legal services programs on reservations and a summer pro-
gram to help Indian students prepare for law school at the American
Indian Law Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico. A new generation
of attorneys began to bring two important and very new perspec-
tives to the practice of Indian law: the Indian perspective and the
generalist perspective. The federal district courts provided forums
willing to listen to new doctrines in Indian law, in part because this
explosion came at the heyday ofjudicial activism and in part because
they were staffed by generalist judges ignorant of the intricacies of
the formal rules developed in claims law jurisprudence.
Some of these cases, in turn, had a salutary impact on Indian
claims in the claims courts. This impact, however, has not been far-
reaching enough to result in significant changes for aggrieved
tribes. Widening the array of courts to which Indians can bring
their claims has simply not erased the rules that, by twists and turns,
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seem so often to result in no recovery for Indian tribes. Having ac-
cess to a federal court of general jurisdiction and the claims court,
for example, was not sufficient to redress the grievances of the Nav-
ajo Tribe and tribal people arising from the uranium mining of Nav-
ajo land, described above.549 Lawsuits brought against the company
by injured miners in Navajo tribal court were held to be beyond tri-
bal jurisdiction.550 The miners sued the company in federal court,
but were remitted to Arizona's workers' compensation scheme. 55'
The miners next brought a Federal Tort Claims action against the
U.S. Government. The Public Health Service had conducted a study
which revealed high levels of exposure to radiation among Navajo
miners. The miners sought recovery for negligence in failing to
warn them about the dangers of radiation. Reluctantly dismissing
the suit, the lower court felt it necessary to distinguish the human
experimentation carried out in concentration camps in World War
II, stating, "The PHS physicians were not studying human beings.
They were gathering data .... -1552 The court noted that, while
"[lthis tragedy of the nuclear age ... cries out for redress," 553 the
discretionary function exception to the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity in the Federal Tort Claims Act 554 barred the suit. Finally, the
tribe sued the Federal Government in the Claims Court, arguing
that the failure to seal abandoned mines and to contain the uranium
tailings was a breach of trust and constituted a continuing wrong
within the jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission Act. The
549. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (discussing problems arising from leasing
tribal lands and negative effects of uranium mining on those lands).
550. UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358, 363 (D.N.M. 1981) (sustaining
injunction against tribal court jurisdiction, holding tribal jurisdiction does not extend beyond
boundaries of reservation); UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1047, 1051 (D. Ariz.
1981) (holding that tribe is without power to exercise jurisdiction because UNC conduct oc-
curred off reservation).
551. Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982). Federal law and
policy dealing with Indian affairs usually preempts application of state law on Indian reserva-
tions. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (stating that exercising state jurisdiction
would infringe on Indians' right of self-governance, thus motion to dismiss state jurisdiction
was granted). The Ninth Circuit, however, held that a federal statute permitted the applica-
tion of state workers compensation laws on Indian reservations. Begay, 682 F. 2d at 1319
(citing 40 U.S.C. § 290).
552. See Begay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 1012-13 (D. Ariz. 1984) (sustaining
dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction since alleged acts of government officials
were shielded from tort liability by discretionary function exception to Federal Tort Claims
Act), aft'd, 768 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1985).
553. Id at 1013. The court stated that decisions such as the failure to warn in conducting
a public health study reflect the kinds of social, economic, and political decisions that come
within the exception. Id. Federal regulations also authorized the Surgeon General to with-
hold information upon a determination that doing so would further the public interest. Id. at
1011 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 1.103(c)(2)).
554. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
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Claims Court rejected the attempt as untimely.55 5 Although it had
no jurisdiction, the court went on to note its conclusion that even if
there were jurisdiction, the plaintiff had not proved any injuries re-
sulting from the tailings or depreciation of its land values.
After the courts failed completely to give any remedy for this
wrong, Congress enacted a law to set up a mechanism to dispose of
all tailings in the Western states. 556 Finally, in 1990, Congress en-
acted the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act,5 57 which provides
a $100 million pool for miners and those downwind exposed to ra-
diation. Although this legislative action is promising, it is notable
that more non-Indians were affected by uranium mining practices in
the West than Indians. The convergence of interests had more to
do with the legislative remedy than the specific wrongs to the Navajo
people. Nevertheless, Congress has been sympathetic to Indian
tribes' attempts to regain land and protect resources, even after un-
successful litigation.558
That substantive Indian law has not served Indian tribes well is
hardly an earth-shaking conclusion. That much of this law has been
created in the claims courts may be one reason that the rules are
tolerated. Recently, scholars whose primary work is outside the
field of Indian law have become interested in the field, in part be-
555. See Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 227, 269 (1985) (noting that
uranium had not been processed before 1954). The court also noted there was no evidence
that the Government had been motivated by self-dealing, or had sufficient knowledge of the
dangers of radiation to impose a fiduciary duty on the Government. Id. at 270 n.42.
556. See generally Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
604, 95 Stat. 3021 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942) (providing for cleaning
up radiation sites in Western states by 1994).
557. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-426, 104 Stat. 920 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note). Mary Helmberger-Jones, a third-year student at The
American University, Washington College of Law, has written an excellent seminar paper giv-
ing the full background of the Navajo struggle to gain remedies through the courts and Con-
gress. Mary S. Helmberger-Jones, "Lo Doo Naa Zhihii": The Sore that Never Heals (Jan. 1992)
(unpublished paper on file with The American University Law Review).
558. In a congressional reference case, for example, the Claims Court held that the Ala-
bama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas had not established that they held exclusive title to land in
Texas, and even if they had, the lands were taken by Mexico, the Republic of Texas, and other
third parties, with no evidence that the Government had been responsible. Battise v. United
States, 12 Cl. Ct. 427, 434 (1987) (Congressional Reference No. 3-83). Subsequently, Con-
gress authorized the restoration of the Alabama Coushatta Tribe as a tribe with a govern-
ment-to-government relationship with the United States and also authorized a payment of
$1.3 million. Act of Aug. 22, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-411, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 Stat.
1097; see also Main Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (establish-
ing settlement fund of $27 million; land acquisition fund of $54.5 million); John F. Martin,
From Judgment to Land Restoration: The Havasupai Land Claims Case, in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA:
THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 271, 271 (Imre Sutton ed. 1985) (noting return of
185,000 acres to reservation and grant of exclusive use for traditional purposes of 95,300
acres of National Forest).
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cause of their reactions as scholars to Supreme Court cases that
have been fairly widely publicized.5 59
My hope is that readers of this Article will understand that the
voluminous records of the Indian Claims Commission, the Court of
Claims, and the claims courts raise questions of deep importance to
those who care about the rule of law. The cases discussed in this
Article raise questions about the impact of court structures on the
development of the law; the role of excess formalism and the impact
of neutral rules in the law relating to minority groups; the reasons
why rules of formal inequality are tolerated when they burden In-
dian tribes, but not other groups; the resistance to protecting sepa-
rate communities under American law; the importance of history in
dispelling myths about present power allocations; the use and mis-
use of historical and anthropological data in the litigation process;
the role of the lawyering process including the difference between
styles of lawyers that can be studied in the same case over a forty-
year period during which counsel may change several times; and the
appropriate role for white lawyers representing outsider groups. 560
In particular, the cases represent stories not just of individual per-
sons but of peoples who continue to struggle to maintain their right
to exist separately in a world still waiting for them to assimilate.
The claims from which these stories spring represent ancient griev-
ances as well as recent wrongs. By listening to these stories care-
fully and relating them to those in power, it may be possible to
begin to work through to real resolutions of Indian grievances, reso-
lutions that involve some land and recognition of real power.
559. See generally Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 Am. B. FOUND, Ras.J.
1 (criticizing complacency of much of then-existing Indian scholarship); Perry Dane, The Maps
of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959 (1991) (discussing mutual recognition of
legal communities' authority, legitimacy, and juridical dignity);Judith Resnik, Dependent Sover-
eigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 671 (1989) (examining
forces that created tribal rule that discriminates based on gender); Joseph William Singer,
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) (criticizing transformation of sovereignty
into property issues and vice versa to disadvantage Indian interests).
560. Literature regarding the lawyering process, for example, has enriched my under-
standing of the complexities of the attorney-client relationship. See generally Derrick A. Bell,
Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85
YALE LJ. 470 (1976) (criticizing civil rights lawyers for failing to respond to shifts in parental
priorities in school desegregation cases); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling:
Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 501 (1990) (discussing pros and cons of client-
centered counseling and opting for latter model which results in richer counseling between
lawyer and client); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lauyering and
Power, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 699 (recounting history of Black South African village, Driefontein,
and lawyer models, which seek to empower villagers); see also Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) (reflecting
on impact of "an inner circle of about a dozen white, male writers" regarding development of
civil rights law).
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